# Draper v. Phelps

> District Court, W.D. Oklahoma · September 6, 1972 · 351 F. Supp. 677

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9788404

## Case

- **Full name:** Duane DRAPER and Jack Dilldine, Plaintiffs, v. Edna Mae PHELPS, Individually and in the Capacity as Chairman, State Election Board of Oklahoma, Et Al., Defendants
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Oklahoma
- **Decided:** September 6, 1972
- **Citations:** 351 F. Supp. 677; 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12094
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Doyle
- **Judges:** Doyle, Daugherty, Eubanks
- **Cited by:** 26 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9788404

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- applying “compelling interest” test pre-Bullock

## Opinion text

WILLIAM E. DOYLE, Circuit Judge
(specially concurring).
I concur generally in Judge Eubanks’ very thorough opinion, and the views I express here are not intended to undermine any of the expressions contained in his thorough and straightforward opinion. Since, however, the plaintiffs are relying almost entirely on Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 , 92 S.Ct. 995 , 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972), I would add a few comments on this decision.
In the Dunn opinion it is stated that the right to travel is an absolute right. However, because of the nature of the present regulation, the relationship between it and the right to travel is indirect and remote. I do not think that the right to public office can be equated to the right to vote in relationship to the right to travel. Candidacy for public office is quite different from voting, and one does not travel from one place to another contemplating that he will offer himself to the voters for election to state office. Therefore, I do not think that the expression in Dunn v. Blumstein, supra, is applicable to the statute in the ease at bar.
As to the violation of the equal protection clause, I agree that the applicable standard is that of compelling state interest, and such an interest is here apparent. Furthermore, the length of the residence duration is not unreasonable in relation to the objects of the statute.
It is not necessary to express ourselves as to what, if any, periods other than six months prior to filing are to be regarded as reasonable or unreasonable. It is enough to hold that the period in question applied to these facts is reasonably related to the interests which Oklahoma seeks to advance.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9788404. Public record. Not legal advice.