# Henry v. New Jersey Department of Human Services

> Supreme Court of New Jersey · December 10, 2010 · 204 N.J. 320

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9785115

## Case

- **Full name:** Lula M. Henry, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. New Jersey Department of Human Services; Hon. Clark E. Bruno, Acting Commissioner of Human Services; Trenton State Psychiatric Hospital; Gregory P. Roberts, Chief Executive Officer for Trenton State Psychiatric Hospital, Defendants-Respondents
- **Court:** Supreme Court of New Jersey
- **Decided:** December 10, 2010
- **Citations:** 204 N.J. 320; 9 A.3d 882; 110 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1803; 2010 N.J. LEXIS 1260
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Rabner
- **Judges:** Stern, Rabner, Rivera-Soto, Hoens
- **Cited by:** 224 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9785115

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding instructive of the Framers' intent that early drafts of the 1947 Constitution included language limiting temporary assignments to the Supreme Court to situations in which it was "necessary to make the quorum," but later drafts, and the Constitution as it was adopted, r…
- explaining appellate courts use the same standard of review that a trial court utilizes (de novo) and do not accord special deference to the trial court rulings (citing Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Manalapan Twp. Comm., 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995))
- discussing Roa and v. Princeton Twp., 962 A.2d 1150, 1155 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009) (concluding that the plaintiff’s hostile-work- environment claim was time-barred as his complaint was filed more than two years following the final alleged act of harassment). noting tha…
- stating that to prove pretext at the summary judgment stage, "the plaintiff must show that the employer’s reason was both false and motivated by discriminatory intent.”
- holding limitations under New Jersey civil rights law runs only when claimant learns or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have learned that less qualified Caucasian nurses were hired for the positions

## Opinion text

Chief Justice RABNER,
concurring.
By order dated September 8, 2010, the Presiding Judge for Administration of the Appellate Division, the Honorable Edwin H. Stern, was temporarily assigned to the Supreme Court until further order. As a result, he participated in the resolution of this matter and authored the majority opinion.
Article VI, Section II, Paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution and Rule 2:13-2(a) authorized Judge Stern’s temporary assignment. His service on the Supreme Court is consistent with more than 800 similar assignments made by Chief Justices over the course of four decades. All of those assignments find support in not only the plain language of the modern Constitution but also the recorded intent of the Framers who drafted it.
Now for the first time, there is a dissent to a temporary assignment, in the form of an abstaining opinion, which claims that such assignments are only permissible when needed to make a quorum. But the Framers rejected draft constitutions that would have limited temporary assignments in that manner. They instead adopted a broader approach that allows for greater discretion in making temporary assignments. It was therefore entirely appropriate for Chief Justices to use that authority in the past when there were vacancies on the Court, and it is proper to do so now again.
The Court today has only six members—one short of its full complement—and it is unclear when that will change. In the interim, the current assignment is necessary to address the Court’s substantial workload and meet the needs of the public.
About two thousand matters and issues requiring action will be presented to the Court for consideration this term. Each involves real parties and actual people who are trying to vindicate their rights as they await justice. To meet their needs fairly and *341 expeditiously, the assignment of a judge to serve temporarily on the Supreme Court is necessary.
I.
The relevant language of both the Constitution and the court rule provides the proper starting point for the assignment. Article VI, Section II, Paragraph 1 reads as follows:
The Supreme Court shall consist of a Chief Justice and six Associate Justices. Five members of the court shall constitute a quorum. When necessary, the Chief Justice shall assign the Judge or Judges of the Superior Court, senior in service, as provided by rules of the Supreme Court, to serve temporarily in the Supreme Court.
[N.J. Const. art. VI, § 2, 111 (third sentence hereafter referred to as Temporary Assignment clause).]
Pursuant to that clause, and consistent with the Court’s “exclusive and plenary power over the governance of the judiciary,” In re P.L.2001, Chapter 362, 186 N.J. 368, 382 , 895 A.2d 1128 (2006) (citations omitted), the Supreme Court has adopted the following current rule relating to temporary assignments:
Five members of the court shall constitute a quorum. When necessary to constitute a quorum, to replace a justice who is absent or unable to act, or to expedite the business of the court, the presiding justice may assign one or more retired justices of the Supreme Court who are not engaged in the practice of law and who consent thereto or the judge or judges of the Appellate Division, senior in length of service therein, to serve temporarily in the Supreme Court.
[R. 2:13-2(a).]
The current rule regarding temporary assignments has been in effect since 1978, after multiple prior iterations. See R.R. 1:1-3 (1948); R.R. 1:1-5 (1953); R.R. l:l-5(b) (1967); R. 2:13-2(a) (1978).
For more than forty years, Chief Justices have consistently interpreted and used the above provisions to allow for temporary assignments to the Supreme Court in order to fill vacancies or replace an unavailable Justice. The extensive history of temporary assignments to the Court has been used in a variety of situations. It has not been limited to assignments for quorum purposes, which comprise only a minority of such assignments. *342 Indeed, Chief Justices have made hundreds of temporary assignments even when they were not needed to create a quorum.
Examples of the longstanding practice abound. The lengthiest assignment occurred in the mid-1970s. Beginning on March 31, 1975, when Justice Frederick W. Hall retired, there was a two-year vacancy on the Court until Justice Alan Handler took the oath of office on March 23, 1977. During that period, Appellate Division Judge Milton B. Conford was assigned temporarily to the Court and participated in about 215 matters. 1 He authored more than forty majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions. E.g., Clayton v. Freehold Twp. Bd. of Educ., 67 N.J. 249 , 337 A.2d 361 (1975) (Conford, P.J.A.D., temporarily assigned, writing for unanimous seven-person Court). Chief Justice Richard J. Hughes also intermittently called on Appellate Division Judges Harold Kolovsky, Lawrence A. Carton, Jr., and Joseph Halpern to join Judge Conford and ensure that the Court had a full complement of seven members. E.g., Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford, 72 N.J. 63 , 367 A.2d 864 (1976) (Kolovsky, P.J.A.D., temporarily assigned, writing for majority); Gallo Asphalt Co. v. Sagner, 71 N.J. 405 , 365 A.2d 932 (1976) (Carton, P.J.A.D., temporarily assigned, dissenting); State v. Fearick, 69 N.J. 32 , 350 A.2d 227 (1975) (Halpern, P.J.A.D., temporarily assigned, writing for unanimous Court that included Judge Kolovsky). Judge Donald G. Collester, Sr., was also temporarily assigned to several cases. E.g., Anderson v. Somberg, 67 N.J. 291 , 338 A.2d 1 (1975) (Collester, P.J.A.D., temporarily assigned, joining in dissent on seven-person Court). During this period, in only about a dozen instances out of more than 240 was a temporary assignment necessary for a quorum.
Several years before, during the 1972 term, the retirements of Justices John J. Francis and C. Thomas Sehettino created two vacancies in September 1972. The vacancies lasted for six months *343 until Justices Pierre P. Garven and Mark A. Sullivan were sworn in on March 23, 1973. During that sixth-month period, Chief Justice Joseph Weintraub temporarily assigned a number of Appellate Division judges—primarily, Judges Conford, Arthur W. Lewis, and then-Judge Sullivan—to participate in dozens of cases. Collectively, the three judges were assigned temporarily approximately 150 times, and in only one-third of those instances was the assignment needed to make a quorum. E.g., S.S. & O. Corp. v. Twp. of Bernards Sewerage Awth., 62 N.J. 369 , 301 A.2d 738 (1973) (Lewis, P.J.A.D., temporarily assigned, writing for a seven-person, unanimous Court that included Judges Conford and Sullivan); Wicks v. Cent. R.R. Co. of N.J., 61 N.J. 553 , 296 A.2d 649 (1972) (Sullivan, P.J.A.D., temporarily assigned, writing for a seven-person, unanimous Court that included Judge Conford); Russell v. Salem Transp. Co., 61 N.J. 502 , 295 A.2d 862 (1972) (Conford, P.J.A.D., temporarily assigned, writing for a seven-person, unanimous Court that included Judge Sullivan).
Many other Appellate Division judges have been temporarily assigned to the Supreme Court over the years on a more sporadic basis, when a sitting Justice was not participating for some reason. For example, from late-March 1973 through late-March 1975, when there were no vacancies on the Court, five Appellate Division judges were assigned about 210 times in total. Roughly eighty percent of those assignments were not for quorum purposes. From late-March 1977 to the present, multiple Appellate Division judges have been assigned about 250 times in total. About eighty-five percent of those assignments were not related to quorum needs. Some examples from the past two decades include the temporary assignments of Appellate Division Judges Stern, Michael Patrick King, Sylvia B. Pressler, Stephen Skillman, and others.
It is important to review statistics of temporary assignments in context and not just as an aggregate accumulation of data. The meaning of the data becomes apparent when considered in that way: faced with long-term vacancies, Chief Justices have respond *344 ed with long-term, temporary assignments to enable the Court to function at full strength. Faced with isolated vacancies in sporadic cases, Chief Justices have not always filled them. In those instances, they simply did not exercise the authority they possessed. In neither situation, though, have Chief Justices accepted the narrow quorum-only rule voiced in the abstaining opinion. The flexible language in the Constitution, as discussed below, provides support for the historical approaches taken and also for the September 8, 2010 assignment order.
In the hundreds of instances when Chief Justices have made temporary assignments to the Court, the practice has never been challenged. See McNeil v. Legislative Apportionment Comm’n, 177 N.J. 364, 391 , 828 A.2d 840 (2003) (noting reliance, inter alia, on long and unchallenged usage of constitutional provision). Even today, the parties have neither objected to the temporary assignment nor presented arguments for the Court to consider. Nonetheless, in a departure from recognized practice, the abstaining Justice has raised a constitutional issue on his own—at the same time, ironically, that he notes the virtue of judicial restraint. See post at 370, 9 A.3d at 913 (Rivera-Soto, J., abstaining); see also Randolph Town Ctr., L.P. v. County of Morris, 186 N.J. 78, 80 , 891 A.2d 1202 (2006) (“Courts should not reach a constitutional question unless its resolution is imperative to the disposition of litigation.” (citations omitted)); Comm. to Recall Robert Menendez from the Office of U.S. Senator v. Wells, 204 N.J. 79, 96 , 7 A.3d 720 (2010) (Rivera-Soto & Hoens, JJ., dissenting) (same). 2
*345 To be sure, historical practice alone rarely proves the correctness of a legal proposition. Ultimately, the Court’s longstanding use of temporary assignments depends on the meaning and purpose of the Temporary Assignment clause.
II.
To determine the meaning of a constitutional provision, courts look first “to the precise language used by the drafters.” State v. Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts, Inc., 160 N.J. 505, 527 , 734 A.2d 1160 (1999). If the language is unclear, courts may consider any relevant constitutional history to help ascertain the meaning of the language used. Id. at 527-28 , 734 A.2d 1160 . Here, the plain language of the Temporary Assignment clause provides the Chief Justice discretionary authority to make temporary assignments to the Supreme Court. Relevant constitutional history confirms that the Framers intended the broad language they chose to use.
Article VI of the New Jersey Constitution pertains to the Judiciary. It declares at the outset that “[t]he judicial power shall be vested in a Supreme Court, a Superior Court, and other courts of limited jurisdiction.” N.J. Const. art. VI, § 1, H1. That provision, and Article VI as a whole, reflect the “clear intent” of the modern Constitution “to give to the judiciary the power and thus to impose on them the responsibility for seeing that the judicial system function[s] effectively in the public interest.” Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240, 244 , 74 A.2d 406 (1950).
The Temporary Assignment clause appears as the very next provision in the Constitution. Its first two sentences declare that the Court shall consist of seven members and that five members shall constitute a quorum. N.J. Const. art. VI, § 2, 111. The next sentence provides that “[w]hen necessary, the Chief Justice shall assign the Judge or Judges of the Superior Court, senior in service, as provided by rules of the Supreme Court, to serve temporarily in the Supreme Court.” Ibid.
The plain wording of the phrase “when necessary” affords discretion to decide when temporary assignments are appropriate. The text is not limited to particular situations. Notably, it does *346 not limit assignments to occasions when they are needed to create a quorum. Instead, the language is deliberately broad—consistent with the Judiciary’s broad obligation to serve the public through wise and effective administration of the judicial branch. The precise language in the Constitution about temporary assignments thus provides flexibility to meet that aim.
One legal commentator has argued that the authority to make temporary assignments is not discretionary because the constitutional provision directs that Chief Justices “shall assign” a judge when necessary. See Edward A. Hartnett, Ties in the Supreme Court of New Jersey, 32 Seton Hall L.Rev. 735, 745-46 (2003). Professor Hartnett submits that “[t]here is little sense in imposing a mandatory duty on someone while leaving the determination of when that duty is triggered to that person’s discretion.” Id. at 745. Yet, at various places in the Constitution including elsewhere in Article VI, the Framers did precisely that. See N.J. Const. art. VI, § 3, H 4 (“[T]he Law Division and the Chancery Division shall each exercise the powers and functions of the other division when the ends of justice so require.” (emphasis added)); see also N.J. Const. art. IV, § 6, H 4 (“The Legislature, in order to insure continuity of State, county and local governmental operations in periods of emergency ... shall have the power and the immediate and continuing duty by legislation ... to adopt such other measures as may he necessary and proper for insuring the continuity of governmental operations.” (emphasis added)). In those instances, the text of the Constitution imposes a duty to act once the actor determines that its responsibility is triggered. The Temporary Assignment clause similarly affords discretion but requires action when necessary.
Because the unadorned language of the Temporary Assignment clause provides discretionary authority to decide when to make such assignments, it is not necessary to look further for guidance.
III.
The abstaining opinion suggests that the phrase “when necessary” is limited to assignments needed to meet the quorum *347 requirement. Post at 355, 9 A.3d at 903 (Rivera-Soto, J., abstaining) (quoting N.J. Const. art. VI, § 2, 1Í1). In support of that view, the opinion notes that the phrase follows a sentence that establishes five as a quorum and thus arguably refers only to meeting quorum needs. Ibid.
In essence, the abstaining opinion inserts additional language into the actual text of the Constitution and would have it read as follows: “When necessary to make the quorum, the Chief Justice shall assign____” But the precise words in the Constitution do not support that reading. Had the Framers intended to limit temporary assignments to meeting quorum needs, they would have said so. Instead, they considered and rejected the very language inserted above. We cannot add it back.
A “quorum-only” rule finds support in early drafts of the Constitution, which were rejected in favor of the current broad language. A May 1942 draft prepared by the Commission on Revision of the New Jersey Constitution would have allowed for temporary assignments only “when necessary to constitute a quorum.” 4 Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of 1947, at 561. Identical language appeared in a proposed constitution that was submitted to the voters and defeated in November 1944. Id. at 567. At the 1947 Constitutional Convention, the Committee on the Judiciary invited public comment on a tentative draft of the judicial article dated July 24, 1947, which specified that temporary assignments should occur “[w]hen necessary to make the quorum.” 2 Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of 1947, supra, at 1167.
The restrictive language did not appear in the Committee’s revised report and proposal dated the following week, July 31, 1947. Instead, the new draft eliminated the quorum-only phrase and recommended the discretionary language that ultimately became part of the Constitution: “When necessary, the Chief Justice shall assign [a judge] to serve temporarily in the Supreme Court.” 2 Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of 1947, supra, at 1190. Thus, the evolution of the modern Constitution demon *348 strates the Framers’ intent not to limit temporary assignments to when a quorum was needed.
It has been suggested that the switch in the wording of the Temporary Assignment clause was “merely a stylistic change.” Hartnett, supra, 32 Seton Hall L.Rev. at 744; see also Earl M. Maltz, The Federalist Soc’y for Law & Pub. Policy Studies, Temporary Assignments to Fill Vacancies on the New Jersey Supreme Court 5 (2010), available at http://www.fed-soc.org/ doclib/20100920_NewJerseyWP.pdf. The accompanying report of the Committee on the Judiciary reveals otherwise. In Appendix A to the report, titled “Annotation of Judicial Article,” the Committee specifically addressed the change to Article VI, Section II, Paragraph 1. The Committee explained that “[t]he provision for supplementing the membership of the Supreme Court is operative whenever a Justice is unavailable at the time a case is argued or submitted.” 2 Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of 1917, supra, at 1190 (Judiciary Committee Report) (emphasis added). Not only does that language reject a quorum-only approach, but it also favors the opposite practice of replacing all unavailable justices regardless of the reason for their absence. Next, the report specifically noted that “[pjrovisions of this general character are found in several state constitutions, notably that of New York, to which it was added in 1915 upon recommendation of the Court of Appeals.” Ibid.
The reference to the New York model is instructive. During a constitutional convention in New York in 1915, a proposed amendment to the judicial article provided that the highest court may make temporary assignments for a period of time “[i]n case of the temporary absence or inability to act of any judge of’ that court. 3 State of N.Y. Comm. on Revision and Engrossment, Present *349 Constitution of State of N.Y., with Amendments Thereto (1915), in Documents of the Constitutional Convention of the State of New York, 1915 No. 52, at 33 (J.B. Lyon Co.1915). The New York Committee to the Judiciary explained the reason for the provision in a report to the ratifying convention: “For the purpose of enabling the Court to retain its maximum strength at all times, provision is further made for calling in Justices of the [lower courts] to take the places of Judges of the [highest Court] temporarily disqualified by absence or illness” for a period of time. State of N.Y. Comm. on the Judiciary, Report Relative to the Proposed Amended Judiciary Article (Aug. 13, 1915), in Documents of the Constitutional Convention of the State of New York, 1915, supra, No. 42, at 10 (emphasis added).
By referencing New York’s plan, the 1947 Judiciary Committee Report sheds light on why “when necessary to make the quorum” was replaced with the broader phrase “when necessary”: the power to make temporary appointments was not meant to be confined to establishing a quorum but could be used “whenever a Justice is unavailable at the time a case is argued or submitted,” in order to reach the Court’s maximum strength. 2 Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of 1947, supra, at 1190. 4 The *350 relevant history therefore reveals that the phrase “when necessary” was not a shorthand reference to the rule of necessity, as the abstaining opinion suggests. Post at 355, 9 A.3d at 903-04 (Rivera-Soto, J., abstaining).
Not only does the historical record demonstrate that the Temporary Assignment clause was not intended as a quorum-only rule, but a simple, practical concern tied to the purpose of the Judicial Article also leads to the same conclusion. Imagine a six-member Court evenly divided over an issue for which the Supreme Court’s review constitutes the first instance of judicial review, for example, a continuing matter in which the court expressly retained jurisdiction and for which there is no underlying trial or appellate ruling. Six Justices hearing the matter would constitute a quorum, and an evenly-divided Court would ordinarily result in an affirmance of the Appellate Division. E.g., State v. Basil, 202 N.J. 570, 577 , 998 A.2d 472 (2010) (affirming judgment of Appellate Division because Court divided 3-3); Reyes v. Egner, 201 N.J. 417, 419 , 991 A.2d 216 (2010) (same); Northvale Bd. of Educ. v. Northvale Educ. Ass’n, 192 N.J. 501, 501 , 933 A.2d 596 (2007) (same). But with no existing appellate ruling, a “quorum-only” rule would mean, in effect, that there would be no meaningful judicial review.
*351 Similar problems would arise in evaluating applications for admission to the bar and disciplinary matters—areas in which the Constitution invests the Supreme Court “with exclusive responsibility.” State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 411 , 217 A.2d 441 (1966) (citing N.J. Const. art. VI, § 2, I 3). Certain candidates cannot be admitted to the bar without the Supreme Court’s review and approval. Committee on Character Regulation 304:3. Likewise, only the Supreme Court can temporarily suspend or disbar an attorney. See, e.g., R. 1:20-11, -16(a). In addition, only the Court can review a presentment by the Advisory Committee on Judicial Conduct and discipline a judge. R. 2:15-15, -17. An evenly divided Court’s ruling in any of those areas would not resolve anything.
The appropriate solution, of course, is not to do without judicial review or decisions altogether—the very reasons animating Article VI—but rather to assign a judge temporarily to the Court, even though a quorum exists. The flexible language in the Constitution provides the authority to do so.
IV.
The relevant court rule outlines certain parameters for temporary assignments. Rule 2:13-2(a) in its current form provides that assignments may be made “[w]hen necessary to constitute a quorum, to replace a justice who is absent or unable to act, or to expedite the business of the court.”
As has happened before on a number of occasions, the Court now faces the prospect of proceeding with fewer than seven members for a potentially long period. That prospect needs to be considered in light of the Court’s responsibilities.
During the 2009-2010 court term, a seven-member Court was required to address a significant number of matters. The Court resolved 1,140 petitions for certification, 462 motions, and 177 disciplinary and character matters. It also heard arguments in eighty-eight appeals and thirty-four attorney and judicial disciplinary matters. The Court filed 115 majority, per curiam, concur *352 ring, and dissenting opinions. Individual Justices decided seventy-eight emergent applications. By any measure, that workload is substantial, and there is no reason to expect it will be materially different in the term that is under way. The temporary assignment of a judge is therefore necessary at this time to conduct the work of the Court and attempt to dispense justice expeditiously.
V.
The order entered on September 8, 2010 temporarily assigns the judge of the Appellate Division who is senior in service there, the Honorable Edwin H. Stern. His assignment is consistent with the Constitution and the court rule.
The Constitution provides for the temporary assignment of a judge “of the Superior Court, senior in service, as provided by rules of the Supreme Court.” N.J. Const. art. VI, § 2, 111. Rule 2:13-2(a), in turn, parses among different parts of the Superior Court and specifies that “the judge or judges of the Appellate Division, senior in length of service therein” can “serve temporarily in the Supreme Court.” The Rule also outlines what should occur in the event the senior judge is unable to serve or if two judges have equal seniority. R. 2:13-2(a).
The Rule properly amplifies the Constitution, as contemplated. It is also consistent with the Court’s duty to “make rules governing the administration of all courts.” N.J. Const. art. VI, § 2, § 3. Judge Stern is senior in length of service in the Appellate Division and, as presiding judge for administration, is also the senior-most Appellate Division judge. The September 8, 2010 order therefore rightly calls upon him for temporary assignment to the Supreme Court.
VI.
A dubitante opinion raises a different concern. It contends that a “true constitutional crisis” would arise if a temporarily assigned member of the Court were to cast a deciding, or outcome- *353 determinative, vote in a case. Post at 527, 9 A.3d at 1001 (Hoens, J., dubitante). Nothing in the text or history of the modern Constitution, though, supports that position.
The critical question under Article VI, Section II, Paragraph 1 is whether a temporary appointment is necessary. Once that threshold is crossed, a temporary appointee serves as a member of the Court. The plain language of the Constitution does not limit the authority of an assigned judge. The constitutional text does not set up two classes of jurists: one with the power to cast tie-breaking votes and another without. Instead, the Temporary Assignment clause simply states that the Chief Justice, when necessary, and as provided by the rules of the Court, shall assign the senior judge “to serve temporarily in the Supreme Court.” N.J. Const. art. VI, § 2,11 (emphasis added).
The argument presented misperceives the nature of a temporary assignment to the Supreme Court. The many distinguished Appellate Division judges who have filled that role have not sat in a second tier. Once on the Court, they have functioned as full voting members—for only a temporary period of time—consistent with the authority in the Constitution itself.
VII.
A dispute about the meaning of a constitutional provision, like the Temporary Assignment clause, is properly informed by the language and history of the Constitution. The abstaining Justice’s perception of the current political situation is irrelevant to that analysis. As a result, the baseless claims insinuated in section V of the abstaining opinion have no place in this discussion.
VIII.
The Supreme Court is responsible “for the overall performance of the judicial branch” and has the obligation “to see that the public interest is fully served by the proper functioning of this vital branch of our government.” Thurber v. City of Burlington, 191 N.J. 487, 499 , 924 A.2d 533 (2007) (citing In re Mattera, 34 *354 N.J. 259, 272 , 168 A.2d 38 (1961), and Passaic County Probation Officers’ Assn. v. County of Passaic, 73 N.J. 247, 253 , 374 A.2d 449 (1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Behind the statistics that summarize the Court’s workload are people, businesses, organizations, and others hoping to get relief. They are entitled to thoughtful and prompt consideration in each of the approximately two thousand matters and items they will present to the Court this term. To serve them best, a temporary assignment of a judge is once again necessary to enable the Court to perform its constitutional duties.
Justice RIVERA-SOTO,
abstaining.
Today, while constituted as one Chief Justice, five Associate Justices and a Judge of the Appellate Division selected unilaterally by the Chief Justice, the Court has rendered a decision in this matter. The Court as so constituted is unconstitutional and its acts are ultra vires for three principal reasons. First, the Constitution allows the assignment of a Superior Court Judge to serve on the Supreme Court only “when necessary,” and any such assignment at this juncture simply is not necessary. Further, the methodology this Court has adopted for the selection of who is to serve on assignment to the Supreme Court does not comport with the clear constitutional mandate. Finally, the assignment of a Superior Court Judge to serve on this Court to fill a vacancy resulting from a political impasse between the Executive and the Legislative Branches thrusts the Judiciary into that political thicket, all the while improperly advancing one side’s views in preference over the other’s. For each of those reasons, I abstain.
I.
In language virtually identical to that originally proposed during the Constitutional Convention of 1947 by the Committee on the Judiciary, 1 Article VI, Section II, Paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution provides, in relevant part, as follows:
*355 The Supreme Court shall consist of a Chief Justice and six Associate Justices. Five members of the court shall constitute a quorum. When necessary, the Chief Justice shall assign the Judge or Judges of the Superior Court, senior in service, as provided by rules of the Supreme Court, to serve temporarily in the Supreme Court.
[N.J. Const. art. VI, § II, 111 (emphasis supplied).]
Although the Report of the Committee on the Judiciary noted that “[t]he provision for supplementing the membership of the Supreme Court is operative whenever a Justice is unavailable at the time a case is argued or submitted]),]” Committee on the Judiciary, Report at Appendix “A”, reprinted in II N.J. Const. Conv. 1190 (Aug. 26, 1947), that expansive interpretation was withheld from the citizenry who was asked to vote on that provision. See Summary and Address to the People of New Jersey by the Constitutional Convention of 1947, What the Proposed New State Constitution Means to You, reprinted in II N.J. Const. Conv. 1321 (1947) (explaining solely that “A New Supreme Court is Established [—] The new high court, with a Chief Justice and six Associate Justices, replaces the old 16-member Court of Errors and Appeals!),]” without reference to any mechanism for augmenting Court membership).
The provisions of Article VI, Section II, Paragraph 1—allowing “[w]hen necessary” the “assign[ment of] the Judge or Judges of the Superior Court, senior in service, as provided by rules of the Supreme Court, to serve temporarily in the Supreme Court”— appears on the heels of the quorum clause, a clause requiring that the Supreme Court be constituted by no fewer than “[f]ive members of the court]).]” That juxtaposition is not accidental and allows only one constitutionally permissible interpretation: that the need for any such assignment can arise only by the absence of a quorum, that is, by invoking of the Rule of Necessity, a Rule long recognized in our jurisprudence. As the Supreme Court of *356 the United States explained in describing the quandary that arises when a court cannot convene a quorum,
[i]t was precisely considerations of this kind that gave rise to the Rule of Necessity, a well-settled principle at common law that, as Pollack put it, “although a judge had better not, if it can be avoided, take part in the decision of a case in which he has any personal interest, yet he not only may but must do so if the case cannot be heard otherwise.”
[United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 213 , 101 S.Ct. 471, 480 , 66 L.Ed.2d 392, 405 (1980) (quoting F. Pollack, A First Book of Jurisprudence 270 (6th ed. 1929)).]
The Court further noted that “[t]he Rule of Necessity had its genesis at least five and a half centuries ago. Its earliest recorded invocation was in 1430 [and e]arly cases in this country confirmed the vitality of the Rule.” Id. at 213-14 , 101 S.Ct. at 480 , 66 L.Ed.2d at 405 (footnotes omitted). It emphasized that “[t]he Rule of Necessity has been consistently applied in this country in both state and federal courts.” Ibid., 449 U.S. at 214 , 101 S.Ct. at 480 , 66 L.Ed.2d at 405 .
In line with that consistency in application, New Jersey long ago defined its version of the Rule of Necessity as follows: “[t]o justify a violation of the maxim [in this case, the constitutional mandate that five members of the Court and only five members of the Court are necessary to constitute a quorum], there should be an imperative reason for it, in order to prevent a failure of justice, and in determining that, the greatest care should be exercised,” State ex rel. Wynans v. Crane, 36 N.J.L. 394, 399 (Sup.Ct.1873). That interpretive restriction arising from the Rule of Necessity— limiting the power to assign a Superior Court Judge to serve on the Supreme Court only “when necessary” to constitute a quorum—is echoed by a respected legal scholar, who unqualifiedly asserts that, specifically in respect of Article VI, Section II, Paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution, “[t]he text, its context and its interpretation for the first two decades of practice under the 1947 Constitution demonstrate that this assignment power is available only when the Court would otherwise lack a quorum and that only Superior Court judges may be assigned.” Edward A. Hartnett, Conventional Wisdom is Wrong on N.J. *357 Supreme Court Appointments, 201 N.J.L.J. 631 (Aug. 23, 2010) (emphasis supplied). 2
No doubt, as a result of the recent retirement of a Justice of this Court and the resulting legislative/executive stalemate in confirming his successor, 3 presently there is a vacancy on this Court; hence, the Court currently is constituted by a Chief Justice and five—not six—Associate Justices. The question, then, is whether that vacancy, standing alone, suffices to trigger the “when necessary” condition precedent required by Article VI, Section II, Paragraph 1 of the Constitution to permit the rightful and constitutional assignment of a Superior Court Judge for service on the Supreme Court. It does not.
II.
Our present circumstances are not new: there have been vacancies on the Court and this Court nevertheless has continued its work. That much has remained self-evident throughout this Court’s published history. Addressing exclusively appeals heard and determined 4 since this Court was constituted following the *358 adoption of the 1947 Constitution, the Court has heard and determined nearly five hundred appeals in which only five Justices participated, 5 and nearly eighteen hundred appeals in which only six Justices participated. 6 In contrast, this Court has heard and determined (1) sixty appeals in which it has assigned a Superior Court Judge or Judges “to serve temporarily in the Supreme Court” for purposes of establishing a quorum; 7 (2) seventy-two cases in which, although there was an absence of a quorum of Supreme Court Justices, more Superior Court Judges were assigned than the minimum needed to meet the quorum requirements; 8 and (3) five hundred seventy-two cases in which, although there already was a quorum of at least five Supreme Court Justices, a Superior Court Judge or Judges nevertheless were assigned “to serve temporarily in the Supreme Court[;]” 9 in respect of that third category, the vast majority of those instances occurred when Superior Court Judges were assigned to serve on the Supreme Court during the early 1970’s, due to the death or the extended illness of several Justices. See, e.g., Justices of the Supreme Court, 64 N.J. VII n.1 & 2 (1974) (noting that Judge Conford was “temporarily assigned to serve October 9, 1973 to December 18, 1973, in the absence of Justice Mountain” and that Judge Collester was “temporarily assigned to serve October 18, 1973 to December 18,1973, in the absence of Chief Justice Garvin due to his illness and death; December 19, 1973 to January 2, *359 1974, in the absence of Justice Mountain”); Justices of the Supreme Court, 65 N.J. VII n.1 & 2 (1974) (noting that Judge Kolovsky was “temporarily assigned to serve September 10, 1974 to October 4, 1974, in the absence of Justice Mountain” and that Judge Conford was “temporarily assigned to serve October 7,1974 to October 11,1974, in the absence of Justice Mountain”); Edward A. Hartnett, Ties in the Supreme Court of New Jersey, 32 Seton Hall L.Rev. 735, 752 n.78 (2003) (noting that “temporary assignment of Judge Conford terminated upon appointment of Justice Handler, except to permit him to participate in disposition of matters presented during his temporary assignment”).
The lesson of those compilations is clear: in this Court’s history, it has rendered decisions in more than two thousand one hundred appeals where five or six—but fewer than seven—Justices participated but no Superior Court Judge was assigned to serve on the Supreme Court. Extrapolated to today, it is equally clear that, so long as a quorum is present, it simply is not “necessary” to assign a Superior Court Judge to fill the current vacancy.
That view is supported in the legal academy’s analysis of Article VI, Section II, Paragraph 1 of our Constitution. Professor Hart-nett, the Richard J. Hughes Professor for Constitutional and Public Law and Service at Seton Hall University School of Law, has explained the quorum and assignment provision of the Constitution as follows:
Five members of the court shall constitute a quorum. If a quorum does not attend a session of the court, the senior justice attending may adjourn the court, or, in the absence of all the justices, the clerk may adjourn the court from day to day. When necessary to make a quorum the presiding justice shall assign the senior judge or judges of the Superior Court to serve temporarily. Seniority shall be determined by the order of their appointment to the Superior Court[.]
[Hartnett, supra, 32 Seton Hall L.Rev. at 749.]
Asserting that “the temporary assignment provision should be interpreted as a narrow, mandatory duty applicable only when the court would otherwise lack a quorum,” he concludes that such “interpretation is in accord with the original Rules of Court promulgated under the New Jersey Constitution of 1947.” Ibid. *360 He has noted that “Arthur Vanderbilt was the Chief Justice when these original rules were promulgated by the New Jersey Supreme Court.” Ibid. Describing Chief Justice Vanderbilt as “a man who did not blush easily when asserting power he thought desirable,” id. at 750, Professor Hartnett emphatically has observed that “even Arthur Vanderbilt did not claim that he had the power to temporarily assign judges to the Supreme Court, except to make a quorum.” Ibid. As empirical proof of those conclusions, Professor Hartnett highlights that “on its very first day of issuing decisions, October 4,1948, the new Supreme Court decided several cases with a bare quorum of five[,]” ibid, (footnote omitted), and that “within its first months, the new Supreme Court promulgated a rule that temporary assignments to the Supreme Court would be made when necessary to make the quorum, decided cases with the bare quorum of five, and decided cases with six justices, even where those six were evenly divided.” Ibid.
Likewise, Professor Earl M. Maltz, a Distinguished Professor of Law at Rutgers-Camden School of Law, has noted that “the text and legislative history of the relevant constitutional provisions raise serious questions about whether the constitution endows the chief justice with the authority to” temporarily assign either a retired justice or a senior judge of the Superior Court to fill a vacancy on the Supreme Court. Earl M. Maltz, Temporary Assignments to Fill Vacancies on the New Jersey Supreme Court, available at http://www.fed-soc.org/doelib/20100920_NewJersey WP.pdf. In Professor Maltz’s view, the difficulty in application of the constitutional provision allowing the assignment of a Superior Court Judge to serve temporarily on the Supreme Court arises because “the provision does not explicity state how one determines when it is ‘necessary5 to make a temporary assignment.” Ibid. Acknowledging that the Court in the past has assigned Superior Court Judges to serve “temporarily” on the Supreme Court for extended periods, Professor Maltz notes that, “despite its relatively long pedigree, this regime faces significant constitutional problems.” Ibid.
*361 Analytically, Professor Maltz notes that “[e]learly, the constitution provides for such assignments when necessary to create a quorum of five justices to decide a case.” Ibid. He correctly crystallizes the issue as follows: “whether a temporary assignment is constitutional in situations where five or six of the permanent members of the court remain available to hear and decide a case.” Ibid. He notes that “[a]n earlier draft of the relevant constitutional provision would have made the proper resolution of this issue crystal clear.” Ibid. He explains that
[a]s initially proposed by the committee charged with drafting the judiciary article, the provision had read “[wjhen necessary to make the quorum, the Chief Justice shall assign the Judge or Judges of the Superior Court, senior in service, as provided by the rules of the Supreme Court, to serve temporarily in the Supreme Court.”
[Ibid, (citing Tentative Draft of Judicial Article, § 2,111, 2 N.J. Const. Conv. 1167 (July 24,1947) (emphasis added by author)).]
He describes that “[tjhis language plainly would have limited the appointment authority of the chief justice to cases in which an appointment is necessary to create a quorum of five justices.” Ibid. Describing it as “the key question!,]” Professor Maltz states the crux of the issue starkly: “whether the elimination of the explicit reference to the necessity of the quorum was simply stylistic or was instead designed to significantly expand the power of the chief justice to make temporary appointments.” Ibid.
Conceding that “[t]here is no record of the reasons for the change!,]” Professor Maltz notes that
the contemporaneous rules adopted by the Supreme Court to implement this provision in 1947 were based on the view that the change in language was only stylistic, made in response to the admonition of Governor Alfred E. Driscoll that the Judiciary Committee should make the constitution “brief and very much to the point.”
[Ibid, (citing 4 N.J. Const. Conv. 430 (July 10,1947)).]
He emphasizes that those contemporaneously adopted rules “did provide that the chief justice would have the authority to temporarily appoint the most senior Superior Court Judge if the appointment was necessary to create a quorum of five justices to hear a case!,]” noting that “the rules did not provide for temporary appointments in any other circumstances.” Ibid. (citing N.J. *362 Rev. R. 1:1-3 (1948); emphasis supplied). He additionally explains that “[i]n 1953, while still focusing only on appointments necessary to create a quorum, the rule was revised to track the language of the constitution itself more elosely[,]” describing that “[t]he revised rule stated that ‘[f]ive members of the court shall constitute a quorum. If a quorum does not attend a session of the court ... [w]hen necessary, the presiding judge shall assign the senior judge or judges of the Superior Court to serve temporarily.’ ” Ibid, (citing N.J. Rev. R. 1:1-5 (Gann 1953)). In vivid contrast, he notes that “[i]t was not until 1967—twenty years after the state constitution was adopted—that the rules were changed to allow the chief justice to make temporary assignments despite the presence of a quorum[,]” explaining that “[t]he 1967 amendment transformed the temporary assignment power from one which the chief justice was required to exercise in a specific, narrowly-defined set of circumstances to one in which he has discretion to make such an appointment in a wide variety of amorphous situations.” Ibid.
Professor Maltz also has acknowledged that
[t]he strongest support for a broad reading of the temporary assignment authority is found in the appendix to the report of the Judiciary Committee accompanying the proposed constitution in 1947. The report avers that
[t]he provision for supplementing the membership of the Supreme Court is operative whenever a Justice is unavailable at the time a case is argued or submitted. Provisions of this general character are found in several state constitutions, notably that of New York, to which it was added in 1915 upon recommendation of the Court of Appeals.
[Ibid, (citing Report of the Committee on the Judiciary, 2 N.J. Const. Corn. 1190 (Aug. 26,1947)).]
He promptly debunks that notion, however, observing that “[i]f in fact Article VI was designed to allow for temporary assignments ‘whenever a Justice is unavailable,’ then it would provide constitutional support for a far broader use of such assignments than was allowed prior to 1967.” Ibid. He further notes that “the language of the report is not necessarily dispositive.” Ibid. Supported by the clear and ringing language of this Court’s seminal decision in Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240 , 74 A.2d 406 (1950), he notes *363 that “the members of the Constitutional Convention did not have access to the committee report when voting on the language of Article VI.” Ibid. (citing Winberry, supra, 5 N.J. at 248 , 74 A.2d 406 ). In this context, Winberry is both prophetic and instructive; it explains plainly and without room for debate that
this report of the Judiciary Committee, though dated August 26, 1947, was not handed to the members of the Convention until August 28th, I Convention Proceedings Record 809, two days after the Judicial Article had been adopted by the Convention on August 26th, I Convention Proceedings Record 793. The report of the Judiciary Committee therefore cannot be deemed a part of the parliamentary history of the Constitution, for it was not known to and was not acted upon by the members of the Constitutional Convention in voting in favor of Article VI, creating a new judicial system. The report, moreover, while signed by all of the members of the Committee, concludes by saying, “Although the foregoing is the report of the Judiciary Committee, it is not necessarily to be inferred that the comments therein contained express the views of all members.” Thus not only was the report of the Judiciary Committee from which we have quoted not before the Convention at the time that it acted on Article VI, but a search of the entire proceedings fails to disclose any debate on the meaning of the phrase [“when necessary”]. The chief debate on the Judicial Article was between the merits of the proposal submitted by the Judiciary Committee and another proposal submitted from the floor.
[ Winberry, supra, 5 N.J. at 248-49 , 74 A.2d 406 (emphasis supplied).]
Or, in Professor Maltz’s words, “the report fails to come to grips with the differences between the language of the New Jersey constitution and that of many state constitutions that the report describes as being of the same ‘general character.’ ” Maltz, supra.
Professor Maltz aptly notes that “by its terms the language of the New Jersey constitution seems consciously designed to limit the discretion of the chief justice.” Ibid. He explains that “Article VI vests him with the authority to make temporary assignments only when ‘necessary’ and then requires him to make assignments in those circumstances.” Ibid, (emphasis in original). He posits that “[b]y its nature, the term ‘necessary’ must mean necessary for something!,]” and straightforwardly reasons that “[g]iven that the phrase ‘[w]hen necessary’ follows directly after the description of the requirements for a quorum (rather than after the more general description of the makeup of the court), the most logical reading of the phrase is that it refers to the creation of a quorum.” Ibid. He notes that, “at most, ‘[w]hen necessary’ should be read as *364 ‘when necessary to the fulfillment of the court’s constitutional responsibilities.’ ” Ibid.
He concludes—and I wholeheartedly concur—that when “Measured against this standard, the practice of making temporary assignments cannot be justified in cases where five or six justices are available to hear appeals.” Ibid. He states, quite reasonably, that because “the court has a quorum, the appeals can be heard, considered, and adjudicated.” Ibid. He addresses those instances where an even number of justices may result in a tie, noting that:
To be sure, when six justices hear a ease, they will at times be divided three to three. But while this situation might not be optimal, the appeal will nonetheless have been heard and adjudicated. The only difference between a decision by an equally-divided court and one in which a clear majority of the justices vote to affirm a judgment of the lower court is that no binding precedent will have been created to govern future, similar eases. However, if the legal issue presented by an appeal in fact recurs with any frequency, that issue will probably soon be resolved in some case in which none of the judges feel compelled to recuse themselves.
[Ibid]
That history and analysis leads directly to the question of tie votes.
III.
It cannot be said that whenever the Supreme Court operates at less than full strength but at equal to or more than a quorum of five, it is somehow “necessary” to assign a Superior Court Judge or Judges to serve on the Supreme Court in order to avoid a tie vote; the notion of a “tie” vote—resulting in an affirmance of the decision of the Appellate Division by an equally divided Court— has been accepted both in respect of entire cases or portions of cases. 10 Therefore, the fact that an aggregate of six Justices presently sit on the Court—with the looming specter of “tie” votes—is of no constitutional moment.
*365 Vigorously condemning the practice of assigning a Superior Court Judge to “break a tie” in the Supreme Court as “wrong,” Professor Hartnett exposes the inherent evil of that practice as follows:
The danger, of course, is particularly great in a case where the Supreme Court is otherwise equally divided. Moreover, using a temporary judge to break a tie in the Supreme Court in a case from the Appellate Division is peculiarly misguided when one compares the alternative: Since an equally divided Supreme Court affirms the judgment below, in effect, those judges who decided the ease in the Appellate Division (and there will always be at least two) serve as tie-breakers. In contrast, if the Chief Justice temporarily assigns a particular judge to the Supreme Court in order to break the tie, that single judge is the tie-breaker. Is there any reason at all to prefer a single tie-breaking judge designated by the Chief Justice to the two (or three) tie-breaking judges that decided the case in the Appellate Division?
[Hartnett, supra, 32 Seton Hall L.Rev. at 761-62.]
The answer, of course, is that, in these circumstances, there is no reason—absolutely no reason at all—to prefer a single tie-breaking judge designated by the Chief Justice to the judges who decided the case in the Appellate Division. Stated differently, unless needed for a quorum (thereby triggering the Rule of Necessity), there simply is no constitutionally permissible reason to empower a single Superior Court Judge to determine the outcome of a Supreme Court appeal.
Although not of constitutional dimension, there are segments of the Bar who object to “tie” votes. As one group recently editorialized, tie votes “are not good for either litigants or the Court as an institution!;.]” Editorial, Three’s Not a Charm, 201 N.J.L.J. 394 (Aug. 2, 2010). That group noted that “[s]ome respected scholars, like Professor Edward Hartnett of Seton Hall Law School, have construed this provision [allowing, “when necessary,” the assignment of a Superior Court Judge to serve on the Supreme Court] to apply only when it is needed for the Court to maintain a quorum, which is five members.” Ibid. It further noted that “that construction appears consistent with the practice of the current chief justice and has a reasonable basis in light of the context in which the provision appears in Article VI, [Section II, Paragraph 1.” Ibid. However, it also bemoaned that “[o]ver the years, the *366 Court has not been uniform in how it has treated temporary appointments.” Ibid. 11
In short, however, whether the result of a six-member Court is to be a tie vote is of no constitutional moment; such a vote results in an affirmance based on an equally divided Court, a result, as earlier noted, that this Court has produced any number of times in the past.
Furthermore, as a practical matter, even the September 8, 2010 assignment order that assigns a specific Superior Court Judge “temporarily to the Supreme Court effective September 8, 2010, and until further Order, to participate in new matters presented for the Court’s consideration” has not, standing alone, avoided cases in which less than seven members have heard an appeal. Since the start of the 2010 Term through mid-November, this Court has heard argument in several cases in which either the assigned Superior Court Judge has been unable to sit, or other members of the Court have had to recuse themselves and less than seven members have heard the appeal. For example, during this Court’s first argument sitting of the Term, on September 13-14, 2010, the Court heard six appeals; of these, the assigned Superior Court Judge did not participate in two—or a third—of the argued cases. Yet, the Court has managed to function well enough to hear the remaining four cases and, in fact, to issue already its opinion in some of them. Likewise, in the Court’s second argument cycle of the Term, on September 27-28, the Court again heard six appeals; of these, the assigned Superior Court Judge again did not participate in two—or a third—of those argued cases. And so on. Yet, the machinery of the Judiciary *367 has not come to a halt, and the Republic still stands. In those circumstances, then, why is the assignment of a Superior Court Judge to the Supreme Court, in the words of the Constitution, “necessary”?
IV.
Even if the Chief Justice in fact possesses the authority to appoint a Superior Court Judge to fill a vacancy on the Court despite the presence of a quorum, the methodology followed in this case in making that appointment violates the Constitution.
Obviously, the drafters of the Constitution sought to avoid any claim of favoritism or any tilting of the Court’s direction in any such appointment. They achieved that goal by stripping away any discretion in respect of that appointment; they required that “the Chief Justice shall assign the Judge or Judges of the Superior Court, senior in service, as provided by rules of the Supreme Court, to serve temporarily in the Supreme Court.” N.J. Const. art. VI, § II, H1 (emphasis supplied). That language is clear and unequivocal; its purpose is sound, transparent, and fundamentally honest.
Yet, this Court has adopted Rule 2:13-2(a), a Rule that both unconstitutionally expands and contracts the power of appointment. It provides as follows:
Five members of the court shall constitute a quorum. When necessary to constitute a quorum, to replace a justice who is absent or unable to act, or to expedite the business of the court, the presiding justice may assign one or more retired justices of the Supreme Court who are not engaged in the practice of law and who consent thereto or the judge or judges of the Appellate Division, senior in length of service therein, to serve temporarily in the Supreme Court. If the judge of the Appellate Division senior in service is unable to serve or shall waive assignment, the presiding justice may assign the judge next senior in service; and if 2 or more judges have equal seniority, the presiding justice may assign either or any of them.
[A 2:13-2(a)J
From the plainly stated constitutional restriction that appointments may be made to the Supreme Court only “when necessary” and then only from the Superior Court Judges “senior in service,” *368 the Rule unconstitutionally expands the power of appointment to also include when a justice “is absent or unable to act” or, in an exception that swallows up the constitutional restrictions whole, “to expedite the business of the court[.]” That expansion is not anchored anywhere in the Constitution.
Further, instead of restricting the universe of eligible assignments to the constitutional limitation of “the Judge or Judges of the Superior Court, senior in service, as provided by rules of the Supreme Court,” that Rule allows the assignment of either retired Justices or “the judge or judges of the Appellate Division, senior in length of service therein,” all without even mentioning the limitations on who may be assigned to serve on the Supreme Court the Constitution so clearly and explicitly imposes. Because it was the Constitution that created the Appellate Division as a division of the Superior Court in the first instance, see N.J. Const. art. VI, § IV, It 3, and the drafters of the Constitution did not restrict the universe of those eligible for assignment to the Supreme Court solely to Superior Court Judges assigned to a specific division of that Court—the Appellate Division—the Rule’s limitation of potential assignees, a limitation that appears nowhere in the Constitution, is without any basis in the Constitution. In that same vein, the provisions of the Rule that allow retired Justices to serve on assignment to the Supreme Court far exceeds that which the Constitution, on its face, allows. See, generally, Hartnett, supra, 32 Seton Hall L.Rev. at 752 (describing Rule 2:13-2 as “lawless”).
V.
Finally, in assigning a Superior Court Judge, albeit one from the Appellate Division who may not be the Superior Court Judge “senior in service,” this Court inadvertently is thrust squarely into an impossibly muddled political thicket. 12 As noted earlier, the *369 Legislative and the Executive Branches of our state government are at an impasse: the Governor has nominated a candidate for appointment and confirmation to fill the current vacancy on this Court, and the Legislature has refused to provide its constitutionally required “advice and consent.” See N.J. Const. art. VI, § VI, II1 (“The Governor shall nominate and appoint, with the advice and consent of the Senate, the Chief Justice and associate justices of the Supreme Court[.]”).
Professor Maltz succinctly states the relevant and operative concerns, and deserves citation at length:
Temporary assignments are especially problematic where the assigned judge is filling a vacancy on the court rather than simply replacing a sitting justice who has recused himself or is temporarily absent from the bench for some other reason. Strikingly, the committee report that took a broad reading of the temporary assignment power did not mention vacancies at all; instead, the report refers only to situations where “a Justice is unavailable at the time a case is argued or submitted.” While the two cases might seem similar on their face, the implications for the separation of powers are radically different.
When a sitting justice is temporarily unavailable for any reason, the New Jersey constitution does not vest either the governor or the state legislature with the power to replace him. Thus, if one takes the view that the assignment of a replacement is “necessary,” the chief justice would be the only person with the authority to make the necessary appointment. But when a justice leaves the court permanently, the constitution clearly vests the power to name a replacement not with the chief justice, but rather with the Governor and the state senate.
Of course, a political deadlock between the Governor and the state senate might in theory leave the court short-handed for an extended period of time. But even if this concern is considered to be of constitutional magnitude, the power to deal with the problem is not vested in the chief justice. Instead, the state constitution provides the Governor with the authority to deal with the problem.
[Maltz, supra.]
By indefinitely assigning a judge to serve on the Supreme Court, the Court invariably will be seen as having chosen sides in that impasse; 13 its actions will be interpreted as having cast its *370 lot—and that of the Judiciary as a whole—with the Legislature. That election essentially further will empower the Legislature to withhold, for whatever period it deems appropriate, consideration of any candidate nominated by the Governor, thereby also frustrating that nomination and the exercise of executive power granted in the Constitution to the Governor and the Governor alone.
In doing so, this Court “indicates how far—and how unwisely— it has strayed from the appropriate bounds of its authority.” Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 615 , 84 S.Ct. 1362, 1409 , 12 L.Ed.2d 506, 558 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Indeed, “the Court is not just entering a ‘political thicket’; it is entering a vast wonderland of judicial review of political activity.” Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 649 , 102 S.Ct. 3272, 3292 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1012, 1038 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting). No doubt, the allure of trespassing into grounds our Constitution has preserved for other, co-equal branches of government is as strong as it is vexing. See also De Vesa v. Dorsey, 134 N.J. 420, 423, 426 , 634 A.2d 493 (1993) (affirming, by an equally divided court, dismissal of complaint challenging exercise of “senatorial courtesy,” defining practice as “an unwritten, informal, and unofficial procedure allowing a single senator who resides in or represents any portion of the county in which a nominee is domiciled to veto the appointment without further action by the Senate[,]” and explaining that “[t]his case *371 implicates three principles that define the role of the judiciary in a democracy: judicial review, judicial restraint, and judicial independence”). That, however, provides no cogent excuse for this Court to enter headlong into a broiling political contest of wills between those co-equal branches of government, and then be seen as choosing sides. For a branch of government sustained only by its moral authority, that course of conduct is an unpardonable mistake.
VI.
Professor Hartnett has summed up the issue well: “it is wrong for the Supreme Court to take license with the constitution, particularly with those provisions designed to cabin its own members’ power.” Hartnett, supra, 32 Seton Hall L.Rev. at 761. Our Constitution is clear, both in its words and in its context: a Judge of the Superior Court may be assigned to serve on the Supreme Court only “when necessary” and that term can be understood meaningfully only in the context of when needed to satisfy the quorum requirement. Because, in the absence of any additional recusals, there is a quorum of duly and constitutionally nominated, confirmed and appointed Justices of the Supreme Court, the addition of a Superior Court Judge is not necessary and, hence, unconstitutional. Further, throughout its history, this Court repeatedly has acted—and acted well—with fewer than seven Justices. Moreover, the methodology in place to select who will be assigned to serve on the Supreme Court contravenes the clear dictates of the Constitution and the salutary bulwarks against favoritism and potential bias the framers of that charter wisely incorporated within its borders. Finally, the unseemly rush to appoint a specific Superior Court Judge to serve on the Supreme Court places this Court, and the entire Judiciary, precisely where it ought to avoid: taking sides in a partisan battle between the other governmental branches.
The Constitution, sober and reflective Court practice, and everyday common sense each counsels against the foolhardy steps *372 the Court today takes. For each of those reasons, I abstain; I will continue to abstain from all decisions of this Court for so long as it remains unconstitutionally constituted.
Appendix “A”
Compendium of cases in which only five Justices participated
Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. Burke, 199 N.J. 140 , 971 A.2d 989 (2009).
Educ. Law Ctr. v. N.J. Dep’t of Educ., 198 N.J. 274 , 966 A.2d 1054 (2009).
Penn Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Costa, 198 N.J. 229 , 966 A.2d 1028 (2009).
Jen Elec., Inc. v. County of Essex, 197 N.J. 627 , 964 A.2d 790 (2009).
Abbott v. Burke, 196 N.J. 544 , 960 A.2d 360 (2008).
Cutler v. Dorn, 196 N.J. 419 , 955 A.2d 917 (2008).
In re Virtua-West Jersey Hosp. Voorhees for a Certificate of Need, 194 N.J. 413 , 945 A.2d 692 (2008).
Sensient Colors, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 193 N.J. 373 , 939 A.2d 767 (2008).
In re Liquidation of Integrity Ins. Co., 193 N.J. 86 , 935 A.2d 1184 (2007).
Basil v. Wolf, 193 N.J. 38 , 935 A.2d 1154 (2007).
In re Micheletti, 192 N.J. 588 , 934 A.2d 633 (2007).
In re Contest of the November 8, 2005 General Election for Mayor of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 192 N.J. 546 , 934 A.2d 607 (2007).
In re Ordinance 04-75, 192 N.J. 446 , 931 A.2d 595 (2007).
Acuna v. Turkish, 192 N.J. 399 , 930 A.2d 416 (2007).
Int'l Union of Operating Engineers Local No. 68 Welfare Fund v. Merck & Co., 192 N.J. 372 , 929 A.2d 1076 (2007).
Richardson v. Bd. of Trs., 192 N.J. 189 , 927 A.2d 543 (2007).
In re Rivera-Soto, 192 N.J. 109 , 927 A.2d 112 (2007).
*373 N.J. Tpk. Auth. v. Local 196, I.F.P.T.E., 190 N.J. 283 , 920 A.2d 88 (2007).
In re Opinion 39 of Comm. on Attorney Adver., 190 N.J. 250 , 919 A.2d 845 (2007).
Twp. of Holmdel v. N.J. Highway Auth., 190 N.J. 74 , 918 A.2d 603 (2007).
In Re Supreme Court Advisory Comm. on Prof'l Ethics Opinion No. 697, 188 N.J. 549 , 911 A.2d 51 (2006).
Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp. v. Nowell Amoroso, P. A., 189 N.J. 436 , 916 A.2d 440 (2007).
Malinowski v. Jacobs, 189 N.J. 345 , 915 A.2d 513 (2007).
Simon v. Rando, 189 N.J. 339 , 915 A.2d 509 (2007).
Simon v. Cronecker, 189 N.J. 304 , 915 A.2d 489 (2007).
In re Supreme Court Advisory Comm. on Prof'l Ethics Opinion, No. 697, 188 N.J. 549 , 911 A.2d 51 (2006).
Olivo v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 186 N.J. 394 , 895 A.2d 1143 (2006).
State v. Castagna, 187 N.J. 293 , 901 A.2d 363 (2006).
Thomsen v. Mercer-Charles, 187 N.J. 197 , 901 A.2d 303 (2006).
Olivo v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 186 N.J. 394 , 895 A.2d 1143 (2006).
Weinberg v. Bergen County Democratic Org., 185 N.J. 287 , 884 A.2d 1259 (2005).
In re Fitchett, 184 N.J. 289 , 877 A.2d 263 (2005).
Yurick v. State, 184 N.J. 70 , 875 A.2d 898 (2005).
DKM Residential Props. Corp. v. Twp. of Montgomery, 182 N.J. 296 , 865 A.2d 649 (2005).
Brodsky v. Grinnell Haulers, Inc., 181 N.J. 102 , 853 A.2d 940 (2004).
Lance v. McGreevey, 180 N.J. 590 , 853 A.2d 856 (2004).
Abbott v. Burke, 180 N.J. 444 , 852 A.2d 185 (2004).
*374 Asbury Park Bd. of Educ. v. N.J. Dep’t of Educ., 180 N.J. 108 , 849 A.2d 158 (2004).
Galvao v. G.R. Robert Constr. Co., 179 N.J. 462 , 846 A.2d 1215 (2004).
State v. Spivey, 179 N.J. 229 , 844 A.2d 512 (2004).
Abbott v. Burke, 177 N.J. 578 , 832 A.2d 891 (2003).
Sacharow v. Sacharow, 177 N.J. 62 , 826 A.2d 710 (2003).
In re Niles Trust, 176 N.J. 282 , 823 A.2d 1 (2003).
Azurak v. Corporate Prop. Investors, 175 N.J. 110 , 814 A.2d 600 (2003).
State v. S.R, 175 N.J. 23 , 811 A.2d 439 (2002).
State v. Carty, 174 N.J. 351 , 806 A.2d 798 (2002).
State v. Nelson, 173 N.J. 417 , 803 A.2d 1 (2002).
Carpenter Tech. Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 172 N.J. 504 , 800 A.2d 54 (2002).
State Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Caldeira, 171 N.J. 404 , 794 A.2d 156 (2002).
State v. Carty, 170 N.J. 632 , 790 A.2d 903 (2002).
Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. Burke, 170 N.J. 537 , 790 A.2d 842 (2002).
Fertile v. St. Michael’s Med. Ctr., 169 N.J. 481 , 779 A.2d 1078 (2001).
State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346 , 788 A.2d 746 (2002).
Camden County Energy Recovery Assocs. v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 170 N.J. 246 , 786 A.2d 105 (2001).
Fertile v. St. Michael’s Med. Ctr., 169 N.J. 481 , 779 A.2d 1078 (2001).
Borough of Princeton v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Mercer, 169 N.J. 135 , 777 A.2d 19 (2001).
Roman Check Cashing v. N.J. Dep’t of Banking & Ins., 169 N.J. 105 , 777 A.2d 1 (2001).
*375 McCann v. Clerk of Jersey City, 168 N.J. 285 , 773 A.2d 1151 (2001).
R.J. Gaydos Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Nat’l Consumer Ins. Co., 168 N.J. 255 , 773 A.2d 1132 (2001).
Stryker Corp. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 168 N.J. 138 , 773 A.2d 674 (2001).
State v. Timmendequas, 168 N.J. 20 , 773 A.2d 18 (2001).
Nobrega v. Edison Glen Assocs., 167 N.J. 520 , 772 A.2d 368 (2001).
In re Registrant J.M., 167 N.J. 490 , 772 A.2d 349 (2001).
In re Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co.’s Rate Unbundling, 167 N.J. 377 , 771 A.2d 1163 (2001).
McCann v. Clerk of Jersey City, 167 N.J. 311 , 771 A.2d 1123 (2001).
State v. Thomas, 166 N.J. 560 , 767 A.2d 459 (2001).
Conestoga Title Ins. Co. v. Premier Title Agency, 166 N.J. 2 , 763 A.2d 746 (2000).
Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Farmer, 165 N.J. 609 , 762 A.2d 620 (2000).
DeLisa v. County of Bergen, 165 N.J. 140 , 755 A.2d 578 (2000).
In re Grant of the Charter Sch. Application of Englewood, 164 N.J. 316 , 753 A.2d 687 (2000).
In re Grant of the Charter Sch. Application of the Greater Brunswick Charter Sch., 164 N.J. 314 , 753 A.2d 686 (2000).
Abbott v. Burke, 164 N.J. 84 , 751 A.2d 1032 (2000).
Crews v. Crews, 164 N.J. 11 , 751 A.2d 524 (2000).
State v. Oliver, 162 N.J. 580 , 745 A.2d 1165 (2000).
Summit Bank v. Thiel, 162 N.J. 51 , 740 A.2d 139 (1999).
Earl v. Johnson & Johnson, 158 N.J. 155 , 728 A.2d 820 (1999).
State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463 , 724 A.2d 234 (1999).
Payton v. N.J. Tpk. Auth., 148 N.J. 524 , 691 A.2d 321 (1997).
*376 Sheffield v. Schering Plough Corp., 146 N.J. 442 , 680 A.2d 750 (1996).
State v. Hessen, 145 N.J. 441 , 678 A.2d 1082 (1996).
Bahrle v. Exxon Corp., 145 N.J. 144 , 678 A.2d 225 (1996).
N.J. Tpk. Auth. v. N.J. Tpk. Supervisors Ass’n, 143 N.J. 185 , 670 A.2d 1 (1996).
DiTrolio v. Antiles, 142 N.J. 253 , 662 A.2d 494 (1995).
State v. Petties, 139 N.J. 310 , 654 A.2d 979 (1995).
Jacobs v. Stephens, 139 N.J. 212 , 652 A.2d 712 (1995).
Volb v. G.E. Capital Corp., 139 N.J. 110 , 651 A.2d 1002 (1995).
Becker v. Baron Bros., 138 N.J. 145 , 649 A.2d 613 (1994).
Contey v. N.J. Bell Tel. Co., 136 N.J. 582 , 643 A.2d 1005 (1994).
Crawn v. Campo, 136 N.J. 494 , 643 A.2d 600 (1994).
State v. Smith, 136 N.J. 245 , 642 A.2d 978 (1994).
Horosz v. Alps Estates, 136 N.J. 124 , 642 A.2d 384 (1994).
In re Estate of Dawson, 136 N.J. 1 , 641 A.2d 1026 (1994).
Morton Int'l v. General Accident Ins. Co., 134 N.J. 1 , 629 A.2d 831 (1993).
In re Seaman, 133 N.J. 67 , 627 A.2d 106 (1993).
Strumph v. Schering Corp., 133 N.J. 33 , 626 A.2d 1090 (1993).
Williams v. Bell Tel. Labs. Inc., 132 N.J. 109 , 623 A.2d 234 (1993).
Brady v. N.J. Redistricting Comm’n, 131 N.J. 594 , 622 A.2d 843 (1992).
Save Our Shore Dist. v. N.J. Redistricting Comm’n, 131 N.J. 159 , 619 A.2d 1005 (1992).
Weichert Co. Realtors v. Ryan, 128 N.J. 427 , 608 A.2d 280 (1992).
In re Bock, 128 N.J. 270 , 607 A.2d 1307 (1992).
Benda v. Benda, 122 N.J. 174, 584 A.2d 238 (1990).
Benda v. Benda, 122 N.J. 149, 584 A.2d 220 (1990).
*377 In re Lunetta, 118 N.J. 443 , 572 A.2d 586 (1989).
In re Disciplinary Procedures of Phillips, 117 N.J. 567 , 569 A.2d 807 (1990).
Shaner v. Horizon Bancorp., 116 N.J. 433 , 561 A.2d 1130 (1989).
In re Petition of South Jersey Gas Co., 116 N.J. 251 , 561 A.2d 561 (1989).
Market St. Mission v. Bureau of Rooming & Boarding House Standards, 110 N.J. 335 , 541 A.2d 668 (1988).
Largey v. Rothman, 110 N.J. 204 , 540 A.2d 504 (1988).
P.T. & L. Constr. Co. v. State, Dep’t of Transp., 108 N.J. 539 , 531 A.2d 1330 (1987).
First Family Mortg. Corp. v. Durham, 108 N.J. 277, 528 A.2d 1288 (1987).
In re Rigolosi 107 N.J. 192 , 526 A.2d 670 (1987).
In re Conway, 107 N.J. 168 , 526 A.2d 658 (1987).
Vanchieri v. N.J. Sports & Exposition Auth., 104 N.J. 80 , 514 A.2d 1323 (1986).
Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp., 103 N.J. 643 , 512 A.2d 466 (1986).
Meglino v. Twp. Comm. of Eagleswood, 103 N.J. 144 , 510 A.2d 1134 (1986).
Lukas v. State, Dep’t of Human Services, 103 N.J. 126 , 510 A.2d 1123 (1986).
Garfield Trust Co. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 102 N.J. 420 , 508 A.2d 1104 (1986).
Lang v. Baker, 101 N.J. 147 , 501 A.2d 153 (1985).
Kolitch v. Lindedahl, 100 N.J. 485 , 497 A.2d 183 (1985).
In re Weinroth, 100 N.J. 343 , 495 A.2d 417 (1985).
Dunkin’ Donuts of Am., Inc. v. Middletown Donut Corp., 100 N.J. 166 , 495 A.2d 66 (1985).
*378 Avco Fin. Servs. Consumer Disc. Co. One v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 100 N.J. 27 , 494 A.2d 788 (1985).
In re Templeton, 99 N.J. 365 , 492 A.2d 1001 (1985).
Old Bridge Bd. of Educ. v. Old Bridge Educ. Ass’n, 98 N.J. 523 , 489 A.2d 159 (1985).
In re Sadofski, 98 N.J. 434 , 487 A.2d 700 (1985).
Nappe v. Anschelewitz, Barr, Ansell & Bonello, 97 N.J. 37 , 477 A.2d 1224 (1984).
Knesz v. Cent. Jersey Bank & Trust Co., 97 N.J. 1 , 477 A.2d 806 (1984).
McMenamy v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 95 N.J. 139 , 469 A.2d 920 (1983).
N.J. State Bar Ass’n v. N.J. Ass’n of Realtor Bds., 94 N.J. 449 , 467 A.2d 577 (1983).
Joseph H. Reinfeld, Inc. v. Schieffelin & Co., 94 N.J. 400 , 466 A.2d 563 (1983).
N.J. State Bar Ass’n v. N.J. Ass’n. of Realtor Bds., 93 N.J. 470 , 461 A.2d 1112 (1983).
In re Schedule of Rates for Barnert Memorial Hosp., 92 N.J. 31 , 455 A.2d 469 (1983).
State, Dep’t of Law & Pub. Safety, Div. of State Police v. State Troopers Fraternal Ass’n of N.J., 91 N.J. 464 , 453 A.2d 176 (1982).
Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chemical Corp., 91 N.J. 386 , 451 A.2d 179 (1982).
General Assembly of N.J. v. Byrne, 90 N.J. 376 , 448 A.2d 438 (1982).
Broadway Maint. Corp. v. Rutgers, State Univ., 90 N.J. 253 , 447 A.2d 906 (1982).
Pomanowski v. Monmouth County Bd. of Realtors, 89 N.J. 306 , 446 A.2d 83 (1982).
Uston v. Resorts Int’l Hotel, Inc., 89 N.J. 163 , 445 A.2d 370 (1982).
*379 N.J. Civil Serv. Ass’n v. State, 88 N.J. 605 , 443 A.2d 1070 (1982). Gilbert v. Gladden, 87 N.J. 275 , 432 A.2d 1351 (1981).
Haynes v. First Nat’l State Bank, 87 N.J. 163 , 432 A.2d 890 (1981).
Paul Kimball Hosp., Inc. v. Brick Twp. Hosp., Inc., 86 N.J. 429 , 432 A.2d 36 (1981).
Brighton, Inc. v. Colonial First Nat’l Bank, 86 N.J. 259 , 430 A.2d 902 (1981).
GATX Terminals Corp. v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 86 N.J. 46 , 429 A.2d 355 (1981).
Autotote, Ltd. v. N.J. Sports & Exposition Auth., 85 N.J. 363 , 427 A.2d 55 (1981).
State v. Maguire, 84 N.J. 508 , 423 A.2d 294 (1980).
Levine v. State Dep’t of Institutions & Agencies, 84 N.J. 234 , 418 A.2d 229 (1980).
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Estate of Simmons, 84 N.J. 28 , 417 A.2d 488 (1980).
In re Rabb, 83 N.J. 109 , 415 A.2d 1168 (1980).
Salorio v. Glaser, 82 N.J. 482 , 414 A.2d 943 (1980).
Gottfried v. The Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 82 N.J. 478 , 414 A.2d 544 (1980).
Darrell v. Governing Body of Twp. of Clark, 82 N.J. 426 , 413 A.2d 610 (1980).
Calabrese v. Trenton State Coll., 82 N.J. 321 , 413 A.2d 315 (1980).
Galligan v. Westfield Ctr. Serv., Inc., 82 N.J. 188 , 412 A.2d 122 (1980).
Heir v. Degnan, 82 N.J. 109 , 411 A.2d 194 (1980).
Cold Indian Springs Corp. v. Twp. of Ocean, 81 N.J. 502 , 410 A.2d 652 (1980).
In re Application of McCabe, 81 N.J. 462 , 409 A.2d 1158 (1980).
*380 In re Mirabelli, 79 N.J. 597, 401 A.2d 1090 (1979).
State v. Cerbo, 78 N.J. 595 , 397 A.2d 671 (1979).
Boyarin v. N.J. Tpk. Auth., 75 N.J. 434 , 383 A.2d 117 (1978).
Creek Ranch, Inc. v. N.J. Tpk. Auth., 75 N.J. 421 , 383 A.2d 110 (1978).
In re Fairfield Gen. Corp., 75 N.J. 398 , 383 A.2d 98 (1978).
IAC, Ltd. v. Princeton Porsche-Audi, 75 N.J. 379 , 382 A.2d 1125 (1978).
Tumarkin v. First Nat’l State Bank, 75 N.J. 373 , 382 A.2d 1122 (1978).
K.S.B. Technical Sales v. N. Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm’n of N.J., 75 N.J. 272 , 381 A.2d 774 (1977).
State v. Smith, 75 N.J. 81 , 379 A.2d 1275 (1977).
Lyons Farms Tavern, Inc. v. Mun. Bd. of Alcoholic Beverage Control of Newark, 68 N.J. 44 , 342 A.2d 204 (1975).
State v. DiCarlo, 67 N.J. 321 , 338 A.2d 809 (1975).
O’Connor v. Altus, 67 N.J. 106 , 335 A.2d 545 (1975).
Cashen v. Spann, 66 N.J. 541 , 334 A.2d 8 (1975).
La Stella v. Garcia Estates, Inc., 66 N.J. 297 , 331 A.2d 1 (1975).
Scanlon v. Gen. Motors Corp., 65 N.J. 582 , 326 A.2d 673 (1974).
Redding v. Burlington County Welfare Bd., 65 N.J. 439 , 323 A.2d 477 (1974).
State v. Clark, 65 N.J. 426 , 323 A.2d 470 (1974).
State v. Parmigiani, 65 N.J. 154 , 320 A.2d 161 (1974).
Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. The Cont’l Ins. Cos., 65 N.J. 152 , 319 A.2d 732 (1974).
State v. Melvin, 65 N.J. 1, 319 A.2d 450 (1974).
Oglesby v. Am. Dredging Co., 64 N.J. 538 , 318 A.2d 14 (1974).
*381 Torres v. Trenton Times Newspaper, 64 N.J. 458 , 317 A.2d 361 (1974).
State v. Carter, 64 N.J. 382 , 316 A.2d 449 (1974).
Lipsit v. Leonard, 64 N.J. 276 , 315 A.2d 25 (1974).
S. Ocean Landfill, Inc. v. Mayor of Ocean, 64 N.J. 190 , 314 A.2d 65 (1974).
State v. Hatch, 64 N.J. 179 , 313 A.2d 797 (1973).
Parkinson v. J. & S. Tool Co., 64 N.J. 159 , 313 A.2d 609 (1974).
Dunellen Bd. of Educ. v. Dunellen Educ. Ass’n, 64 N.J. 17 , 311 A.2d 737 (1973).
Burlington County Coll. Faculty Ass’n v. Bd. of Trs., 64 N.J. 10 , 311 A.2d 733 (1973).
State v. Dalonges, 64 N.J. 9, 311 A.2d 733 (1973).
Bd. of Educ. of Englewood v. Englewood Teachers Ass’n, 64 N.J. 1 , 311 A.2d 729 (1973).
In re Sgro, 63 N.J. 538 , 310 A.2d 459 (1973).
In re Queenan, 61 N.J. 579 , 297 A.2d 3 (1972).
In re the Petition of S. Lakewood Water Co., 61 N.J. 230 , 294 A.2d 13 (1972).
Nisivoccia v. City of Newark, 60 N.J. 499 , 291 A.2d 143 (1972).
Affiliated Distillers Brands Corp. v. Sills, 60 N.J. 342 , 289 A.2d 257 (1972).
Twp. Comm. of Morris v. Bd. of Educ. of Morris, 60 N.J. 186 , 287 A.2d 449 (1972).
State v. King, 59 N.J. 525 , 284 A.2d 350 (1971).
Williams v. Williams, 59 N.J. 229 , 281 A.2d 273 (1971).
Salerno v. McGraw-Edison Indus., 59 N.J. 129 , 279 A.2d 835 (1971).
Manzo v. City of Plainfield, 59 N.J. 30 , 279 A.2d 706 (1971).
*382 A. & B. Auto Stores of Jones St., Inc. v. City of Newark, 59 N.J. 5 , 279 A.2d 693 (1971).
R.L. Mulliken, Inc. v. City of Englewood, 59 N.J. 1 , 279 A.2d 691 (1971).
Mickens v. Marascio, 58 N.J. 569 , 279 A.2d 666 (1971).
Lander v. Vill. of S. Orange, 58 N.J. 509 , 279 A.2d 633 (1971).
Wojcik v. Bd. of Review, Div. of Employment Sec., 58 N.J. 341 , 277 A.2d 529 (1971).
State v. Conyers, 58 N.J. 123 , 275 A.2d 721 (1971).
Capodanno v. Capodanno, 58 N.J. 113, 275 A.2d 441 (1971).
Rutgers v. Kugler, 58 N.J. 113 , 275 A.2d 441 (1971).
Crescent Park Tenants Ass’n v. Realty Equities Corp. of N.Y., 58 N.J. 98 , 275 A.2d 433 (1971).
Miselly Masons, Inc. v. D.H. Overmyer Co., 58 N.J. 39 , 274 A.2d 584 (1971).
Levin v. Twp. Comm. of Bridgewater, 57 N.J. 506 , 274 A.2d 1 (1971).
Risley v. Kirkman, 56 N.J. 464 , 267 A.2d 50 (1970).
Am. B.D. Co. v. House of Seagrams, Inc., 56 N.J. 164 , 265 A.2d 544 (1970).
Di Giovanni v. Pessel, 55 N.J. 188, 260 A.2d 510 (1970).
N.J. State AFL-CIO v. Bryant, 55 N.J. 171, 260 A.2d 225 (1969).
Jackson v. Concord Co., 54 N.J. 113 , 253 A.2d 793 (1969).
State v. Morse, 54 N.J. 32 , 252 A.2d 723 (1969).
State v. Briley, 53 N.J. 498 , 251 A.2d 442 (1969).
Willis v. Sec. Ins. Group, 53 N.J. 260 , 250 A.2d 129 (1969).
Dep’t of Health v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 53 N.J. 248 , 250 A.2d 11 (1969).
DeLorenzo v. Bd. of Review, 53 N.J. 143 , 249 A.2d 68 (1969).
*383 In re Estate of Wallace, 53 N.J. 137 , 249 A.2d 65 (1969).
Grubb v. Wyckoff, 52 N.J. 599 , 247 A.2d 481 (1968).
Bergen v. Koppenal, 52 N.J. 478 , 246 A.2d 442 (1968).
Koslow v. Mun. Council of Wayne, 52 N.J. 441 , 245 A.2d 729 (1968).
State v. Magee, 52 N.J. 352 , 245 A.2d 339 (1968).
Goldberg v. Traver, 52 N.J. 344 , 245 A.2d 334 (1968).
65 McKinley Ave., Inc. v. City of E. Orange, 52 N.J. 338 , 245 A.2d 332 (1968).
City of E. Orange v. Palmer, 52 N.J. 329, 245 A.2d 327 (1968).
State v. Mathis, 52 N.J. 238 , 245 A.2d 20 (1968).
Totten v. Gruzen, 52 N.J. 202 , 245 A.2d 1 (1968).
Diamond v. N.J. Bell Tel. Co., 51 N.J. 594 , 242 A.2d 622 (1968).
Oleyar v. Swift & Co., 51 N.J. 470 , 242 A.2d 321 (1968).
State v. Dent, 51 N.J. 428 , 241 A.2d 833 (1968).
McLaughlin v. Bassing, 51 N.J. 410, 241 A.2d 450 (1968).
State v. Alvarado, 51 N.J. 375 , 240 A.2d 677 (1968).
Cohen v. First Camden Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 51 N.J. 11 , 237 A.2d 257 (1967).
Booth v. Bd. of Adjustment, Rockaway Twp., 50 N.J. 302 , 234 A.2d 681 (1967).
In re Trust Estate of Moore, 50 N.J. 131 , 232 A.2d 641 (1967).
Jackman v. Bodine, 50 N.J. 127 , 232 A.2d 419 (1967).
B. v. O., 50 N.J. 93 , 232 A.2d 401 (1967).
State v. Krempecki, 50 N.J. 50 , 231 A.2d 811 (1967).
State v. Bacsko, 50 N.J. 49 , 231 A.2d 811 (1967).
State v. Oliver, 50 N.J. 39, 231 A.2d 805 (1967).
State v. Funicello, 49 N.J. 553 , 231 A.2d 579 (1967).
*384 In re the Petition of the Erie-Lackawanna R.R. Co., 48 N.J. 567 , 227 A.2d 129 (1967).
Jacobs v. Jacobs, 48 N.J 361, 225 A.2d 570 (1966).
In re Estate of Burke, 48 N.J. 50 , 222 A.2d 273 (1966).
In re Contempt of Carton, 48 N.J. 9 , 222 A.2d 92 (1966).
Bayonne v. Palmer, 47 N.J. 520 , 221 A.2d 741 (1966).
Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Cent. R.R. Co. of N.J., 47 N.J. 508 , 221 A.2d 735 (1966).
Bd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Palmer, 47 N.J. 488 , 221 A.2d 724 (1966).
In re Duckworth, 47 N.J. 235 , 220 A.2d 110 (1966).
Devlin v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 47 N.J. 126 , 219 A.2d 523 (1966).
Jaquith & Co. v. Island Creek Coal Co., 47 N.J. 111 , 219 A.2d 514 (1966).
McClintock v. Trenton, 47 N.J. 102 , 219 A.2d 510 (1966).
Rubens v. Wiss Bldg. Assocs., 47 N.J. 53 , 219 A.2d 176 (1966).
Garden State Dev. Co. v. Markowitz, 47 N.J. 1 , 218 A.2d 857 (1966).
State v. Pickles, 46 N.J. 542 , 218 A.2d 609 (1966).
State v. Smith, 46 N.J. 510 , 218 A.2d 147 (1966).
In re Presentment of the Essex County Grand Jury, 46 N.J. 467 , 217 A.2d 874 (1966).
Del. River Port Auth. v. Hughes, 46 N.J. 451 , 217 A.2d 865 (1966).
Highway Trailer Co. v. Donna Motor Lines, Inc., 46 N.J. 442 , 217 A.2d 617 (1966).
State v. Cerce, 46 N.J. 387 , 217 A.2d 319 (1966).
State v. Johnson, 46 N.J. 289 , 216 A.2d 392 (1966).
Hallman v. State Parole Bd., 46 N.J. 279 , 216 A.2d 387 (1966).
State v. Schultz, 46 N.J. 254 , 216 A.2d 372 (1966).
State v. Portee, 46 N.J. 239 , 216 A.2d 227 (1966).
*385 Ekalo v. Constructive Serv. Corp. of Am., 46 N.J. 82 , 215 A.2d 1 (1965).
State v. Bisaccia, 45 N.J. 504 , 213 A.2d 185 (1965).
State v. Contursi 44 N.J. 422 , 209 A.2d 829 (1965).
State v. Dennis, 43 N.J. 418 , 204 A.2d 868 (1964).
State v. Tyson, 43 N.J. 411 , 204 A.2d 864 (1964).
State v. LaFera, 42 N.J. 97 , 199 A.2d 630 (1964).
Alberti v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 41 N.J. 147 , 195 A.2d 297 (1963).
In re Forgotson, 40 N.J. 581 , 194 A.2d 233 (1963).
State v. Lanza, 39 N.J. 595 , 190 A.2d 374 (1963).
State v. LaPierre, 39 N.J. 156 , 188 A.2d 10 (1963).
U.S. Steel Corp. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 38 N.J. 533 , 186 A.2d 266 (1962).
Wiramal Corp. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 36 N.J. 201 , 175 A.2d 631 (1961).
Levin v. Twp. of Livingston, 35 N.J. 500 , 173 A.2d 391 (1961).
525 Main St. Corp. v. Eagle Roofing Co., 34 N.J. 251 , 168 A.2d 33 (1961).
Deubel v. Kervick, 33 N.J. 568, 166 A.2d 561 (1960).
Bd. of Dirs. of Ajax Electrothermic Corp. v. First Nat’l Bank of Princeton, 33 N.J. 456 , 165 A.2d 513 (1960).
Margaritell v. Caldwell Twp., 33 N.J. 453 , 165 A.2d 298 (1960).
State v. Murray, 33 N.J. 393 , 165 A.2d 161 (1960).
Steger v. Schellenger, 33 N.J. 293 , 163 A.2d 377 (1960).
Dep’t of Mental Health of Kentucky v. Mullins, 31 N.J. 598 , 158 A.2d 527 (1960).
Ratsch v. Holderman, 31 N.J. 458 , 158 A.2d 24 (1960).
Krauth v. Geller, 31 N.J. 270 , 157 A.2d 129 (1960).
Graham v. Green, 31 N.J. 207 , 156 A.2d 241 (1959).
*386 B.R. Waldron & Sons Co. v. Venezia, 31 N.J. 161 , 155 A.2d 769 (1959).
Depew v. Twp. of Hillsborough, 31 N.J. 157 , 155 A.2d 766 (1959).
Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44 , 155 A.2d 90 (1959).
State v. McDonald, 30 N.J. 126 , 152 A.2d 143 (1959).
Walter E. Heller & Co. v. Hammond Appliance Co., 29 N.J. 589 , 151 A.2d 537 (1959).
State v. Van Buren, 29 N.J. 548 , 150 A.2d 649 (1959).
N.Y., Susquehanna & W. R.R. Co. v. Bd. of Pub. Util. Comm’rs, 29 N.J. 513 , 150 A.2d 656 (1959).
Napierkowski v. Twp. of Gloucester, 29 N.J. 481 , 150 A.2d 481 (1959).
Saddle River Country Day Sch. v. Borough of Saddle River, 29 N.J. 468 , 150 A.2d 34 (1959).
State v. West, 29 N.J. 327 , 149 A.2d 217 (1959).
Franklin Discount Co. v. Ford, 27 N.J. 473 , 143 A.2d 161 (1958).
Angermeier v. Borough of Sea Girt, 27 N.J. 298 , 142 A.2d 624 (1958).
Russo v. United States Trucking Corp., 26 N.J. 430 , 140 A.2d 206 (1958).
The Cent. R.R. Co. of N.J. v. Neeld, 26 N.J. 188 , 139 A.2d 119 (1958).
The Cent. R.R. Co. of N.J. v. Neeld, 26 N.J. 172 , 139 A.2d 110 (1958).
Engelbretson v. Am. Stores, 26 N.J. 106 , 139 A.2d 19 (1958).
Jorgensen v. Pa. R.R. Co., 25 N.J. 541 , 138 A.2d 24 (1958).
Martin v. Bengue, Inc., 25 N.J. 359 , 136 A.2d 626 (1957).
In re Application of the Del., Lackawanna & W. R.R. Co., 25 N.J. 353 , 136 A.2d 413 (1957).
*387 In re Application of the N.Y., Susquehanna & W. R.R. Co., 25 N.J. 343 , 136 A.2d 408 (1957).
Hertz Washmobile Sys. v. The Vill. of S. Orange, 25 N.J. 207 , 135 A.2d 524 (1957).
Auto-Rite Supply Co. v. Mayor & Twp. Committeemen of Woodbridge, 25 N.J. 188 , 135 A.2d 515 (1957).
Republic Factors, Inc. v. Carteret Work Uniforms, 24 N.J. 525 , 133 A.2d 6 (1957).
In re Estate of Dickerson, 24 N.J. 513 , 132 A.2d 805 (1957).
Murray v. Hudson Dispatch, 24 N.J. 487 , 132 A.2d 793 (1957).
Grofo Realty Co. v. City of Bayonne, 24 N.J. 482 , 132 A.2d 802 (1957).
Wagner v. The Mayor of Newark, 24 N.J. 467 , 132 A.2d 794 (1957).
Stamato v. Agamie, 24 N.J. 309 , 131 A.2d 745 (1957).
Kozesnik v. Twp. of Montgomery, 24 N.J. 154 , 131 A.2d 1 (1957).
Minter v. Bendix Aviation Corp., 24 N.J. 128 , 130 A.2d 809 (1957).
Consol. Police & Firemen’s Pension Fund Comm’n v. City of
Passaic, 23 N.J. 645 , 130 A.2d 377 (1957).
Jacobs v. Rothstein, 23 N.J. 641 , 130 A.2d 384 (1957).
Denbo v. Twp. of Moorestown, 23 N.J. 476 , 129 A.2d 710 (1957).
Buzzone v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 23 N.J. 447 , 129 A.2d 561 (1957).
Ford v. Reichert, 23 N.J. 429 , 129 A.2d 439 (1957).
Ellenstein v. Herman Body Co., 23 N.J. 348 , 129 A.2d 268 (1957).
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Local No. 449 of Int'l Union of Elec. & Radio, 23 N.J. 170 , 128 A.2d 457 (1957).
State v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 23 N.J. 38 , 127 A.2d 169 (1956).
Trs. of Princeton Univ. v. Trust Co. of N.J., 22 N.J. 587 , 127 A.2d 19 (1956).
*388 Louis Schlesinger Co. v. Wilson, 22 N.J. 576 , 127 A.2d 13 (1956).
Yanuzzi v. The Mayor of Spring Lake, 22 N.J. 567 , 126 A.2d 873 (1956).
In re Petition of Sheffield Farms Co., 22 N.J. 548 , 126 A.2d 886 (1956).
First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. MacGarvie, 22 N.J. 539 , 126 A.2d 880 (1956).
Friedman v. Tappan Dev. Corp., 22 N.J. 523 , 126 A.2d 646 (1956).
DeFazio v. Haven Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 22 N.J. 511 , 126 A.2d 639 (1956).
Ledden v. Ehnes, 22 N.J. 501 , 126 A.2d 633 (1956).
Ferdinand v. Agricultural Ins. Co. of Watertown, 22 N.J. 482 , 126 A.2d 323 (1956).
Adams Newark Theatre Co. v. City of Newark, 22 N.J. 472 , 126 A.2d 340 (1956).
Taylor v. N.J. Highway Auth., 22 N.J. 454 , 126 A.2d 313 (1956).
Van Sweringen v. Van Sweringen, 22 N.J. 440 , 126 A.2d 334 (1956).
Honey v. Brown, 22 N.J. 433 , 126 A.2d 354 (1956).
Bank of Commerce v. Markakos, 22 N.J. 428 , 126 A.2d 346 (1956).
Newark Publ’rs Ass’n v. Newark Typographical Union No. 103, 22 N.J. 419 , 126 A.2d 348 (1956).
State v. Brown, 22 N.J. 405 , 126 A.2d 161 (1956).
Journeymen Barbers, Hairdressers & Cosmetologists’ Int’l Union of Am., Local 687 v. Pollino, 22 N.J. 389 , 126 A.2d 194 (1956).
Krosnowski v. Krosnowski, 22 N.J. 376 , 126 A.2d 182 (1956).
Bailey v. Council of the Div. of Planning & Dev., 22 N.J. 366 , 126 A.2d 189 (1956).
Fifth St. Pier Corp. v. City of Hoboken, 22 N.J. 326 , 126 A.2d 6 (1956).
*389 State v. D’Ippolito, 22 N.J. 318 , 126 A.2d 1 (1956).
Swede v. City of Clifton, 22 N.J. 303 , 125 A.2d 865 (1956).
Loeb v. Peter F. Pasbjerg & Co., 22 N.J. 95 , 123 A.2d 522 (1956).
Latzoni v. City of Garfield, 22 N.J. 84 , 123 A.2d 531 (1956).
A.J. & J.O. Pilar, Inc. v. Lister Corp., 22 N.J. 75 , 123 A.2d 536 (1956).
Daly v. Daly, 21 N.J. 599 , 123 A.2d 3 (1956).
Lindroth v. Christ Hosp., 21 N.J. 588 , 123 A.2d 10 (1956).
Graybar Elec. Co. v. Mfrs. Cas. Co., 21 N.J. 517 , 122 A.2d 624 (1956).
Gerber v. Bd. of Review, 20 N.J. 561 , 120 A.2d 436 (1956).
Mahoney v. Nitroform Co., 20 N.J. 499 , 120 A.2d 454 (1956).
In re the Sworn Application of Tiene, 19 N.J. 149 , 115 A.2d 543 (1955).
Lionel Corp. v. Grayson-Robinson Stores, 15 N.J. 191 , 104 A.2d 304 (1954).
In re Revision in Rates Filed by N.J. Power & Light Co., 15 N.J. 82 , 104 A.2d 1 (1954).
Beirn v. Morris, 14 N.J. 529 , 103 A.2d 361 (1954).
Kagan v. Berman, 14 N.J. 467 , 102 A.2d 765 (1954).
Herr v. Herr, 13 N.J. 79 , 98 A.2d 55 (1953).
Greenspan v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 12 N.J. 456 , 97 A.2d 413 (1953).
In re Application of Hardman for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, 12 N.J. 360 , 96 A.2d 794 (1953).
Harker v. McKissock, 12 N.J. 310 , 96 A.2d 660 (1953).
E.Ridgelawn Cemetery v. Winne, 11 N.J. 459 , 94 A.2d 833 (1953).
In re Estate of Armour, 11 N.J. 257 , 94 A.2d 286 (1953).
*390 Air-Way Branches, Inc. v. Bd. of Review, 10 N.J. 609 , 92 A.2d 771 (1952).
State v. Hardman, 10 N.J. 468 , 92 A.2d 27 (1952).
Del., Lackawanna & W. R.R. Co. v. City of Hoboken, 10 N.J. 418 , 91 A.2d 739 (1952).
State v. Meinken, 10 N.J. 348 , 91 A.2d 721 (1952).
State v. Doto, 10 N.J. 318 , 91 A.2d 337 (1952).
O’Neil v. Bilotta, 10 N.J. 308 , 91 A.2d 231 (1952).
Schanerman v. Everett & Carbin, Inc., 10 N.J. 215 , 89 A.2d 689 (1952).
In re Application of Caruso, 10 N.J. 184 , 89 A.2d 661 (1952).
Reinhardt v. Passaic-Clifton Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 9 N.J. 607 , 89 A.2d 242 (1952).
Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co. v. Reading Co., 9 N.J. 606 , 89 A.2d 242 (1952).
Savarese v. Pyrene Mfg. Co., 9 N.J. 595 , 89 A.2d 237 (1952).
Fountain v. Fountain, 9 N.J. 558 , 89 A.2d 8 (1952).
Holly v. Meyers Hotel & Tavern, Inc., 9 N.J. 493 , 89 A.2d 6 (1952).
Marchitto v. Cent. R.R. Co. of N.J., 9 N.J. 456 , 88 A.2d 851 (1952).
State v. Shiren, 9 N.J. 445 , 88 A.2d 601 (1952).
Delawanna Iron & Metal Co. v. Albrecht, 9 N.J. 424 , 88 A.2d 616 (1952).
Schmidt v. Bd. of Adjustment of Newark, 9 N.J. 405 , 88 A.2d 607 (1952).
Hill v. Bor. of Collingswood, 9 N.J. 369 , 88 A.2d 506 (1952).
In re Isserman, 9 N.J. 316 , 88 A.2d 199 (1952).
Struyk v. Samuel Braen’s Sons, 9 N.J. 294 , 88 A.2d 201 (1952).
Robison v. Robison, 9 N.J. 288 , 88 A.2d 202 (1952).
*391 In re Isserman, 9 N.J. 269 , 87 A.2d 903 (1952).
165 Augusta St., Inc. v. Collins, 9 N.J. 259 , 87 A.2d 889 (1952).
Baron v. Peoples Nat’l Bank of Secaucus, 9 N.J. 249 , 87 A.2d 898 (1952).
Nichols v. Bd. of Educ. of Jersey City, 9 N.J. 241 , 87 A.2d 894 (1952).
Jaroszewski v. Cent. R.R. Co. of N.J., 9 N.J. 231 , 87 A.2d 705 (1952).
Craster v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Newark, 9 N.J. 225 , 87 A.2d 721 (1952).
Frank v. Frank’s Inc., 9 N.J. 218 , 87 A.2d 724 (1952).
Leeds v. Harrison, 9 N.J. 202 , 87 A.2d 713 (1952).
State v. Pa. R.R. Co., 9 N.J. 194 , 87 A.2d 709 (1952).
Scarborough Apartments, Inc. v. City of Englewood, 9 N.J. 182 , 87 A.2d 537 (1952).
Riverview Gardens, Section One, Inc. v. Bor. of N. Arlington, 9 N.J. 167 , 87 A.2d 425 (1952).
Allegro v. Afton Vill. Corp., 9 N.J. 156 , 87 A.2d 430 (1952).
Houston Petrol. Co. v. Auto. Prods. Credit Ass’n, Inc., 9 N.J. 122 , 87 A.2d 319 (1952).
deVries v. The Evening Journal Ass’n, 9 N.J. 117 , 87 A.2d 317 (1952).
Januszewski v. Pub. Serv. Coordinated Transp., 9 N.J. 107 , 87 A.2d 19 (1952).
Lakutis v. Greenwood, 9 N.J. 101 , 87 A.2d 23 (1952).
Sokol v. Liebstein, 9 N.J. 93 , 87 A.2d 1 (1952).
The Motorlease Corp. v. Mulroony, 9 N.J. 82 , 86 A.2d 765 (1952).
Danek v. Hommer, 9 N.J. 56 , 87 A.2d 5 (1952).
Meyer v. Bd. of Educ., 9 N.J. 46 , 86 A.2d 761 (1952).
Strang v. S. Jersey Broad. Co., 9 N.J. 38 , 86 A.2d 777 (1952).
*392 Tagliabue v. Twp. of N. Bergen, 9 N.J. 32 , 86 A.2d 773 (1952).
In re Avis, 9 N.J. 27 , 86 A.2d 771 (1952).
Flint Frozen Foods, Inc. v. Firemen’s Ins. Co. of Newark, 8 N.J. 606, 86 A.2d 673 (1952).
Flexmir, Inc. v. Lindeman & Co., 8 N.J. 602 , 86 A.2d 585 (1952).
In re the Accounting of the Executors of Koretzky, 8 N.J. 506 , 86 A.2d 238 (1951).
George Siegler Co. v. Norton, 8 N.J. 374, 86 A.2d 8 (1952).
Hoffman v. Hoffman, 8 N.J. 157 , 84 A.2d 441 (1951).
A.C. Schultes & Sons v. Twp. of Haddon, 8 N.J. 103 , 83 A.2d 896 (1951).
Pa.-Reading Seashore Lines v. Bd. of Pub. Util. Comm’rs, 8 N.J. 85 , 83 A.2d 774 (1951).
The Nat’l State Bank of Newark v. Stuart, 8 N.J. 72 , 83 A.2d 715 (1951).
Capone v. Norton, 8 N.J. 54, 83 A.2d 710 (1951).
Horsman Dolls, Inc. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm’n of N.J., 7 N. J. 541, 82 A.2d 177 (1951).
Cent. R.R. Co. of N.J. v. Dep’t of Pub. Utils., 7 N.J. 247 , 81 A.2d 162 (1951).
State v. Janiec, 6 N.J. 608 , 80 A.2d 94 (1951).
Weaver v. N.J. Dep’t of Civil Serv., 6 N.J. 553 , 79 A.2d 305 (1951).
Shields v. The Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 6 N.J. 517 , 79 A.2d 297 (1951).
Weaver v. Twp. of N. Bergen, 6 N.J. 475 , 79 A.2d 286 (1951).
Employers Liab. Assurance Corp. v. Haidt, 6 N.J. 471 , 79 A.2d 308 (1951).
Bankers Trust v. Bacot, 6 N.J. 426 , 78 A.2d 904 (1951).
Seylaz v. Bennett, 5 N.J. 168, 74 A.2d 309 (1950).
*393 Wolff v. Veterans of Foreign Wars, Post 4715, 5 N.J. 143 , 74 A.2d 253 (1950).
In re The Evening Journal Ass’n, 5 N.J. 142 , 74 A.2d 303 (1950).
Brinn v. Mennen Co., 4 N.J. 610 , 73 A.2d 541 (1950).
Sheild v. Welch, 4 N.J. 563 , 73 A.2d 536 (1950).
Eberhard v. Eberhard, 4 N.J. 535 , 73 A.2d 554 (1950).
Green’s Hotel v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 4 N.J. 517 , 73 A.2d 349 (1950).
Flexmir, Inc. v. Lindeman & Co., 4 N.J. 509 , 73 A.2d 243 (1950).
Truhlar v. Borough of E. Paterson, 4 N.J. 490, 73 A.2d 163 (1950).
Kays v. Town of Newton, 4 N.J. 356, 73 A.2d 64 (1950).
Moses v. Edward H. Ellis, Inc., 4 N.J. 315, 72 A.2d 856 (1950).
State v. Pierce, 4 N.J. 252 , 72 A.2d 305 (1950).
Corson v. Keane, 4 N.J. 221, 72 A.2d 314 (1950).
Cresse v. Nuneville, 4 N.J. 128, 71 A.2d 715 (1950).
Nat’l Bank of N.J. v. Div. Tax Appeals, 2 N.J. 570, 67 A.2d 458 (1949).
Jamouneau v. Div. of Tax Appeals, 2 N.J. 325, 66 A.2d 534 (1949).
Zanzonico v. Zanzonico, 2 N.J. 309, 66 A.2d 530 (1949).
Agnew v. Am. Ice Co., 2 N.J. 291, 66 A.2d 330 (1949).
Anschelewitz v. Belmar, 2 N.J. 178, 65 A.2d 825 (1949).
Wilber v. Owens, 2 N.J. 167, 65 A.2d 843 (1949).
Matawan Bank v. Matawan Tile Co., 2 N.J. 116, 65 A.2d 729 (1949).
Bruns v. Mattocks, 2 N.J. 83, 65 A.2d 745 (1949).
Steinbrugge v. Steinbrugge, 2 N.J. 77, 65 A.2d 606 (1949).
Pa. R.R. Co. v. N.J. State Aviation Comm’n, 2 N.J. 64, 65 A.2d 61 (1949).
Williams v. Evenstein, 2 N.J. 60, 65 A.2d 521 (1949).
*394 Huber v. New England Tree Expert Co., 2 N.J. 53, 65 A.2d 514 (1949).
Handler v. Horns, 2 N.J. 18 , 65 A.2d 523 (1949).
Isserman v. Isserman, 2 N.J. 1 , 65 A.2d 508 (1949).
Marx v. Rice, 1 N.J. 574 , 65 A.2d 48 (1949).
DeMuro v. Martini, 1 N.J. 516 , 64 A.2d 351 (1949).
Duffcon Concrete Prods. v. Borough of Cresskill, 1 N.J. 509 , 64 A.2d 347 (1949).
N.J. Realty Title v. Div. of Tax Appeals, 1 N.J. 496 , 64 A.2d 341 (1949).
Dickerson v. Camden Trust Co., 1 N.J. 459 , 64 A.2d 214 (1949).
Hoyt v. Orcutt, 1 N.J. 454 , 64 A.2d 212 (1949).
Gallena v. Scott, 1 N.J. 430 , 64 A.2d 77 (1949).
Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Herbert, 1 N.J. 426 , 64 A.2d 75 (1949).
Russo v. Wright Aeronautical Corp., 1 N.J. 417 , 64 A.2d 71 (1949).
Town of Kearny v. Div. of Tax Appeals, 1 N.J. 409 , 64 A.2d 67 (1949).
Nixon v. Borough of Matawan, 1 N.J. 408, 64 A.2d 66 (1949).
Toth v. Bigelow, 1 N.J. 399 , 64 A.2d 62 (1949).
State v. Hogan, 1 N.J. 375 , 63 A.2d 886 (1949).
Miske v. Habay, 1 N.J. 368 , 63 A.2d 883 (1949).
Taber v. State Bd. of Registration & Examination in Dentistry of N.J., 1 N.J. 343 , 63 A.2d 535 (1949).
Temple v. Clinton Trust Co., 1 N.J. 219 , 62 A.2d 690 (1948).
Kaplan v. Meranus, 1 N.J. 219 , 62 A.2d 689 (1948).
Rottinger v. Friedhof, 1 N.J. 206 , 62 A.2d 683 (1948).
New Jersey Bankers Ass’n v. Van Riper, 1 N.J. 193 , 62 A.2d 677 (1948).
*395 L. Bamberger & Co. v. Div. of Tax Appeals, 1 N.J. 151 , 62 A.2d 389 (1948).
Nauman v. Cent. & Lafayette Realty Co., 1 N.J. 124 , 62 A.2d 218 (1948).
Atlas Fence Co. v. W. Ridgelawn Cemetery, 1 N.J. 110 , 62 A.2d 212 (1948).
Chipolone v. Mun. Council of Clifton, 1 N.J. 93 , 61 A.2d 896 (1948).
Oldfield v. N.J. Realty Co., 1 N.J. 63 , 61 A.2d 767 (1948).
State v. Wesler, 1 N.J. 58 , 61 A.2d 746 (1948).
Lakewood Express Serv. v. Bd. of Pub. Util. Comm’rs, 1 N.J. 45 , 61 A.2d 730 (1948).
Sanders v. Jarka, 1 N.J. 36 , 61 A.2d 641 (1948).
Spence v. Maier, 1 N.J. 36 , 61 A.2d 590 (1948).
State v. Van Riper, 1 N.J. 14 , 61 A.2d 503 (1948).
Appendix “B”
Compendium of cases in wkich only six Justices participated
Comm. to Recall Robert Menendez from the Office of U.S. Senator v. Wells, 204 N.J. 79 , 7 A.3d 720 (2010).
Alexander v. Seton Hall Univ., 204 N.J. 219 , 8 A.3d 198 (2010).
In re Expungement Petition of D.H., 204 N.J. 7 , 6 A.3d 421 (2010).
Lewis v. Harris, 202 N.J. 340 , 997 A.2d 227 (2010).
Estate of Hanges v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369 , 997 A.2d 954 (2010).
State v. Basil, 202 N.J. 570 , 998 A.2d 472 (2010).
Linden Bd. of Educ. v. Linden Educ. Ass’n ex rel. Mizichko, 202 N.J. 268 , 997 A.2d 185 (2010).
Guido v. Duane Moms LLP, 202 N.J. 79 , 995 A.2d 844 (2010).
*396 State v. Carvajal, 202 N.J. 214 , 996 A.2d 1029 (2010).
Salzano v. N. Jersey Media Group Inc., 201 N.J. 500 , 993 A.2d 778 (2010).
State v. Mai 202 N.J. 12 , 993 A.2d 1216 (2010).
In re Gross, 202 N.J. 39 , 994 A.2d 523 (2010).
City of Atl. City v. Trupos, 201 N.J. 447 , 992 A.2d 762 (2010).
Reyes v. Egner, 201 N.J. 417 , 991 A.2d 216 (2010).
In re Petition for Referendum on Trenton Ordinance 09-02, 201 N.J. 349 , 990 A.2d 1109 (2010).
State v. McCabe, 201 N.J. 34 , 987 A.2d 567 (2010).
Zabilowicz v. Kelsey, 200 N.J. 507 , 984 A.2d 872 (2009).
Highland Lakes Country Club & Cmty. Ass’n v. Nicastro, 201 N.J. 123 , 988 A.2d 90 (2009).
In re State Grand Jury Investigation, 200 N.J. 481 , 983 A.2d 1097 (2009).
In re Attorney Gen. ’s “Directive on Exit Polling: Media & NonPartisan Pub. Interest Groups”, 200 N.J. 283 , 981 A.2d 64 (2009).
State v. Taccetta, 200 N.J. 183 , 975 A.2d 928 (2009).
Pellicer ex rel. Pellicer v. St. Barnabas Hosp., 200 N.J. 22 , 974 A.2d 1070 (2009).
Fernandez v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 199 N.J. 591 , 974 A.2d 1031 (2009).
Berk Cohen Assocs. v. Borough of Clayton, 199 N.J. 432 , 972 A.2d 1141 (2009).
Shore Orthopaedic Group, LLC v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc’y, 199 N.J. 310 , 972 A.2d 381 (2009).
Lee v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 199 N.J. 251 , 971 A.2d 1054 (2009).
G.H. v. Twp. of Galloway, 199 N.J. 135 , 971 A.2d 401 (2009).
Leang v. Jersey City Bd. of Educ., 198 N.J. 557 , 969 A.2d 1097 (2009).
*397 Twp. of W. Orange v. 769 Assocs., 198 N.J. 529 , 969 A.2d 1080 (2009).
DEG, LLC v. Twp. of Fairfield, 198 N.J. 242 , 966 A.2d 1036 (2009).
State v. Vallejo, 198 N.J. 122 , 965 A.2d 1181 (2009).
Bosland v. Warnock Dodge, Inc., 197 N.J. 543 , 964 A.2d 741 (2009).
M. S. v. Millburn Police Dep’t, 197 N.J. 236 , 962 A.2d 515 (2008).
Sroczynski v. Milek, 197 N.J. 36 , 961 A.2d 704 (2008).
Borough of Glassboro v. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 108, 197 N.J. 1 , 960 A.2d 735 (2008).
Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. Burke, 196 N.J. 451 , 956 A.2d 923 (2008).
In re Estate of Stockdale, 196 N.J. 275 , 953 A.2d 454 (2008).
In re Taylor, 196 N.J. 162 , 952 A.2d 1025 (2008).
N. J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88 , 952 A.2d 436 (2008).
Mason v. City of Hoboken, 196 N.J. 51 , 951 A.2d 1017 (2008).
State v. Ingram, 196 N.J. 23 , 951 A.2d 1000 (2008).
Amerada Hess Corp. v. Burlington County Planning Bd., 195 N.J. 616 , 951 A.2d 970 (2008).
McMahon v. City of Newark, 195 N.J. 526 , 951 A.2d 185 (2008).
Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 195 N.J. 231 , 948 A.2d 1285 (2008).
Bedford v. Riello, 195 N.J. 210 , 948 A.2d 1272 (2008).
State v. Rodriguez, 195 N.J. 165 , 949 A.2d 197 (2008).
State v. Burr, 195 N.J. 119 , 948 A.2d 627 (2008).
Sinclair v. Merck & Co., 195 N.J. 51 , 948 A.2d 587 (2008).
Cruz v. Cent. Jersey Landscaping, Inc., 195 N.J. 33 , 947 A.2d 1228 (2008).
*398 Villa v. Short, 195 N.J. 15 , 947 A.2d 1217 (2008).
Owens v. Feigin, 194 N.J. 607 , 947 A.2d 653 (2008).
Romagnola v. Gillespie, Inc., 194 N.J. 596 , 947 A.2d 646 (2008).
Rutgers Cas. Ins. Co. v. LaCroix, 194 N.J. 515 , 946 A.2d 1027 (2008).
Reilly v. AAA Mid-Atl. Ins. Co. of N.J., 194 N.J. 474 , 946 A.2d 564 (2008).
Wein v. Morris, 194 N.J. 364 , 944 A.2d 642 (2008).
In re Alleged Improper Practice Under Section XI, Paragraph A(d) of the Port Auth. Labor Relations Instruction, 194 N.J. 314 , 944 A.2d 611 (2008).
Toll Bros. v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Burlington, 194 N.J. 223 , 944 A.2d 1 (2008).
State v. Chun, 194 N.J. 54 , 943 A.2d 114 (2008).
Oberhand v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 193 N.J. 558 , 940 A.2d 1202 (2008).
State v. Sloane, 193 N.J. 423 , 939 A.2d 796 (2008).
In re Kivler, 193 N.J. 332 , 939 A.2d 216 (2008).
State v. Froland, 193 N.J. 186 , 936 A.2d 947 (2007).
State v. O’Neill, 193 N.J. 148 , 936 A.2d 438 (2007).
Maglies v. Estate of Guy, 193 N.J. 108 , 936 A.2d 414 (2007).
Northvale Bd. Of Educ. v. Northvale Educ. Ass’n, 192 N.J. 501 , 933 A.2d 596 (2007).
State v. Parks, 192 N.J. 483 , 933 A.2d 586 (2007).
Pascack Valley Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. Pascack Valley Reg’l Support Staff Ass’n, 192 N.J. 489 , 933 A.2d 589 (2007).
State v. Parks, 192 N.J. 483 , 933 A.2d 586 (2007).
State v. Meyer, 192 N.J. 421 , 930 A.2d 428 (2007).
D’Annunzio v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 192 N.J. 110 , 927 A.2d 113 (2007).
*399 In re Advisory Comm. on Prof'l Ethics Opinion 705, 192 N.J. 46 , 926 A.2d 839 (2007).
In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19 , 926 A.2d 350 (2007).
State v. Williams, 192 N.J. 1 , 926 A.2d 340 (2007).
State v. Francis, 191 N.J. 571 , 926 A.2d 305 (2007).
State v. Clark, 191 N.J. 503 , 924 A.2d 542 (2007).
Thurber v. City of Burlington, 191 N.J. 487 , 924 A.2d 533 (2007).
State v. Jimenez, 191 N.J. 453 , 924 A.2d 513 (2007).
In re Gordon, 191 N.J. 451 , 924 A.2d 512 (2007).
In re Lead Paint Litig., 191 N.J. 405 , 924 A.2d 484 (2007).
Raspa v. Office of Sheriff of County of Gloucester, 191 N.J. 323 , 924 A.2d 435 (2007).
In re Venezia, 191 N.J. 259 , 922 A.2d 1263 (2007).
Iliadis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 191 N.J. 88 , 922 A.2d 710 (2007).
Brenman v. Demello, 191 N.J. 18 , 921 A.2d 1110 (2007).
State v. Wakefield, 190 N.J. 397 , 921 A.2d 954 (2007).
First Union Nat’l Bank v. Penn Salem Marina, Inc., 190 N.J. 342 , 921 A.2d 417 (2007).
Toll Bros. v. Twp. of W. Windsor, 190 N.J. 61 , 918 A.2d 595 (2007).
Bd. of Educ. of Borough of Alpha, Warren County v. Alpha Educ. Assoc., 190 N.J. 34 , 918 A.2d 579 (2006).
State v. Fortin, 189 N.J. 579 , 917 A.2d 746 (2007).
State v. Fleischman, 189 N.J. 539 , 917 A.2d 722 (2007).
T.H. v. Div. of Developmental Disabilities, 189 N.J. 478 , 916 A.2d 1025 (2007).
J.D.A. v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 189 N.J. 413 , 915 A.2d 1041 (2007).
Carmona v. Resorts Int'l Hotel, Inc., 189 N.J. 354 , 915 A.2d 518 (2007).
*400 N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M, 189 N.J. 261 , 914 A.2d 1265 (2007).
Hodges v. Sasil Corp., 189 N.J. 210 , 915 A.2d 1 (2007).
State v. Samuels, 189 N.J. 236 , 914 A.2d 1250 (2007).
Davidson v. Slater, 189 N.J. 166 , 914 A.2d 282 (2007).
State v. O’Hagen, 189 N.J. 140 , 914 A.2d 267 (2007).
A.A ex rel. B.A v. Attorney Gen. of N.J., 189 N.J. 128 , 914 A.2d 260 (2007).
State v. Dispoto, 189 N.J. 108 , 913 A.2d 791 (2007).
Muhammad v. County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Del., 189 N.J. 1 , 912 A.2d 88 (2006).
Wiese v. Dedhia, 188 N.J. 587 , 911 A.2d 479 (2006).
In re Mathesius, 188 N.J. 496, 910 A.2d 594 (2006).
Lanco, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 188 N.J. 380 , 908 A.2d 176 (2006).
State v. Mahoney, 188 N.J. 359 , 908 A.2d 162 (2006).
In re T.T., 188 N.J. 321 , 907 A.2d 416 (2006).
State v. Pierce, 188 N.J. 155 , 902 A.2d 1195 (2006).
State v. Thomas, 188 N.J. 137 , 902 A.2d 1185 (2006).
Hardwicke v. American Boychoir Sch., 188 N.J. 69 , 902 A.2d 900 (2006).
Marshall v. Klebanov, 188 N.J. 23 , 902 A.2d 873 (2006).
N.J. Transit Bus Operations, Inc. v. Amalgamated Transit Union, 187 N.J. 546 , 902 A.2d 209 (2006).
Infinity Broad. Corp. v. N.J. Meadowlands Comm’n, 187 N.J. 212 , 901 A.2d 312 (2006).
State v. Thomas, 187 N.J. 119 , 900 A.2d 797 (2006).
Prado v. State, 186 N.J. 413 , 895 A.2d 1154 (2006).
In re P.L. 2001, Chapter 362, 186 N.J. 368 , 895 A.2d 1128 (2006).
*401 Fitzgerald v. Stanley Roberts, Inc., 186 N.J. 286 , 895 A.2d 405 (2006).
Pasqua v. Council, 186 N.J. 127 , 892 A.2d 663 (2006).
N.J. Lawyers’ Fund for Client Prot. v. Pace, 186 N.J. 123 , 892 A.2d 661 (2006).
State v. Gyori, 185 N.J. 422 , 887 A.2d 156 (2005).
St. Peter’s Univ. Hosp. v. Lacy, 185 N.J. 1 , 878 A.2d 829 (2005).
Shankman v. State, 184 N.J. 187 , 876 A.2d 269 (2005).
French v. Hernandez, 184 N.J. 144 , 875 A.2d 943 (2005).
Serrano v. Serrano, 183 N.J. 508 , 874 A.2d 1058 (2005).
DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477 , 874 A.2d 1039 (2005).
Murawski v. CNA Ins. Co., 183 N.J. 423 , 874 A.2d 530 (2005).
Pinto v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 183 N.J. 405 , 874 A.2d 520 (2005).
Schundler v. Donovan, 183 N.J. 383 , 874 A.2d 506 (2005).
Mun. Council v. James, 183 N.J. 361 , 873 A.2d 544 (2005).
Cumberland Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 183 N.J. 344 , 873 A.2d 534 (2005).
Thiedemann v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 183 N.J. 234 , 872 A.2d 783 (2005).
Nav-Its, Inc. v. Selective Ins. Co., 183 N.J. 110 , 869 A.2d 929 (2005).
In re Harris, 182 N.J. 594 , 868 A.2d 1011 (2005).
Price v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 182 N.J. 519 , 867 A.2d 1181 (2005).
Moon v. Warren Haven Nursing Home, 182 N.J. 507 , 867 A.2d 1174 (2005).
State v. Branch, 182 N.J. 338 , 865 A.2d 673 (2005).
Szczuvelek v. Harborside Healthcare Woods Edge, 182 N.J. 275 , 865 A.2d 636 (2005).
Abbott v. Burke, 182 N.J. 153 , 862 A.2d 538 (2004).
*402 Info. Spectrum, Inc. v. The Hartford, 182 N.J. 34 , 860 A.2d 926 (2004).
Furst v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 182 N.J. 1 , 860 A.2d 435 (2004).
State v. Reddish, 181 N.J. 553 , 859 A.2d 1173 (2004).
State v. Jarrells, 181 N.J. 538 , 859 A.2d 451 (2004).
State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391 , 859 A.2d 364 (2004).
State v. Hodde, 181 N.J. 375 , 858 A.2d 1126 (2004).
Casinelli v. Manglapus, 181 N.J. 354 , 858 A.2d 1113 (2004).
Auto Lenders Acceptance Corp. v. Gentilini Ford, Inc., 181 N.J. 245 , 854 A.2d 378 (2004).
Estate of Frankl v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co, 181 N.J. 1 , 853 A.2d 880 (2004).
In re the Petition for Authorization to Conduct a Referendum on the Withdrawal of N. Haledon Sch. District from the Passaic County Manchester Reg’l High Sch. District, 181 N.J. 161 , 854 A.2d 327 (2004).
State v. Guenther, 181 N.J. 129 , 854 A.2d 308 (2004).
Tarr v. Ciasulli, 181 N.J. 70 , 853 A.2d 921 (2004).
In re Keri, 181 N.J. 50 , 853 A.2d 909 (2004).
State v. Moore, 181 N.J. 40 , 853 A.2d 903 (2004).
State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13 , 853 A.2d 887 (2004).
Varsolona v. Breen Capital Servs. Corp., 180 N.J. 605 , 853 A.2d 865 (2004).
State v. Brown, 180 N.J. 572 , 853 A.2d 260 (2004).
State v. Bunch, 180 N.J. 534 , 853 A.2d 238 (2004).
Dziewiecki v. Bakula, 180 N.J. 528 , 853 A.2d 234 (2004).
N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. P.P., 180 N.J. 494 , 852 A.2d 1093 (2004).
In re Freshwater Wetlands Prot. Act Rules, 180 N.J. 478 , 852 A.2d 1083 (2004).
*403 James v. Petitioners for Initiative & Referendum Challenging Neward City Ordinance No. 6S & FH, 180 N.J. 456 , 852 A.2d 192 (2004).
In re Freshwater Wetlands Prot. Act Rules, 180 N.J. 415 , 852 A.2d 167 (2004).
Univ. of Mass. Mem’l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Christodoulou, 180 N.J. 334 , 851 A.2d 636 (2004).
State v. Ways, 180 N.J. 171 , 850 A.2d 440 (2004).
Comparato v. Schait, 180 N.J. 90 , 848 A.2d 770 (2004).
Selective Ins. Co. of Am. v. Thomas, 179 N.J. 616 , 847 A.2d 578 (2004).
In re of the N.J. Individual Health Coverage Program’s Readoption of N.J.A.C. 11:20-1 et seq., 179 N.J. 570 , 847 A.2d 552 (2004). State v. Cook, 179 N.J. 533 , 847 A.2d 530 (2004).
Island Venture Assocs. v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 179 N.J. 485 , 846 A.2d 1228 (2004).
Maw v. Advanced Clinical Communs., Inc., 179 N.J. 439 , 846 A.2d 604 (2004).
Borteck v. Riker, Danzig, Scherer, Hyland & Perretti, LLP, 179 N.J. 246 , 844 A.2d 521 (2004).
Craft v. Stevenson Lumber Yard, Inc., 179 N.J. 56 , 843 A.2d 1076 (2004).
Verdicchio v. Ricca, 179 N.J. 1 , 843 A.2d 1042 (2004).
State v. Fortin, 178 N.J. 540 , 843 A.2d 974 (2004).
State v. Milne, 178 N.J. 486 , 842 A.2d 140 (2004).
State v. P.H., 178 N.J. 378 , 840 A.2d 808 (2004).
State v. Jenkins, 178 N.J. 347 , 840 A.2d 242 (2004).
Macedo v. Dello Russo, 178 N.J. 340 , 840 A.2d 238 (2004).
State v. Oliphant, 178 N.J. 245 , 837 A.2d 1089 (2003).
In re Gallo, 178 N.J. 115 , 835 A.2d 682 (2003).
*404 In re N.J. Individual Health Coverage Program’s Readoption of N.J.A.C. 11:20-1, 178 N.J. 106 , 835 A.2d 321 (2003).
State v. Natale, 178 N.J. 51 , 834 A.2d 1024 (2003).
State v. Greeley, 178 N.J. 38 , 834 A.2d 1016 (2003).
State v. Artwell, 177 N.J. 526 , 832 A.2d 295 (2003).
Jumpp v. City of Ventnor, 177 N.J. 470 , 828 A.2d 905 (2003).
Lockley v. Dep’t of Corr., 177 N.J. 413 , 828 A.2d 869 (2003).
State v. Holland, 176 N.J. 344 , 823 A.2d 38 (2003).
Tischler v. Watts, 177 N.J. 243 , 827 A.2d 1036 (2003).
State v. Garron, 177 N.J. 147 , 827 A.2d 243 (2003).
N.J. Transit Carp. v. Cat in the Hat, LLC, 177 N.J. 29 , 826 A.2d 690 (2003).
Hous. Auth. v. Suydam Investors, L.L.C., 177 N.J. 2, 826 A.2d 673 (2003).
Crippen v. Cent. Jersey Concrete Pipe Co., 176 N.J. 397 , 823 A.2d 789 (2003).
Torneo v. Thomas Whitesell Constr. Co., 176 N.J. 366 , 823 A.2d 769 (2003).
State v. Holland, 176 N.J. 344 , 823 A.2d 38 (2003).
Kosmowski v. Atl. City Med. Ctr., 175 N.J. 568 , 818 A.2d 319 (2003).
Nisivoccia v. Glass Gardens, Inc., 175 N.J. 559 , 818 A.2d 314 (2003).
Van Note-Harvey Assocs., P.C. v. Twp. of E. Hanover, 175 N.J. 535 , 816 A.2d 1041 (2003).
State v. Brooks, 175 N.J. 215 , 814 A.2d 1051 (2002).
Mortara v. Cigna Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 174 N.J. 566 , 811 A.2d 404 (2002).
Lonegan v. State, 174 N.J. 435 , 809 A.2d 91 (2002).
*405 Matturri v. Bd. of Trs. of the Judicial Ret. Sys., 173 N.J. 368 , 802 A.2d 496 (2002).
State v. Marshall, 173 N.J. 343 , 801 A.2d 1142 (2002).
Couri v. Gardner, 173 N.J. 328 , 801 A.2d 1134 (2002).
In re PSE & G Shareholder Litigation, 173 N.J. 258 , 801 A.2d 295 (2002).
In re R.S., 173 N.J. 134 , 801 A.2d 219 (2002).
In re Commitment of W.Z., 173 N.J. 109 , 801 A.2d 205 (2002).
Viscik v. Fowler Equip. Co., 173 N.J. 1 , 800 A.2d 826 (2002).
Ballinger v. Del. River Port Auth., 172 N.J. 586 , 800 A.2d 97 (2002).
Abbott v. Burke, 172 N.J. 294 , 798 A.2d 602 (2002).
Di Maria Constr. v. Interarch, 172 N.J. 182 , 797 A.2d 137 (2002).
Starkey v. Estate of Nicolaysen, 172 N.J. 60 , 796 A.2d 238 (2002).
O’Connell v. State, 171 N.J. 484 , 795 A.2d 857 (2002).
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Simone, 170 N.J. 438 , 790 A.2d 157 (2002).
Bd. of Educ. of Englewood Cliffs v. Bd. of Educ. of Englewood, 170 N.J. 323 , 788 A.2d 729 (2002).
Heher v. Smith, 170 N.J. 213 , 785 A.2d 907 (2001).
Dep’t of Labor v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 170 N.J. 59 , 784 A.2d 64 (2001).
Trinity Cemetery Ass’n v. Twp. of Wall, 170 N.J. 39 , 784 A.2d 52 (2001).
Campbell v. N.J. Racing Comm’n, 169 N.J. 579 , 781 A.2d 1035 (2001).
State v. Fowlkes, 169 N.J. 387 , 778 A.2d 422 (2001).
State v. Wade, 169 N.J. 302 , 777 A.2d 346 (2001).
In re Williams, 169 N.J. 264 , 777 A.2d 323 (2001).
State v. Sullivan, 169 N.J. 204 , 777 A.2d 60 (2001).
*406 Zacarias v. Allstate Ins. Co., 168 N.J. 590 , 775 A.2d 1262 (2001).
Palanque v. Lambert-Woolley, 168 N.J. 398 , 774 A.2d 501 (2001).
Hubbard v. Reed, 168 N.J. 387 , 774 A.2d 495 (2001).
Mahoney v. Podolnick, 168 N.J. 202 , 773 A.2d 1102 (2001).
Do-Wop Corp. v. City of Rahway, 168 N.J. 191 , 773 A.2d 706 (2001).
State v. Manzie, 168 N.J. 113 , 773 A.2d 659 (2001).
Fink v. Thompson, 167 N.J. 551 , 772 A.2d 386 (2001).
Christie v. Jeney, 167 N.J. 509 , 772 A.2d 361 (2001).
State v. Rolex, 167 N.J. 447 , 771 A.2d 1206 (2001).
Galik v. Clara Moms Med. Ctr., 167 N.J. 341 , 771 A.2d 1141 (2001).
Allen v. Fauver, 167 N.J. 69 , 768 A.2d 1055 (2001).
State v. Rumblin, 166 N.J. 550 , 766 A.2d 1141 (2001).
State v. Johnson, 166 N.J 523, 766 A.2d 1126 (2001).
In re Convery, 166 N.J. 298 , 765 A.2d 724 (2001).
City Check Cashing v. Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co., 166 N.J. 49 , 764 A.2d 411 (2001).
In re Samay, 166 N.J. 25, 764 A.2d 398 (2001).
In re Jackman, 165 N.J. 580 , 761 A.2d 1103 (2000).
State v. Feaster, 165 N.J. 388 , 757 A.2d 266 (2000).
State v. Harris, 165 N.J. 303 , 757 A.2d 221 (2000).
State v. Morton, 165 N.J. 235 , 757 A.2d 184 (2000).
In re Liquidation of Integrity Ins. Co., 165 N.J. 75 , 754 A.2d 1177 (2000).
Cox v. RKA Corp., 164 N.J. 487 , 753 A.2d 1112 (2000).
In re Pena, 164 N.J. 222, 753 A.2d 633 (2000).
Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. State, 164 N.J. 183 , 752 A.2d 1286 (2000).
*407 In re Kelly, 164 N.J. 173 , 752 A.2d 715 (2000).
Kurzke v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 164 N.J. 159 , 752 A.2d 708 (2000).
Beauchamp v. Amedio, 164 N.J. 111 , 751 A.2d 1047 (2000).
Ventola v. N.J. Veteran’s Mem'l Home, 164 N.J. 74 , 751 A.2d 559 (2000).
Greenway Dev. Co. v. Borough of Paramus, 163 N.J. 546 , 750 A.2d 764 (2000).
Wymbs v. Twp. of Wayne, 163 N.J. 523 , 750 A.2d 751 (2000).
In re Schwartz, 163 N.J. 501 , 750 A.2d 88 (2000).
Wanetick v. Gateway Mitsubishi, 163 N.J. 484 , 750 A.2d 79 (2000).
Golden v. County of Union, 163 N.J. 420 , 749 A.2d 842 (2000).
State v. Lark, 163 N.J. 294 , 748 A.2d 1103 (2000).
In re Wright, 163 N.J. 133 , 748 A.2d 103 (2000).
163 N.J. 16 , 163 N.J. 95 (2000).
Gallagher v. Burdette-Tomlin Mem. Hosp., 163 N.J. 38 , 747 A.2d 262 (2000).
Mancuso v. Neckles, 163 N.J. 26 , 747 A.2d 255 (2000).
State v. Burford, 163 N.J. 16 , 746 A.2d 998 (2000).
Aponte-Correa v. Allstate Ins. Co., 162 N.J. 318 , 744 A.2d 175 (2000).
Blank v. City of Elizabeth, 162 N.J. 150 , 742 A.2d 540 (1999).
Baker v. Nat’l State Bank, 161 N.J. 220 , 736 A.2d 462 (1999).
In re Opinion 33 of the Comm. on the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 160 N.J. 63 , 733 A.2d 478 (1999).
New Brunswick Cellular Tel. Co. v. Borough of S. Plainfield Bd. of Adjustment, 160 N.J. 1 , 733 A.2d 442 (1999).
Gibson v. Callaghan, 158 N.J. 662 , 730 A.2d 1278 (1999).
Eagan v. Boyarsky, 158 N.J. 632 , 731 A.2d 28 (1999).
*408 Lowe v. Zarghami, 158 N.J. 606 , 731 A.2d 14 (1999).
In re Di Martini, 158 N.J. 439 , 730 A.2d 346 (1999).
In re Hodge, 158 N.J. 289 , 729 A.2d 1020 (1999).
R & R Mktg., L.L.C. v. Brown-Forman Corp., 158 N.J. 170 , 729 A.2d 1 (1999).
State v. Cromedy, 158 N.J. 112 , 727 A.2d 457 (1999).
A. v. B., 158 N.J. 51 , 726 A.2d 924 (1999).
State v. Caliguiri, 158 N.J. 28 , 726 A.2d 912 (1999).
State v. Covell, 157 N.J. 554 , 725 A.2d 675 (1999).
Spencer v. Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co., 156 N.J. 455 , 720 A.2d 601 (1998).
Laufgas v. N.J. Tpk. Auth., 156 N.J. 436 , 720 A.2d 335 (1998).
State v. Nelson, 155 N.J. 487 , 715 A.2d 281 (1998).
James v. Bessemer Processing Co., 155 N.J. 279 , 714 A.2d 898 (1998).
State v. Smith, 155 N.J. 83 , 713 A.2d 1033 (1998).
State v. Zeidell, 154 N.J. 417 , 713 A.2d 401 (1998).
State v. Pennington, 154 N.J. 344 , 712 A.2d 1133 (1998).
Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 154 N.J. 312 , 712 A.2d 1116 (1998).
Unisys Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 154 N.J. 217 , 712 A.2d 649 (1998).
Pfizer, Inc. v. Employers Ins., 154 N.J. 187 , 712 A.2d 634 (1998).
Trantino v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 154 N.J. 19 , 711 A.2d 260 (1998).
Mehlman v. Mobil Oil Corp., 153 N.J. 163 , 707 A.2d 1000 (1998).
State v. Dickey, 152 N.J. 468 , 706 A.2d 180 (1998).
Marsh v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 152 N.J. 137 , 703 A.2d 927 (1997).
*409 County of Hudson v. Dep’t of Corr., 152 N.J. 60 , 703 A.2d 268 (1997).
United Water Res. v. N. Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm’n, 151 N.J. 497 , 701 A.2d 434 (1997).
State v. Harvey, 151 N.J. 117 , 699 A.2d 596 (1997).
GMC v. City of Linden, 151 N.J. 462 , 700 A.2d 875 (1997).
State v. Villar, 150 N.J. 503 , 696 A.2d 674 (1997).
N.J. Tpk. Auth. v. Am. Fed’n of State, County, & Mun. Employees, Council 73, 150 N.J. 331 , 696 A.2d 585 (1997).
Lemelledo v. Beneficial Mgmt. Corp., 150 N.J. 255 , 696 A.2d 546 (1997).
In re Imbriani 149 N.J. 521 , 694 A.2d 1030 (1997).
Clohesy v. Food Circus Supermarkets, 149 N.J. 496 , 694 A.2d 1017 (1997).
Kiken v. Kiken, 149 N.J. 441 , 694 A.2d 557 (1997).
Brock v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 149 N.J. 378 , 693 A.2d 894 (1997).
Abbott by Abbott v. Burke, 149 N.J. 145 , 693 A.2d 417 (1997).
Twp. of Voorhees v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 149 N.J. 119 , 693 A.2d 97 (1997).
In re Return of Weapons to J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108 , 693 A.2d 92 (1997).
Bd. of Trs. of Operating Eng’rs Local 825 Fund Serv. Facilities v. L.B.S. Const. Co., 148 N.J. 561, 691 A.2d 339 (1997).
State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89 , 690 A.2d 1 (1997).
Keddie v. Rutgers, 148 N.J. 36 , 689 A.2d 702 (1997).
Whitaker v. DeVilla, 147 N.J. 341 , 687 A.2d 738 (1997).
Ivaldi v. Ivaldi 147 N.J. 190, 685 A.2d 1319 (1996).
Del Tufo v. Twp. of Old Bridge, 147 N.J. 90 , 685 A.2d 1267 (1996).
In re Registrant G.B., 147 N.J. 62 , 685 A.2d 1252 (1996).
*410 State v. Medina, 147 N.J. 43 , 685 A.2d 1242 (1996).
In re La Vigne, 146 N.J. 590 , 684 A.2d 1362 (1996).
State v. Wallace, 146 N.J. 576 , 684 A.2d 1355 (1996).
Strasenburgh v. Straubmuller, 146 N.J. 527 , 683 A.2d 818 (1996).
In re Inquiry of Broadbelt, 146 N.J. 501 , 683 A.2d 543 (1996).
State v. Hightower, 146 N.J. 239 , 680 A.2d 649 (1996).
State v. Roach, 146 N.J. 208 , 680 A.2d 634 (1996).
Kubis & Perszyk Assocs. v. Sun Microsystems, 146 N.J. 176 , 680 A.2d 618 (1996).
Cohen v. Radio-Electronics Officers Union, 146 N.J. 140 , 679 A.2d 1188 (1996).
In re N.N., 146 N.J. 112 , 679 A.2d 1174 (1996).
In re Registrant, C.A., 146 N.J. 71 , 679 A.2d 1153 (1996).
In re D.C., 146 N.J. 31 , 679 A.2d 634 (1996).
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Licensed Bev. Ins. Exch., 146 N.J. 1 , 679 A.2d 620 (1996).
Holgate Prop. Assocs. v. Twp. of Howell, 145 N.J. 590 , 679 A.2d 613 (1996).
State v. Womack, 145 N.J. 576 , 679 A.2d 606 (1996).
R.C. Maxwell Co. v. Galloway Twp., 145 N.J. 547 , 679 A.2d 141 (1996).
State v. Burris, 145 N.J. 509 , 679 A.2d 121 (1996).
Gantes v. Kason Corp., 145 N.J. 478 , 679 A.2d 106 (1996).
State v. G.S., 145 N.J. 460 , 678 A.2d 1092 (1996).
Ahn v. Kim, 145 N.J. 423 , 678 A.2d 1073 (1996).
Conklin v. Hannoch Weisman, 145 N.J. 395 , 678 A.2d 1060 (1996).
Munoz v. N.J. Auto. Full Ins. Underwriting Ass’n, 145 N.J. 377 , 678 A.2d 1051 (1996).
*411 Eagle Fire Prot. Corp. v. First Indem. of Am. Ins. Co., 145 N.J. 345 , 678 A.2d 699 (1996).
State v. Chenique-Puey, 145 N.J. 334 , 678 A.2d 694 (1996).
Lym-Anna Props. v. Harborview Dev. Corp., 145 N.J. 313 , 678 A.2d 683 (1996).
Brennan v. Orban, 145 N.J. 282 , 678 A.2d 667 (1996).
Bd. of Educ. of Newark v. N.J. Dep’t of the Treasury, 145 N.J. 269 , 678 A.2d 660 (1996).
State v. Abronski, 145 N.J. 265 , 678 A.2d 659 (1996).
State v. Knight, 145 N.J. 233 , 678 A.2d 642 (1996).
State v. Gerns, 145 N.J. 216 , 678 A.2d 634 (1996).
Prevratil v. Mohr, 145 N.J. 180 , 678 A.2d 243 (1996).
State v. Kirk, 145 N.J. 159 , 678 A.2d 233 (1996).
State v. Kittrell, 145 N.J. 112 , 678 A.2d 209 (1996).
In re Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 144 N.J. 511 , 677 A.2d 721 (1996).
State v. Jack, 144 N.J. 240 , 676 A.2d 545 (1996).
Weiss v. Carpenter, 143 N.J. 420 , 672 A.2d 1132 (1996).
Milos v. Exxon Co., U.S.A, 143 N.J. 333 , 671 A.2d 120 (1996).
Pagano v. United Jersey Bank, 143 N.J. 220 , 670 A.2d 509 (1996).
In re Beck, 143 N.J. 135 , 669 A.2d 238 (1996).
Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., 143 N.J. 22 , 667 A.2d 1052 (1995).
Verriest v. INA Underwriters Ins. Co., 142 N.J. 401 , 662 A.2d 967 (1995).
Mortgagelinq Corp. v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 142 N.J. 336 , 662 A.2d 536 (1995).
Circle Chevrolet Co. v. Giordano, Halleran & Ciesla, 142 N.J. 280 , 662 A.2d 509 (1995).
State v. Harris, 141 N.J. 525 , 662 A.2d 333 (1995).
*412 State v. Mejia, 141 N.J. 475 , 662 A.2d 308 (1995).
Silverman v. Berkson, 141 N.J. 412 , 661 A.2d 1266 (1995).
Martin v. Home Ins. Co., 141 N.J. 279 , 661 A.2d 808 (1995).
Anzalone v. Westech Gear Corp., 141 N.J. 256 , 661 A.2d 796 (1995).
Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Monmouth County Mun.
Joint Ins. Fund, 141 N.J. 235 , 661 A.2d 785 (1995).
State v. Ball, 141 N.J. 142 , 661 A.2d 251 (1995).
Higg-A-Rella, Inc. v. County of Essex, 141 N.J. 35 , 660 A.2d 1163 (1995).
Young v. Schering Corp., 141 N.J. 16 , 660 A.2d 1153 (1995).
Mitzner v. Lights 18, 140 N.J. 573 , 660 A.2d 480 (1995).
In re Shelly, 140 N.J. 501 , 659 A.2d 460 (1995).
Fiore v. Consol. Freightways, 140 N.J. 452 , 659 A.2d 436 (1995).
In re Carton, 140 N.J. 330 , 658 A.2d 1211 (1995).
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9785115. Public record. Not legal advice.