# Cossey v. Cherokee Nation Enterprises, LLC > Supreme Court of Oklahoma · January 20, 2009 · 212 P.3d 447 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9787739 ## Case - **Full name:** Loyman COSSEY, Plaintiff/Respondent, v. CHEROKEE NATION ENTERPRISES, LLC, Formerly Known as Cherokee Nation Enterprises, Inc., and Cherokee Nation Enterprises, Defendant/Petitioner - **Court:** Supreme Court of Oklahoma - **Decided:** January 20, 2009 - **Citations:** 212 P.3d 447; 2009 OK 6; 2009 Okla. LEXIS 6; 2009 WL 146685 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Taylor - **Judges:** Taylor, Opala, Watt, Winchester, Colbert, Edmondson, Kauger, Hargrave, Reif - **Cited by:** 17 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - **Red flag:** Overruled in part by Sheffer v. Buffalo Run Casino, PTE, Inc., 2013 Okla. LEXIS 105 (2013). - Negative treatments: 1 - Distinguished by: 0 - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9787739 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that a tribal court is not a court of general jurisdiction and that "[i]ts jurisdiction could be asserted in matters involving non-Indians only when their activities on Indian lands are activities that may be regulated by the Tribe" ## Opinion text TAYLOR, V.C.J., with whom OPALA, J., joins, concurring: 1 1 I join in the majority opinion. I write separately to contribute further analysis of the federal and state statutes authorizing the state-tribal gaming compact and to address the positions taken in the dissenting opinion. T2 Today we decide that 1) the state district court is a court of competent jurisdiction under the gaming compact between the State of Oklahoma and the Cherokee Nation, 2) the Cherokee Nation's sovereign interests are not implicated in the suit, and 3) Cossey's right to seek redress in state court is guaranteed by the state constitution. Relying upon well-established state law, we construe "court of competent jurisdiction" under the tribal gaming compact to include the state district court. Relying upon state and federal jurisprudence, 1 we determine Public Law 280 2 is *461 not an impediment to the exercise of state court jurisdiction. We also determine that exercise of state court jurisdiction is consistent with federal Indian law. 3 {3 The majority interprets "court of competent jurisdiction" within the meaning of the compact with the Cherokee Nation. Because Oklahoma offers the one and only statutory model tribal compact to all Oklahoma Indian tribes, I would go further and hold that the state district court is a court of competent jurisdiction as that term is used in the Model Tribal Gaming Compact codified at 3A O.S.Supp.2004, § 281. Even though Indian-law disputes most often require case-by-case resolution in light of the individualized tribal cireumstances, treaties, and laws, construing the phrase "court of competent jurisdiction" for all Indian tribes that enter into the statutory model compact would be consistent with the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2722 , and federal principles of statutory construction. 4 T4 Congress enacted the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act in response to the ruling in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 , 107 S.Ct. 1083 , 94 L.Ed.2d 244 (1987). Cabazon decided that an Indian tribe may operate bingo games on an Indian reservation located in a state that permits gaming for any purpose and that state law does not apply to bingo games played predominantly by non-Indians coming onto the Indian reservation. The dissent to the Cabae-zon opinion urged that a state has a legitimate law enforcement interest in Indian *462 gaming that caters to non-Indians where Congress has not set aside the state's interests through federal regulation of Indian gaming. The Cabazon ruling impelled Congress to legislate in the area. S.Rep. No. 100-446, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. p. 3071. T5 Congress had considered the problems and benefits of Indian gaming in committee hearings for at least three years before Ca-bazon. Congress enacted Public Law 100-446, finding that gaming was a means of economic development for the tribes that would promote tribal self-sufficiency and strengthen tribal governments. 102 Stat. 2467 (1988). Public Law 100-446 legalized gaming in Indian country, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1166-1168 , within the framework for regulating gaming in Indian country in the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2722 . IGRA attempted to balance the federal, tribal and state interests in Indian gaming through a system of joint regulation. 5 IGRA established three classes of Indian gaming. Id. $ 2703(6), (7) and (8). As to class I gaming (social games with prizes of minimal value and tribal ceremonial or celebrating games), tribal regulation is exclusive. Id. § 2710(a). As to class II gaming (bingo games played with cards, pull-tabs, lotto, punch boards and other games similar to bingo games played with cards), tribal regulation is subject to approval, monitoring, and continued approval of a federal Indian gaming commission. Id. As to class III gaming (all gambling not included in Class I or Class I1), tribal regulation is defined and confined by a tribal-state compact with limited federal oversight. Id. § 2710(d). T6 The tribal-state compact may allocate responsibility for gaming standards and regulation between the Indian tribe and the state, provide for licensing, specify the application of tribal or state criminal and civil laws, allocate law enforcement jurisdiction, authorize state assessments necessary to defer costs of state regulation, and authorize tribal taxation comparable to state taxation. Id. § States that allow class III gaming for any purpose by any person, organization or entity are required to negotiate the terms of a tribal-state compact in good faith when requested by an Indian tribe. Id. § 2710(d)(B)(A). An Indian tribe entering into a tribal-state compact retains the right "to regulate class III gaming on its Indian lands concurrently with the State" but the regulation cannot be "inconsistent with, or less stringent than, the State laws and regulations made applicable by any Tribal-State compact." Id. § 2710(d)(5). Indian gaming must be conducted consistent with IGRA, or state law will govern the Indian gaming. 6 18 U.S.C. § 1166 . T7 Rather than set aside state interests in Indian-country gaming activities catering to the state's residents and visitors, IGRA authorizes the extension of state law over class III gaming activities in Indian country. 7 Rather than set aside the rights of Oklahoma's residents and visitors to state-law protections while they patronize an Indian casino, IGRA allows the casino patrons to retain their state-law protections as provided in the tribal-state compact. There is no language in IGRA that prohibits the extension of state court jurisdiction over a tort claim arising out of activity at a tribal casino against the Indian tribe or its casino. Fur *463 ther, as the majority finds, there is no language in IGRA that explicitly or implicitly extends tribal court jurisdiction over non-consenting casino patrons. T8 State Question No. 712, Legislative Referendum No. 835, the State-Tribal Gaming Act, codified at 8A O.8.Supp.2004, §§ 261-281, was approved by a vote of the people on November 2, 2004. The State-Tribal Gaming Act authorizes the operation of gaming machines at horse race tracks and on Indian lands. It provides a Model Tribal Gaming Compact (gaming compact) which Indian tribes may enter into and operate the gaming machines on Indian lands subject to oversight by the Office of State Finance, the designated state compliance agency (SCA). Id. § 281. The gaming compact is offered to the Indian tribes of Oklahoma, which if ace-cepted, constitutes the gaming compact between this state and the accepting tribe for purposes of IGRA without any further action on behalf of the State of Oklahoma. Id. § 280. T9 The gaming compact recognizes an Indian tribe's liability for tort claims. Part 6(A)(1) of the gaming compact requires the Indian enterprise, defined as the tribe or tribal ageney in Part 3(18), to maintain public liability insurance for the express purpose of covering and satisfying tort claims in the minimum amounts of 250,000 dollars for any one person, two million dollars for any one occurrence for personal injury, and one million dollars for any one occurrence for property damage or the corresponding limits under the Governmental Tort Claims Act, whichever is greater. The Governmental Tort Claims Act, 51 0.$.2001, §§ 151-170, is this state's law that waives the state's and its political subdivisions' governmental immunity for tort claims. Part 6(A)(8) of the gaming compact specifically provides that tribal sovereign immunity will not be invoked by casino insurers up to the liability limits. T 10 The gaming compact provides for notice of tort claims to the tribal compliance agency (TCA) or the tribal enterprise for investigation and approval or denial. It also specifically declares that the tribe consents to suit on tort claims. Part 6(A)(2) states that the "tribe consents to suit on a limited basis with respect to tort claims subject to the limitations set forth in this subsection" and further states that "Injo consents to suit with respect to tort claims, or as to any other claims against the tribe shall be deemed to have been made under this Compact, except as provided in subsections B and C of this Part." Part 6(A)(9) declares that "(al judicial proceeding for any cause arising from a tort claim may be maintained in accordance with and subject to the limitations of subsection C of this part" under specified circumstances. This language in the gaming compact is far too plain for an Indian tribe to deny that it consents to suit on Indian-country arising tort claims at its casino. T 11 The gaming compact provides for the State of Oklahoma to monitor class III gaming casinos through the SCA. 8 At Part 8(C), the SCA is required to report to the TCA "all pertinent, nonconfidential information regarding any violation of federal, state, or tribal laws, the rules and regulations, or this Compact." Part 8(C) effectively acknowledges that state law applies to activity related to class III gaming operations in Indian country, and there is no language indicating otherwise. 9 Application of state law is fur *464 ther acknowledged in Part 8(D) which limits the SCA's monitoring so as not to regulate the tribe's government or interfere with the tribe's selection of its governmental officers. T 12 The dissenting opinion, at least implicitly, denies that the gaming compact is a law of Oklahoma. The compact is part of a legislative referendum that was approved by the Oklahoma Legislature, signed by the Governor, and approved by a vote of the people, both Indian and non-Indian registered Oklahoma voters. Onee enacted through the exercise of this state's legislative power, the model class III gaming compact is a state statute-a law in this state. The terms of the gaming compact became fixed by state statute and are not negotiable. 10 113 The dissent refers to the statutory gaming compact as a mutual agreement rather than a statute because of the recital in Part 2(8) that the "state and the tribe maintain a government-to-government relationship, and this Compact will help foster mutual respect and understanding among Indians and non-Indians." This recital . undeniably expresses legislative intent to respect another recital in Part 2(1) that the "tribe is a federally recognized tribal government possessing sovereign powers and the rights of self-government." It also undeniably supports the disclaimer in Part 8(D) that "[nlothing in this Compact shall be deemed to authorize the state to regulate the tribe's government, including the TCA, or to interfere in any way with the tribe's selection of its governmental officers, including members of the TCA." But, it does not remove the gaming compact from the general statutory laws of the State of Oklahoma. {14 The dissent characterizes the Indian tribe's consent to suit as a waiver of tribal immunity. According to this dissent, the Indian tribe, in the gaming compact, waived tribal sovereign immunity, but the tribe did not agree to allocate civil jurisdiction to the state for tort claims. The gaming compact does not speak in terms waiver of tribal immunity. 11 The gaming compact provides, in precise words, that the Indian tribe "consents to suit," at Part 6(A)(2), in a "judicial proceeding for any cause arising from a tort claim," at Part 6(A)(9), "in a court of competent jurisdiction," at Part 6(C)(1). This consent to suit effectively designates that both the state and federal courts may exercise their jurisdiction over tort claims against the Indian tribe. This is so because of the well-established meaning of "court of competent jurisdiction." {15 "Competent jurisdiction" usually refers to a court's subject-matter jurisdiction, its authority to hear a given type of case, that is, the power vested in the court-by the *465 law of its ereation-to pass upon the subject matter of the suit. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 , 24 L.Ed. 565 (1878); In re A.N.O.,, 2004 OK 33, ¶ 19 , 91 P.3d 646, 649 . Both federal and state laws utilize the phrase "court of competent jurisdiction. 12 The phrase "court of competent jurisdiction" as used in federal statutes has long been construed to mean federal and state courts. Blackburn v. Portland Gold Mining Co., 175 U.S. 571, 579 , 20 S.Ct. 222, 225 , 44 L.Ed. 276 (1900); Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505, 506 , 20 S.Ct. 726 , 44 L.Ed. 864 (1900). Under these authorities, the phrase "court of competent jurisdiction" in the gaming compact is a designation of state and federal courts. Accordingly, the effect of the phrase "court of competent jurisdiction" is to allocate the adjudication of tort claims against Indian tribes related to the operation of tribal gaming activities to the concurrent jurisdiction of the state and federal courts in accordance with 25 U.S.C.2001, § and (vii). {16 The dissent also takes the position that the gaming compact does not expressly extend Oklahoma tort law into the land of the Cherokee Nation and that Part 6(D) reflects intent that tribal tort law is the applicable tort law. As the dissent points out in footnote 3, Part 6(D) deals with collecting damages on a tort claim when the Indian tribe has failed to maintain the minimum required public liability insurance. Part 6(D) requires the Indian tribe to inform both the claimant and the state of any notice and hearing on a claim "to cover any award that might be made within the limits set forth in paragraph 1 of subsection A of this part." Part 6(D) is not a choice-of-substantive-tort-law provision. It is a post-judgment remedy for collecting a money judgment on a tort claim against an uninsured Indian tribe. 17 The right to damages to compensate the plaintiff for injuries caused by a violation of his or her legal rights is the basis for classifying a wrong as a "tort." An action for damages is an essential characteristic of a "tort." United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 235 , 112 S.Ct. 1867, 1871 , 119 L.Ed.2d 34 (1992). In federal jurisprudence, a tort is "a civil wrong, other than a breach of contract, for which the court will provide a remedy in the form of an action for damages." Id, 504 U.S. at 234 , 112 S.Ct. at 1870-1871 . Similarly, the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act defines "tort" as "a legal wrong, independent of contract, involving violation of a duty imposed by general law or otherwise, resulting in a loss to any person, association or corporation as the proximate result of an act or omission of a political subdivision or the state or an employee acting within the seope of employment." 51 O.S.2001, § 152(11). Nothing in Part 6(D) would withhold the common law "tort" action for damages from those injured at an Indian casino. Notwithstanding, this dissent seems to advocate that the Indian tribe agreed to a system of tort liability that does not include a common law tort suit for damages. €18 The dissent relies on Part 9-"This compact shall not alter tribal, federal or state civil adjudicatory or eriminal jurisdiction." for the proposition that the tribal court is the only court with jurisdiction over the Indian tribe's activity on its tribal land. When the Legislature passed the referendum to send the State-Tribal Gaming Act to a vote of the people in 2004, three overarching principles determined the civil jurisdiction of a tribal court over alleged tortious injury to a non-tribal-member in Indian country: 1) the jurisdiction of the tribal court does not extend to non-members who come onto tribal land except as may be necessary to preserve the Indian tribe's right to self-governance or its right to control its internal relations, Montana v. U.S., 450 U.S. at 564, 101 S.Ct. at 1258-1259; 2) tribal courts are not courts of general jurisdiction, Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 367, 121 S.Ct. at 2304 (2001), and 3) *466 an Indian tribe's attempt to exercise civil authority over activities of nonmembers is presumptively invalid. Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 , 659 121 S.Ct. 1825, 1835 , 149 L.Ed.2d 889 (2001). The language in Part 9 safeguards these Indian law principles, but it does not diminish the unequivocal consent to suit on a tort claim against the Indian tribe or its casino in a court of competent jurisdiction in Part 6. {19 Finally, the dissent argues that the gaming compact deals solely with the liability of the Indian tribe and that it does not alter rights or remedies between private parties. This contention implies that casino patrons retain their common law tort rights and remedies and that Oklahoma's tort law follows persons into Indian country and governs the gambling-related activity of all persons and entities in Indian country except the Indian tribe. This contention essentially argues for tribal immunity from damages caused by tribal tortious gambling-related activities. Application of the doctrine of tribal immunity requires a pre-emption analysis against a backdrop of a tradition of tribal sovereignty that gives rise to tribal immunity. Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 , 103 S.Ct. 3291 , 77 L.Ed.2d 961 (1983). There was no class III gambling in Indian country until the ruling in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 , 107 S.Ct. 1083 , 94 L.Ed.2d 244 (1987), and the enactment of IGRA. Just as Rice v. Rehner concluded that there is no tradition of tribal sovereignty in governing activity related to alcoholic beverages, there is no tradition of tribal sovereignty in governing activity related to class III gambling. Both are vice activities traditionally controlled through the states' police power for the protection of the public health and welfare. See Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 182 , 119 S.Ct. 1923, 1929 , 144 L.Ed.2d 161 (1999); Artichoke Joe's California Grand Casino v. Norton, 353 F.3d 712 (9th Cir.2003); Bittle v. Bahe, 2008 OK 10, ¶ 35, n. 15 , 192 P.3d 810, 823, n. 15 . Similar to the authority delegated to the states and the Indian tribes over alcoholic beverages in 18 U.S.C. § 1161 , IGRA delegated authority over class III gaming in Indian country to the states and the Indian tribes to be exercised through a tribal-state compact system. 25 U.S.C. § 2710 (d). In Oklahoma's statutory model tribal gaming compact, the Indian tribes consent to be sued for damages resulting from a tribe's tortious activity related to the operation of its gambling casino and nothing in the compact alters the common law rights and remedies available to casino patrons under Oklahoma law. 1 20 The issue decided today touches upon the rights and remedies of casino patrons and the accountability of casino operators. Indian casinos are vigorously marketed to non-Indian patrons in this and surrounding states. In an August of 2007 publication, the Cherokee Nation reported that in 1992 it had one gaming facility with 86 employees; and by 2006, those number skyrocketed to nine gaming facilities with more than two thousand employees and at least ten gaming-facility-related golf clubs, hotels and convenience stores with more than one thousand employees. These are the numbers for only one of the more than thirty federally recognized Indian tribes in Oklahoma. The importance of this issue cannot be underestimated. The majority opinion properly construes "court of competent jurisdiction" as used in our statute under state law and consistent with the federal law. Oklahoma courts are competent to adjudicate tort claims against Indian tribes under the state Model Tribal Gaming Compact and the federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act did not pre-empt state law. . Lewis v. Sax and Fox Tribe, 1994 OK 20 , 896 P.2d 503 ; Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505 , 111 S.Ct. 905 , 112 L.Ed.2d 1112 (1991). . 67 Stat. 588 (1953)(wherein Congress consented to state assumption of jurisdiction over civil causes of action arising in Indian country between Indians or to which Indians are parties, codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1322 ). Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463 , 99 S.Ct. 740 , 58 L.Ed.2d 740 (1979), addressed the requirements of Public Law 280. In Yakima, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that the enabling acts for eight states, Arizona, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Oklahoma, required disclaimer of jurisdiction over Indian lands in their state constitutions. *461 The Yakima decision quotes portions of the enabling act for the Dakotas, Montana, and Washington that required the states to disclaim any right and title to unappropriated public lands and to Indian lands and to acknowledge that Indian lands shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of Congress until the title has been extinguished by the United States. 439 U.S. at 480-481 , 99 S.Ct. at 752 . The language in Oklahoma's constitution is different. It disclaims all right and title to unappropriated public lands and Indian lands and acknowledges that "until title to any such public lands shall have been extinguished by the United States, the same shall be and remain subject to the jurisdiction, disposal, and control of the United States." Section 3 of Article I of the Oklahoma Constitution is set out in full in the majority opinion at footnote 7. This constitutional provision disclaims title to and jurisdiction over unappropriated public lands and it disclaims title to Indian lands but it does not disclaim jurisdiction over Indian lands. The Yakima Court failed to recognize this difference in the Oklahoma's constitutional language. Notwithstanding, this Court has followed Yakima and recognized Oklahoma as a disclaimer-of-jurisdiction state for purposes of Public Law 280. Ahkboah v. Housing Authority of Kiowa Tribe of Indians, 1983 OK 20 , 660 P.2d 625 . . The federal cases discussed in today's opinion include Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 , 101 S.Ct. 1245 , 67 L.Ed.2d 493 (1981)(establishing the general rule that Indian tribes have no authority over activities or conduct of nonmembers except that (1) a tribe has authority to regulate a nonmember who has a consensual relationship with the tribe and (2) a tribe has adjudicatory authority over conduct of a nonmember in Indian country if the conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 , 117 S.Ct. 1404 , 137 L.Ed.2d 661 (1997) (pronouncing that tribal court jurisdiction is no greater than the tribe's legislative authority absent congressional direction enlarging tribal court jurisdiction); Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 , 121 S.Ct. 2304 , 150 L.Ed.2d 398 (2001)(deciding that tribal courts are not courts of general jurisdiction nor are tribal courts included in the historical and constitutional assumption of concurrent state-court jurisdiction to adjudicate claims arising under laws of the United States); Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Company, — U.S. —, 128 S.Ct. 2709 , 171 L.Ed.2d 457 (2008) (teaching that tribal laws and regulations may be imposed on a nonmember only if the nonmember has consented, expressly or by his actions, and then the regulation must stem from the tribe's inherent sovereign authority to set conditions on entry into Indian country, to preserve tribal self-government, or to control internal affairs). . Basic rules of federal statutory construction provide that where a statute does not define its terms, the court will give the terms their ordinary and natural meaning, Smith v. U.S., 508 U.S. 223, 228 , 113 S.Ct. 2050, 2054 , 124 L.Ed.2d 138 (1993); if a phrase is not commonly understood, the court will inquire into the contemporaneous understanding, Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 759 , 100 S.Ct. 2455, 2460 , 65 L.Ed.2d 488 (1980), or the common law meaning of the phrase, Gilbert v. U.S., 370 U.S. 650, 655 , 82 S.Ct. 1399, 1402 , 8 L.Ed.2d 750 (1962); and the rule that ambiguous terms will be construed in favor of Indians applies where the language of a treaty with the United States is being interpreted, but it is not a mandatory guide for interpreting statutes. Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84 , 122 S.Ct. 528, 535-536 , 151 L.Ed.2d 474 (2001). . IGRA provided a statutory basis for the operation and regulation of gaming by Indian tribes and for the adoption of federal standards for gaming on Indian lands, 25 U.S.C. § 2702 ; creating the National Indian Gaming Commission within the Department of Interior, id. § 2704, to monitor class II gaming and to approve tribal ordinances and tribal management contracts for class II and class III gaming, id. § 2706, and establishing a tribal-state compact system. Id. § 2710. . 18 U.S.C. § 1166 imposed state gambling law, including the licensing, regulation, or prohibition of gambling, into Indian country in the same manner and to the same extent elsewhere in the state; left jurisdiction with the United States to prosecute violations of the state gambling laws unless the Indian tribe consents to state jurisdiction; and excepted gaming conducted in compliance with IGRA from the blanket imposition of state gambling law. . It was Congress' intent in IGRA to make use of the existing state regulatory systems because there was no adequate federal regulatory system for class III gaming. S$.Rep. No. 100-446, at 13-14, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071, 3083-84. . Likewise, IGRA uses "monitoring" in describing the powers of the National Indian Gaming Commission that regulates and oversees the tribal regulation of class II gaming. 25 U.S.C. § 2706 (b). . The Ballot Title in the legislative referendum proposing enactment of State-Tribal Gaming Act did not indicate that Oklahoma law would not apply to Indian-country gaming. It read as follows: This measure creates the State-Tribal Gaming Act. It would allow some types of gaming machines at some horse race tracks in this state. The Oklahoma Horse Racing Commission would oversee the new types of gaming machines. It would require that a portion of the money wagered on such gaming be paid to the state. Some of the money would go to purses for horse races. Some of the money would go to the horse race tracks. The measure also provides a model compact which Indian tribes may enter into and then operate such gaming machines on Indian lands. The model compact provides regulatory controls for the gaming authorized by the compact. The Office of State Finance would have the authority to oversee this gaming by the tribes. The money wagered on gaming would go to horse race tracks, purses for horse races, and the tribes. *464 The state's portion of the money from the gaming authorized by this act would go for treatment of compulsive gambling disorders, to the Education Reform Revolving Fund and for college scholarships. 2004 Okla.Sess.Laws, ch. 316. . Oklahoma negotiated the terms of the gaming compact with the Indian tribes but those negotiations have not been preserved as the history of the statutory gaming compact. Oklahoma has no system for preserving legislative history like the federal congressional system of receiving information and recommendations submitted in congressional hearings and reporting on bills such as the legislative history of Public Law 100-446 in S. Rep No. 100-446, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. ~ . The gaming compact mentions tribal sovereign immunity in Part 6(A)(3), requiring that the Tribe's public liability insurance policy to "include an endorsement providing that the insurer may not invoke tribal sovereign immunity in connection with any claim made within the limit of liability if the claim complies with the limited consent provisions of subsection C of this Part." The gaming compact does not contain language that would recognize an Indian tribe is clothed with inherent tribal sovereignty that gives rise to tribal immunity from suit when it engages in gambling-related activities. In 2000, Congress expressed its opinion on tribal immunity and contracts. Reacting to the decision in Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. 751 , 118 S.Ct. 1700 , 140 L.Ed.2d 981 (1998), Congress amended 25 U.S.C. § 81 to require the Secretary of the Interior to refuse to approve an Indian land-related contract that does not disclose the tribe's claim to tribal sovereign immunity. Pub.L. 106-179 (2000), 114 Stat. 46 . Senate Report 106-150 (1999) indicates that Congress did not attempt to reconcile the divergent views of tribal immunity expressed in the majority opinion and the dissenting opinion. The Senate reported, at p. 9, that "Indian tribes and their contracting partners are generally best served if questions of immunity are addressed, resolved, or at least disclosed when a contract is executed." . See Okla. Const., art. VIII, § 1(requiring that elected state officers shall automatically be suspended upon their being declared guilty of a felony by a court of competent jurisdiction); 51 0.$.2001, § 152(1) (the state governmental tort claims law defining "action" as a proceeding in a court of competent jurisdiction by which one party brings a suit against another); 15 U.S.C. § 3007 (providing for jurisdiction over civil action involving interstate horse racing in the federal district court in the host state or the offtrack state concurrent with that of any state court of competent jurisdiction located in the host state or the off-track state). --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9787739. Public record. Not legal advice.