# Adamson v. Bonesteele

> Oregon Supreme Court · November 1, 1983 · 295 Or. 815

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9790108

## Case

- **Full name:** ADAMSON, Respondent on Review, v. BONESTEELE, Petitioner on Review
- **Court:** Oregon Supreme Court
- **Decided:** November 1, 1983
- **Citations:** 295 Or. 815; 671 P.2d 693; 41 A.L.R. 4th 1103; 1983 Ore. LEXIS 1632
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Linde
- **Judges:** Lent, Linde, Peterson, Campbell, Roberts
- **Cited by:** 5 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9790108

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that societal “concern for preservation of the interest in reputation and fair name is reflected in the common law’s long standing recognition of a right to recover damages from that person who invades that interest”

## Opinion text

LINDE, J.,
concurring.
Although I concur in the Court’s opinion, I add a couple of caveats. First, it should be noted that the discussion of Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass 1 (1808), is presented as a possible explanation for a comment in the Restatement of Torts. That decision is not necessarily a correct indication of the legislative privilege in Oregon under circumstances like those in Coffin.
*830 Second, it is not obvious that the common law legislative privilege can be limited in the traditional way in a state in which the public may legislate for itself. Originally the privilege was designed for freedom of debate in an elected legislative body, specifically the highest legislative assembly in the jurisdiction. In Oregon, however, the “legislative power of the state ... is vested in [the] Legislative Assembly” only with the exception of “the initiative and referendum powers reserved to the people.” Or Const art IV, § 1(1). See also §§ l(2)(a) and (3)(a). Moreover, these powers “are further reserved to the qualified voters of each municipality and district as to all local, special and municipal legislation of every character in or for their municipality or district.” Or Const art IV, § 1(5).
If the object of the common-law privilege is to protect uninhibited legislative discussion and debate, it might therefore be argued that when a statement relates to an item of public business that may be the subject of an initiative or referendum, even a measure not yet initiated or referred, a citizen is absolutely privileged in bringing information or opinion bearing on that subject to the attention of his fellow citizen-legislators, through the press and other media of mass communication or otherwise. But every kind of public business is not potentially a subject for legislation by the people; it must be legislative in character. In this case, the question whether the subject on which defendant was quoted was “legislation” susceptible to initiative or referendum under article IV, section 1(5), has not been argued or considered below, and the Court decides nothing about this possible issue.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9790108. Public record. Not legal advice.