# People v. Jones

> California Supreme Court · April 30, 2003 · 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9785776

## Case

- **Full name:** The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ERNEST DWAYNE JONES, Defendant and Appellant
- **Court:** California Supreme Court
- **Decided:** April 30, 2003
- **Citations:** 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468; 29 Cal. 4th 1229; 64 P.3d 762
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Kennard
- **Judges:** Brown, Kennard
- **Cited by:** 255 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## Opinion text

KENNARD, J.
—I concur generally with the majority opinion. I disagree, however, with its analysis of one issue, which I discuss below.
Defendant was charged with the first degree murder and rape of Julia Miller, and there was a special circumstance allegation that the murder occurred during a rape. In defendant’s testimony at the guilt phase of his capital trial, he did not deny killing Miller and having sexual intercourse with her before she died. He testified, however, while struggling with Miller, he “kind of slipped back into [his] childhood.” He had no recollection of having intercourse with Miller, but he remembered picking up a knife and stabbing her, and then “being curled up in a ball crying.” When he looked at Miller, he realized she was dead. While driving away from Miller’s house, he began “hearing certain little things in my head,” which he described as “paranoia, thinking someone was coming to kill me.” Based on this testimony, the defense argued that defendant lacked the specific intent to rape, a necessary element when, as here, the prosecution alleges under the felony-murder rule that an unlawful killing is first degree murder because it took place during a rape.
To support his claim that he lacked this intent, defendant sought to testify that he had a long history of untreated psychiatric problems. At a hearing to consider the admissibility of this testimony, defense counsel stressed that defendant had heard voices, that as a child he was placed in special education classes, that other members of his family were mentally ill, that he had abused drugs, and that he was an abused child who grew up in poverty. *1269 Counsel also mentioned defendant’s “dizzy spells, blackouts, [and] screaming at night. . . The trial court excluded the testimony on the ground that it was not supported by expert psychiatric testimony.
Defendant now claims the trial court prevented him from testifying that “he had an extensive history of hearing voices, flashbacks, and blackouts.” The majority holds that the trial court properly excluded defendant’s testimony, but it relies on a different ground than the trial court. The majority points out that defendant testified he heard voices only after he had intercourse with and killed Miller, so his previous history of hearing voices was irrelevant to his intent to rape her. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1253.) True. But defendant testified that he blacked out and had a flashback to his childhood before he had sex with Miller, so the majority’s reasoning does not address his claim that the court erroneously excluded testimony about his alleged history of blackouts and flashbacks. I would reject this claim because defense counsel’s passing reference to blackouts, without any information as to when and how often they had occurred, was insufficient to show that the blackouts were probative on the question of whether defendant intended to rape Miller. Also, the trial court did not prevent defendant from testifying about flashbacks because defense counsel did not mention flashbacks in his offer of proof.
The majority also finds any error harmless. It reasons that at the penalty phase, a defense psychiatrist who had interviewed defendant did not mention defendant’s history of blackouts or flashbacks. This, according to the majority, implies that defendant’s proposed testimony was a recent fabrication. In my view, the expert’s testimony has no bearing on whether the trial court’s exclusion of defendant’s testimony was harmless, because the expert testified at the penalty phase, whereas defendant’s testimony was offered at the guilt phase. Nevertheless, I agree with the majority that any error was harmless: defendant’s offer of proof included nothing that could have altered the jury’s determination that he intended to rape Miller when he had sexual intercourse with her before killing her.
On April 30, 2003, the opinion was modified to read as printed above.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9785776. Public record. Not legal advice.