# People v. Medina

> California Supreme Court · November 19, 1990 · 51 Cal. 3d 870

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9791942

## Case

- **Full name:** The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. TEOFILO MEDINA, JR., Defendant and Appellant
- **Court:** California Supreme Court
- **Decided:** November 19, 1990
- **Citations:** 51 Cal. 3d 870; 274 Cal. Rptr. 849; 799 P.2d 1282; 90 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 8358; 1990 Cal. LEXIS 5054
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Mosk
- **Judges:** Lucas, Mosk, Broussard
- **Cited by:** 198 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9791942

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that “[n]one of the police agent cases cited by defendant indicates that it would have been improper for the officers to grant an inmate’s relatives special visitation privileges in the unspoken hope that they might elicit statements from defendant and inform the offic…
- holding that there was no error where a competent defendant first withdrew an insanity plea, then reinstated this plea against the advice of counsel; the court held that a presently sane defendant has control over this decision

## Opinion text

MOSK, J.
I dissent.
Defendant contends that the judgment must be reversed: the jury’s determination that he was mentally competent cannot stand without offense to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The majority reject the claim. After review, I am of the opinion that their analysis is erroneous and their conclusion unsound.
Prior to trial, on defense counsel’s motion the court declared a doubt about defendant’s mental competence and instituted proceedings on the question under the authority of the statutory scheme codified in Penal Code section 1367 and following. One of the provisions of that scheme is Penal Code section 1369, subdivision (f) (hereafter section 1369(f)), which allocates the burden of proof to the defendant: “It shall be presumed that the defendant is mentally competent unless it is proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is mentally incompetent.” The parties introduced substantial, but sharply conflicting, evidence on the issue. The jury was instructed in accordance with section 1369(f). It subsequently returned a verdict finding defendant mentally competent.
The statutory scheme on mental competence is fundamentally flawed in its allocation of the burden of proof to the defendant, and therefore cannot support the verdict returned under its “authority.”
The due process clause prohibits the conviction of a person for a crime if he does not satisfy all the elements of the offense. (See, e.g., Mullaney v. Wilbur (1975) 421 U.S. 684, 691-704 [ 44 L.Ed.2d 508, 514-523 , 95 S.Ct. 1881 ].) Further, it bars conviction except on proof beyond a reasonable doubt by the prosecution of each of the elements. (E.g., In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 364 [ 25 L.Ed.2d 368, 375 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 ].)
Similarly, the due process clause prohibits the conviction of a person for a crime if he is not mentally competent. (See, e.g., Pate v. Robinson (1966) *914 383 U.S. 375, 378 [ 15 L.Ed.2d 815, 818 , 86 S.Ct. 836 ].) By parity of reasoning, it bars conviction except on proof beyond a reasonable doubt by the prosecution that the defendant is in fact mentally competent.
To be sure, the due process clause does not require the prosecution to prove the defendant sane beyond a reasonable doubt. (Mullaney v. Wilbur, supra, 421 U.S. at pp. 705-706 [44 L.Ed.2d at pp. 523-524] (conc. opn. of Rehnquist, J.) [discussing In re Winship, supra, 397 U.S. 358 , and Leland v. Oregon (1952) 343 U.S. 790 ( 96 L.Ed. 1302 , 72 S.Ct. 1002 )].) But an insanity defense is apparently not constitutionally mandated. (Ake v. Oklahoma (1985) 470 U.S. 68, 91 [ 84 L.Ed.2d 53, 71 , 105 S.Ct. 1087 ] (dis. opn. of Rehnquist, J.) [stating that “[i]t is highly doubtful that due process requires a State to make available an insanity defense to a criminal defendant”].) Further, it is an affirmative defense and as such comes into play only after the prosecution has proved the existence of all the elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. (See Mullaney v. Wilbur, supra, 421 U.S. at pp. 705-706 [44 L.Ed.2d at pp. 523-524] (conc. opn. of Rehnquist, J.).)
The foregoing analysis, however, does not affect the conclusion that the due process clause does indeed require the prosecution to prove the defendant mentally competent beyond a reasonable doubt. Mental competence is in fact constitutionally mandated. Further, mental incompetence is not an affirmative defense that becomes operative only after proof of the crime at trial. “It has long been accepted that a person whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to trial.” (Drope v. Missouri (1975) 420 U.S. 162, 171 [ 43 L.Ed.2d 103, 112-113 , 95 S.Ct. 896 ].)
Therefore, the statutory scheme for proceedings on mental competence is fundamentally flawed in its allocation of the burden of proof to the defendant, and as a result cannot support the verdict returned under its “authority” in this case. 1
Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment in its entirety.
For purposes here, I need not and do not consider the separate question of the constitutionally proper allocation of the burden of producing evidence. (See generally 2 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, std. 7-4.8 (2d ed. 1986) p. 7.208; id., Commentary, at pp. 7.213 to 7.215.)

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9791942. Public record. Not legal advice.