# Ringle v. Bruton > Nevada Supreme Court · April 1, 2004 · 120 Nev. 82 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9789072 ## Case - **Full name:** EDWARD RINGLE, an Individual, and STAGECOACH CASINO AND HOTEL, a Sole Proprietorship, Appellants, v. ALPHEUS C. BRUTON, II, Respondent - **Court:** Nevada Supreme Court - **Decided:** April 1, 2004 - **Citations:** 120 Nev. 82; 120 Nev. Adv. Rep. 14; 86 P.3d 1032; 21 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 204; 2004 Nev. LEXIS 14 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Rose - **Judges:** Agosti, Rose, Shearing, Becker, Gibbons, Maupin - **Cited by:** 74 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9789072 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - stating that courts must enforce a clear and unambiguous contract as written and "may not admit any other evidence of the parties' intent because the contract expresses their intent" - stating that parol evidence is admissible to clarify an ambiguous term as long as it does not contradict the terms of the written agreement - holding that parol evidence may be considered to resolve ambiguity and determine the parties’ intent - explaining that the plain language of an unambiguous contract controls ## Opinion text Rose, J., with whom Maupin, J., agrees, concurring: I concur in the result, but object to what I perceive is the resurrection of the standard stated in DeJesus v. Flick 1 for assessing *97 when unobjected-to, improper attorney argument will require a reversal of a case. Four justices have indicated their disapproval of the DeJesus standard and expressed their agreement with the less stringent standard as set forth in the DeJesus dissent. 2 It appeared that the DeJesus standard was rejected, only to see that the majority opinion now cites DeJesus with approval and states that the DeJesus verdict was not supported by any version of the evidence. As was explained in the DeJesus opinion, medical experts testified that Flick sustained permanent brain and nerve damage, and her continual headaches, dizzy episodes, blackouts, memory loss, neck pain, and curling of her hands in a claw-like manner were permanent. 3 The jury believed these witnesses, and Flick’s injuries certainly supported the future pain and suffering award of $1,000,000.00 and the loss of income award of $300,000.00. The majority opinion acknowledges that the award for pain and suffering was supported by the record. The majority opinion does claim that the evidence in DeJesus did not support the $100,000.00 awarded as future medical expenses, but only $21,000.00, as indicated by Flick’s experts. 4 This is correct, but the appropriate action in DeJesus would have been to strike the $79,000.00 from the special damages award and let the rest of the verdict stand — not strike the entire verdict that was overwhelmingly supported by competent evidence. Finally, the majority claims that the DeJesus verdict could only be explained by the inflammatory language used by Flick’s attorney. This simply is not true. The evidence on damages was more than sufficient to support the verdict, with the exception of the excess damages awarded for future medical expenses. As explained in the DeJesus dissent, Flick was injured when DeJesus, in a rage, cut off the vehicle Flick was riding in and sent it crashing into the highway median. 5 DeJesus then jumped onto the front hood of the car and pounded on the windshield, demanding that the two women come out. 6 In addition to the damages evidence, Dejesus’s road rage certainly helps explain why Flick was given full recovery for her injuries. As the DeJesus dissent began: “This is a case about the road rage conduct of Kenneth DeJesus that caused a substantial permanent brain injury to Sherry Flick.’ ’ 7 With liability ad *98 mitted, it was probable that a sizeable verdict would have been returned regardless of the arguments of Flick’s attorney. By now stating that the damages awarded in DeJesus were not supported by the evidence and that the sole reason for the award was the improper remarks of counsel, the majority is repeating the same errors made in DeJesus, giving new viability to a decision that was thought to be rejected by a majority of the justices on this court. I concur in all other aspects of the majority opinion. 116 Nev. 812 , 7 P.3d 459 (2000). See Canterino v. The Mirage Casino-Hotel, 118 Nev. 191, 195 , 42 P.3d 808, 810 (2002) (Maupin, J., concurring .and agreeing with the dissent in DeJesus); DeJesus, 116 Nev. at 823, 7 P.3d at 466 (Rose, C. J., dissenting with Shearing and Leavitt, JL). 116 Nev. at 814, 7 P.3d at 461 ; id. at 824, 7 P.3d at 467 (Rose, C. J., dissenting). Id. at 820, 7 P.3d at 464-65 . Id. at 823, 7 P.3d at 466 (Rose, C. J., dissenting). Id. (Rose, C. J., dissenting). Id. (Rose, C. J., dissenting). --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9789072. Public record. Not legal advice.