# Tax/Investments Concepts, Inc. v. McLaughlin

> Supreme Court of Oklahoma · November 16, 1982 · 670 P.2d 981

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9789959

## Case

- **Full name:** TAX/INVESTMENTS CONCEPTS, INC., an Oklahoma Corporation, Appellee, v. Thomas McLAUGHLIN and Amanda McLaughlin, Individuals, Appellants, v. FIDELITY AND DEPOSIT COMPANY OF MARYLAND, Appellee
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Oklahoma
- **Decided:** November 16, 1982
- **Citations:** 670 P.2d 981; 1982 OK 134; 1982 Okla. LEXIS 344
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Simms
- **Judges:** Lavender, Irwin, Barnes, Hodges, Hargrave, Simms, Doolin, Opala, Wilson
- **Cited by:** 14 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## Opinion text

SIMMS, Justice,
dissenting:
I must respectfully dissent to the majority’s determination that the loans in question were made for commercial purposes. I believe the evidence clearly shows that the loans were “primarily for a personal, family, [and] household purpose” as required by 14A O.S.1971, § 3-104(2).
*986 The loan proceeds were used by the McLaughlins for their intended and stated purposes: paying off existing consumer loans; paying the moving expenses of the family and paying for the family’s living expenses.
In my opinion the majority places far too much emphasis on the circumstances surrounding the need for loans to the exclusion of examining the purpose of the loans. The fact that the McLaughlins’ necessity for the loans arose from previous financial difficulty and an attempt to start a new life does not transform the purpose of the loan from being primarily for their personal, family and household expenses.
Mr. McLaughlin was attempting to start a new career at the time the loans were made, however the loans were not for a professional or commercial purpose such as purchasing professional instruments, equipment or inventory or furnishing his office. Compare: Farmers State Bank of Oakley v. Cooper, 227 Kan. 547 , 608 P.2d 929 (1980); Hall v. Owen Cty. State Bank, Ind.App., 370 N.E.2d 918 (1977). As to commercial purposes, see also, Barnes v. Helfenbein, Okl., 548 P.2d 1014 (1976), and Nat. Interstate Life Ins. Co. v. Thomas, Okl., 630 P.2d 779, 782 (1981).
The loan in question was for $8500. The amount of the employment agency debt was $500. Assuming for argument that this portion of the indebtedness was for a clearly commercial purpose, the loan was nonetheless for consumer purposes. The UCCC does not require that the entire loan be for personal, family or household expenses only that it be primarily for those purposes. 1
If we decide whether a loan is a “consumer” loan within the UCCC by limited inquiry into only the surrounding financial circumstances of the debtor, rather than looking at the purpose of the loan, we will exclude from coverage many of those loans which the Act was intended to cover.
It seems to me common knowledge that consumer loans are needed more frequently by people whose business/commercial ventures have failed than by those whose ventures are successful.
This judgment should be reversed and the loan declared void pursuant to the direction of 14A O.S.1971, §§ 5-202(2), 3-502.
I am authorized to state that Justice Doo-lin, Justice Opala, and Justice Wilson join with me in this dissent.
. The following cases discuss this issue in regard to the identical definition of “consumer credit” in the federal Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 ; Gallegos v. Stokes, 593 F.2d 372 (10th Cir.1979), 54 A.L.R.Fed. 485; Tower v. Moss, 625 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir.1980); Smith v. Chapman, 436 F.Supp. 58 (WD Tex.1977); Toy Natl. Bank v. McGarr, Iowa, 286 N.W.2d 376 (1979).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9789959. Public record. Not legal advice.