# Hac v. University of Hawai'i

> Hawaii Supreme Court · July 17, 2003 · 102 Haw. 92

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9786852

## Case

- **Full name:** Anna HAC, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNIVERSITY OF HAWAI'I; Paul Yuen; Shu Lin; Bharat Kinariwala; N. Thomas Gaarder; James Holm-Kennedy; Frank Koide; Anthony Kuh; David Yun and Kazutoshi Najita, Defendant-Appellees
- **Court:** Hawaii Supreme Court
- **Decided:** July 17, 2003
- **Citations:** 102 Haw. 92; 73 P.3d 46; 20 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 401; 2003 Haw. LEXIS 341
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Moon
- **Judges:** Acoba, Hifo, I-V, Vii-Viii, Levinson, Vi-Viii, Moon, Nakayama
- **Cited by:** 120 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9786852

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that Hawaii law on intentional infliction of emotional distress follows the Restatement (Second) of Torts
- holding that a tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is distinct from a claim for emotional distress damages under the employment discrimination statute
- holding that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to compel discovery in employment discrimination case
- noting that the trial court’s denial of a motion to compel discovery “will not be disturbed in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion that results in substantial prejudice to a party.”

## Opinion text

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by
MOON, C.J.,
in which NAKAYAMA, J., joins.
Although I agree with the majority’s resolution of plaintiff-appellant Anna Hac’s claims, I disagree with its decision to, sua sponte, alter the elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress inasmuch as the issue is neither raised by the parties nor presented by the present appeal.
This court has previously stated:
Prudential rules of judicial self-governance properly limit the role of the courts in a democratic society. Cf. Trustees of OHA v. Yamasaki, 69 Haw. 154, 171 , 737 P.2d 446, 456 (1987); Life of the Land v. Land Use Commission, 63 Haw. 166, 172 , 623 P.2d 431, 438 (1981) (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 , 95 S.Ct. 2197 , 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975)). One such prudential rule is that “the use of judicial power to resolve public disputes ... should be limited to those questions capable of judicial resolution and presented in an adversary context.” Yamasaki, 69 Haw. at 171 , 737 P.2d at 456 (citation omitted). Another such rule is that, “even in the absence of constitutional restrictions, [courts] must still carefully weigh the wisdom, efficacy, and timeliness of an exercise of their power before acting, especially where there may be an intrusion into areas committed *108 to other branches of government.” Id. [ (emphasis in original omitted) ] (citation omitted). Although, generally, issues concerning prudential rules of self-governance arise in cases where justiciability is at issue, self-governance and the proper role of the courts preclude this court not only from considering a case, but also from considering any issue that is not properly before it. We do not have the prerogative ... to discharge ... our individual judicial obligations in our written opinion[s], ... where the case on appeal does not bring the issue squarely before this couri. To refrain from doing so represents an exercise in judicial self-restraint, not a shirking of judicial responsibility.
James Madison, speaking on the notion of checks and balances in a democratic society, wrote that, “[i]n framing a government which is to be administered by [the people] over [the people], the great difficulty lies in this: You must first enable the government to controul [sic] the governed; and in the next place, oblige it to controul itself.” The Federalist Papers No. 51 (J. Madison). Although judicial review serves as a check on the unconstitutional exercise of power by the executive and legislative branches of government, “the only check upon [the judicial branch’s] exercise of power is [its] oum sense of self-restraint." U.S. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 78-79 , 56 S.Ct. 312 , 80 L.Ed. 477 (1936) (Stone, J., dissenting). For that reason, alone, judicial self-restraint is surely an implied, if not an expressed, condition of the grant of authority of judicial revieiu.
In re Attorney’s Fees of Mohr, 97 Hawai'i 1, 9-10 , 32 P.3d 647, 655-56 (2001) (emphases added) (some internal quotation marks omitted) (some ellipsis points added).
In the present case, the majority recognizes that neither party advocates changing established precedent and observes that “the parties cited to our jurisdiction’s present formulation of the elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress[.]” Majority Opinion at 105, 73 P.3d at 59. Given the absence of any argument by the parties, the majority’s decision to refashion the elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress evinces a lack of judicial restraint. I, therefore, respectfully dissent.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9786852. Public record. Not legal advice.