# Blatty v. New York Times Co. > California Supreme Court · December 29, 1986 · 42 Cal. 3d 1033 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9790534 ## Case - **Full name:** WILLIAM PETER BLATTY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. NEW YORK TIMES COMPANY, Defendant and Respondent - **Court:** California Supreme Court - **Decided:** December 29, 1986 - **Citations:** 42 Cal. 3d 1033; 232 Cal. Rptr. 542; 728 P.2d 1177; 13 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1928; 1986 Cal. LEXIS 300 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Grodin - **Judges:** Mosk, Grodin - **Cited by:** 175 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9790534 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - recognizing in context of intentional interference with economic advantage claim “[a]lthough the limitations that define the First Amendment’s zone of protection for the press were established in defamation actions, they are not peculiar to such actions but apply to all claims… - stating that "this case involves, not defamation of character, but defamation of a product of a business and the correct standard to be applies is that of actual malice.” - holding that plaintiffs cannot avoid First Amendment limitations by "creative pleading[s]" that "affix a label other than 'defamation' to injurious falsehood claims" - stating that an alleged defamatory statement must be “of and concerning” the plaintiff in order to be actionable ## Opinion text GRODIN, J., Concurring and Dissenting. I cannot join in the majority’s conclusion that the “of and concerning” requirement applicable to defamation actions is a constitutionally required element of a cause of action for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, whenever the alleged intentional tort is effectuated through a media publication. A hypothetical example may be helpful in exposing the fallacy of the majority’s broad holding. Suppose that the New York Times, after conducting its normal survey of representative bookstores throughout the country, found that Blatty’s novel was, indeed, the top selling book for a particular week based on its own statistics. Suppose further that, despite this information, the Times purposefully substituted one of its own publications for Blatty’s book at the top of its best seller list in order to enhance its own book’s sales, and entirely omitted Blatty’s book from the list. Under the majority’s analysis, Blatty would have no cause of action against the New York Times for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage under these hypothetical facts, because nothing in the false best seller list would have indicated to the reading public that the falsity in the published information was “of and concerning” Blatty’s book. It seems clear from this hypothetical, however, that the “of and concerning” require *1050 ment is ill-suited to this type of intentional tort, since the plaintiff is required in any event to prove, as an element of the tort, that the defendant acted for the specific purpose of injuring the particular plaintiff. If a plaintiff can prove that a media defendant knowingly published a false statement for the purpose of inflicting financial injury on him personally, I do not believe that the free speech provisions of either the state or federal Constitution would be offended if the defendant were held liable in damages for such conduct, even if it were not obvious on the face of the publication who the defendant was intending to injure. Thus, I do not join in the majority’s broad holding. Nonetheless, on the specific facts of this case, I concur in the judgment. Although plaintiff has attempted to state a cause of action for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, the facts that he has alleged—even after being granted leave to amend—are not, in my view, sufficient to support such an action. Plaintiff’s allegations do not suggest that the Times intentionally misrepresented the actual results of its bookstore survey for the purpose of injuring plaintiff financially; at most, the allegations suggest that the Times did not do as thorough a job in gathering sales statistics as it should have and that, after Blatty’s publisher complained to the Times, the Times should have realized that its survey figures would harm plaintiff financially. Even assuming those allegations are true, they would not support recovery on an intentional-interference theory. Accordingly, I agree with the majority that the trial court properly sustained defendant’s demurrer to all causes of action, and I concur in the reversal of the judgment of the Court of Appeal to the extent that its judgment is inconsistent with this conclusion. Broussard, J., and Lucas, J., concurred. Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied February 26, 1987. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9790534. Public record. Not legal advice.