# Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc.

> California Supreme Court · August 3, 2006 · 46 Cal. Rptr. 3d 668

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9789133

## Case

- **Full name:** BROOK DORE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ARNOLD WORLDWIDE, INC., Et Al., Defendants and Respondents
- **Court:** California Supreme Court
- **Decided:** August 3, 2006
- **Citations:** 46 Cal. Rptr. 3d 668; 39 Cal. 4th 384; 2006 Daily Journal DAR 10153; 139 P.3d 56; 24 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1688; 2006 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7078; 2006 Cal. LEXIS 9288
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Moreno
- **Judges:** Moreno, Werdegar, Baxter
- **Cited by:** 139 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9789133

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- concluding that no triable issues of fact existed because the letter at issue “contained no ambiguity, patent or latent, in its termination provisions” (emphasis added)

## Opinion text

MORENO, J., Concurring.
I concur in the majority opinion, but write separately to emphasize one point.
The majority devotes substantial attention to employment agreements that authorize termination “upon notice,” or after a specified notice period. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 388-391, discussing Bionghi v. Metropolitan Water Dist. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1358 [ 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 388 ] and Wallis v. Farmers Group, Inc. (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 718 [ 269 Cal.Rptr. 299 ].) But the written agreement before us did not use the words “upon notice,” or any equivalent phrasing. Instead, the agreement allowed for termination “at any time.” Our analysis is properly directed at this “at any time” language. The majority has no occasion to express, and does not express, any view as to whether providing for termination “upon notice” also connotes a mutual intention to create an at-will employment arrangement. (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 390-391.)
*397 In my view, a provision that allows for termination “upon notice” does not, by itself, shed light on whether the parties intended an at-will employment contract, or a relationship terminable only for cause. I concur in the majority opinion with the understanding that it takes no position on this issue.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9789133. Public record. Not legal advice.