# People v. Lawley

> California Supreme Court · January 24, 2002 · 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 614

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9786749

## Case

- **Full name:** The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DENNIS HAROLD LAWLEY, Defendant and Appellant
- **Court:** California Supreme Court
- **Decided:** January 24, 2002
- **Citations:** 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 614; 27 Cal. 4th 102; 2002 Daily Journal DAR 849; 38 P.3d 461; 2002 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 658; 2002 Cal. LEXIS 272
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Brown
- **Judges:** Werdegar, Baxter, Brown
- **Cited by:** 371 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## Opinion text

BROWN, J., Concurring.
I disagree with part of the majority’s reasoning in affirming the trial court’s exclusion of hearsay testimony concerning the Aryan Brotherhood’s alleged role in the murder. According to the majority (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 153-154), Brian Seaboum’s statement that the Aryan Brotherhood hired him to kill Kenneth Lawton Stewart did not meet the second prong of the penal interest exception to the hearsay rule because it *174 was not a declaration against his penal interest. (See People v. Duarte (2000) 24 Cal.4th 603, 610-611 [ 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 701 , 12 P.3d 1110 ] [to fit within the penal interest exception, the proponent of the evidence “must show that ... the declaration was against the declarant’s penal interest”].) The majority reasons that: (1) “nothing about who hired Seaboum to kill Stewart made Seaboum more culpable than did the other portions of his statement” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 154); and (2) the identity of Seaboum’s hirer was not an element of the crime of conspiracy (id. at pp. 153-154). The majority’s reasoning is, however, dubious, because its definition of a declaration against penal interest is too narrow.
First, a declarant’s statement may subject him to such a “risk of . . . criminal liability . . . that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true” even if the statement does not satisfy an element of a crime. (Evid. Code, § 1230.) For example, the statement may increase the likelihood of a criminal conviction by providing a motive for the crime or by leading the police to additional evidence against the declarant. In this case, Seaboum’s statement that the Aryan Brotherhood directed him to kill Stewart enhanced his culpability by suggesting additional motives for the crime—i.e., Seaboum’s affiliation with the Aryan Brotherhood and/or his desire to join or advance within the group. The excluded statements also could have pointed the police to additional evidence against Seaboum. In this sense, Seaboum’s naming of the Aryan Brotherhood specifically disserved his penal interests. (People v. Duarte, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 612 .)
Second, hearsay statements identifying coconspirators constitute declarations against penal interest if the statements are “an integral part of the statement in which” the declarant “implicated himself’ (People v. Greenberger (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 298, 340 [ 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 61 ]), and do not shift blame or minimize the declarant’s role in the crime (id. at p. 341). Here, Seaboum’s identification of the Aryan Brotherhood as his hirer was integral to his inculpatory statements—that he performed a murder for hire. His statements did not shift blame or minimize his role in the murder. Thus, the excluded statements are declarations against penal interest. (See id. at pp. 336-341 [finding hearsay statements identifying coconspirators admissible under the penal interest exception].)
Nonetheless, this conclusion does not warrant reversal because defendant cannot meet the third prong of the penal interest exception: “that the declaration was sufficiently reliable to warrant admission despite its hearsay character.” (People v. Duarte, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 611 .) At oral argument, defendant made a detailed presentation of the facts surrounding the excluded *175 statements to show their reliability. Unfortunately, defendant presented none of these facts to the trial court. In a classic example of the hazards of self-representation, defendant’s offer of proof only highlighted the unreliability of the excluded testimony. As described by defendant, the proposed testimony from the first witness—Monty Ray Mullins—did not identify the victim in any way or exclude defendant as a coconspirator. Defendant also failed to mention the circumstances surrounding the excluded statements. Finally, Mullins testified at the offer of proof that Seaboum never said that the Aryan Brotherhood hired him to murder Stewart. After the court excluded Mullins from testifying about the Aryan Brotherhood, defendant did not even make an offer of proof as to his second witness—David Hager. He also made no effort to authenticate the letter implicating the Aryan Brotherhood and presented the court with no evidence to gauge the letter’s reliability. Based on this record, the excluded hearsay statements were too unreliable to warrant admission. (Ibid.) Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding them notwithstanding defendant’s persuasive contention that the exclusion of these statements deprived him of a critical defense. (See In re Pratt (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 795, 937 [ 170 Cal.Rptr. 80 ], quoting Davey v. Southern Pacific Co. (1897) 116 Cal. 324, 330 [“ ‘[I]t is judicial action, and not judicial reasoning or argument, which is the subject of review; and, if the former be correct, we are not concerned with the faults of the latter’ ”].) Accordingly, I reluctantly join my colleagues in affirming defendant’s judgment of death.
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied March 13, 2002.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9786749. Public record. Not legal advice.