# Luurtsema v. Commissioner of Correction

> Supreme Court of Connecticut · January 5, 2011 · 299 Conn. 740

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9785180

## Case

- **Full name:** Peter Luurtsema v. Commissioner of Correction
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Connecticut
- **Decided:** January 5, 2011
- **Citations:** 299 Conn. 740; 12 A.3d 817; 2011 Conn. LEXIS 12
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by McLACHLAN
- **Judges:** Eveleigh, Katz, McLACHLAN, McLachlan, Palmer, Rogers, Vertefeuille
- **Cited by:** 51 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9785180

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- reasoning general presumption of retroactivity appropriate because "considerations of finality simply cannot justify the continued incarceration of someone who did not commit the crime of which he stands convicted" and it would be unjust and amount to judicial usurpation of th…
- declining to adopt per se rule of retroactivity "because a review of the diverse contexts in which such challenges have arisen persuades us that there are various situations in which to deny retroactive relief may be neither arbitrary nor unjust"
- recognizing that courts may take judicial notice of public records

## Opinion text

McLACHLAN, J.,
concurring. I concur with the plurality reluctantly. I concur reluctantly because the majority opinion in State v. Salamon, 287 Conn. 509 , 949 A.2d 1092 (2008), compels me to concur. Although I agree with the holding of Salamon , namely, that “to commit a kidnapping in conjunction with another crime, a defendant must intend to prevent the victim’s liberation for a longer period of time or to a greater degree than that which is necessary to commit the other crime”; *799 id., 542 ; I disagree with that portion of the analysis in which the court concluded that for more than thirty years, and in innumerable cases, the courts of this state, including this court, have misconstrued our kidnapping statutes. The discussion of legislative acquiescence in the dissent in State v. Salamon, supra, 595-601 , convinces me that the courts of the state, including this court, had not misconstrued General Statutes § 53a-91 et seq. for a period of more than thirty years. Thus, when the petitioner in the present case, Peter Luurtsema, was convicted of kidnapping in 2000, it was in accordance with the laws of this state, which had been consistently interpreted at that time for more than twenty years.
In Salamon , this court adopted a “new rule” expressly overruling the law in existence at the time of the petitioner’s crime and conviction. Id., 542 . As reasoned by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, “[t]o pretend that [past precedent] never existed or applied to any case simply to reach a desired result is disingenuous to the litigants, attorneys and . . . courts that were bound by those decisions.” State v. Lagundoye, 268 Wis. 2d 77, 100 , 674 N.W.2d 526 (2004). To date the United States Supreme Court has not required “new” interpretations of statutes to be applied retroactively in criminal cases, and I would not so provide. See Fiore v. White, 531 U.S. 225 , 121 S. Ct. 712 , 148 L. Ed. 2d 629 (2001). Although I would prefer to follow our longstanding principle of finality of judgments and would deny the petitioner the relief that he seeks, I am compelled to follow the precedent established by Salamon , and, accordingly, concur in the result.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9785180. Public record. Not legal advice.