# Marine Forests Society v. California Coastal Commission

> California Supreme Court · June 23, 2005 · 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 30

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9785583

## Case

- **Full name:** MARINE FORESTS SOCIETY Et Al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION Et Al., Defendants and Appellants
- **Court:** California Supreme Court
- **Decided:** June 23, 2005
- **Citations:** 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 30; 36 Cal. 4th 1; 2005 Daily Journal DAR 7550; 113 P.3d 1062; 2005 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5501; 2005 Cal. LEXIS 6846
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Werdegar
- **Judges:** George, Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar
- **Cited by:** 77 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9785583

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- concluding that the legislature's appointment of a majority of Commission did not violate separation of powers, in part because the appointees served four-year terms, which the court found "significantly reduces the potential control that the legislative appointing authorities…
- describing the chaos that could result from failing to apply the de facto officer doctrine
- noting that section 30801 was a statute of limitations

## Opinion text

WERDEGAR, J., Concurring.
I agree with the majority that, even were this court to hold that the California Coastal Commission’s (Commission) former appointment structure made it essentially a legislative agency prohibited from exercising executive or judicial powers under separation-of-powers principles, the de facto officer doctrine (or a closely related rule) would bar a separation-of-powers challenge to particular executive and quasi-judicial acts of the Commission brought before a court had finally determined, in an action for injunctive or declaratory relief, that the performance of such acts was unconstitutional. For that reason, as the majority explains, we need not decide whether the Commission’s former structure did render it subservient to the Legislature. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 53.)
I write separately to stress why the de facto officer doctrine (or a closely related rule) applies here. While plaintiffs’ separation-of-powers challenge is not, strictly speaking, an attack on the qualifications or appointment of any particular officer, it does, as the majority observes, rest on aspects of the Commission members’ appointment and tenure; consequently, if successful, it would, like a collateral attack on an officer’s qualifications or appointment to office, undermine the validity of all the Commission’s executive or quasi-judicial acts. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 55.) Because of the reasonable public reliance on an agency’s prima facie legitimacy, to require that this type of challenge be brought first in an action for prospective relief rather than in a direct attack on past agency actions is appropriate and fair.
The majority, as I understand it, does not embrace any broader doctrine precluding a party from raising fundamental flaws in an agency action directly in challenges to those actions. As a general rule, individuals aggrieved by government actions affecting them or their property may present fundamental legal challenges in a timely complaint or petition directly attacking the government action. (See Travis v. County of Santa Cruz (2004) 33 Cal.4th 757, 767-769 [ 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 404 , 94 P.3d 538 ] [challenge to permit conditions imposed under allegedly unconstitutional and preempted ordinance]; Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. City of La Habra (2001) 25 Cal.4th 809, 819-822 [ 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 369 , 23 P.3d 601 ] [challenge to continued collection of tax under ordinance allegedly adopted in violation of *64 state law].) The court’s opinion today should not be read as suggesting, instead, that a separate action for declaratory or injunctive relief must generally be successfully pursued before an agency’s actions can be challenged as unconstitutional.
With this understanding, I have signed the majority opinion.
Brown, J., concurred.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9785583. Public record. Not legal advice.