# Commonwealth v. Holmes

> Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · February 22, 2011 · 609 Pa. 1

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9784903

## Case

- **Full name:** COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Jason HOLMES, Appellee
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** February 22, 2011
- **Citations:** 609 Pa. 1; 14 A.3d 89; 2011 Pa. LEXIS 384
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Saylor
- **Judges:** Castille, Saylor, Eakin, Baer, Todd, McCaffery, Melvin
- **Cited by:** 132 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9784903

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- concluding that the "semantic difference" between the probable cause standard and the "articulable and reasonable grounds" are, when balancing the underlying interests, a "distinction without a difference"
- explaining that the prior version of Section 6308(b) required an officer to have “articulable and reasonable grounds” which courts interpreted as meaning probable cause, whereas the current version of Section 6308(b) expressly requires only “reasonable grounds”
- stating that a police officer may conduct a vehicle stop if there is reasonable suspicion that a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code has occurred
- recognizing that probable cause standard for investigatory stop has been superseded by statute

## Opinion text

Justice SAYLOR,
concurring.
I join the majority opinion as to the issue on which allocatur was granted, see Commonwealth v. Holmes, 605 Pa. 567 , 992 A.2d 845 (2010) (allowing appeal relative to the validity of the underlying vehicle stop), 1 but write separately to explain my understanding of the limits of its holding. See Majority Opinion, at 17, 14 A.3d at 98 (“Lacking any evidence of such specific and articulable facts, the suppression court in the instant case was unable to perform its required independent *19 assessment of whether Officer Trotta had reasonable suspicion to justify a vehicle stop.”).
Central to the majority’s ruling is the fact that the officer’s testimony amounted to a conclusory statement, in that he essentially recited the elements of the alleged Vehicle Code infraction, instead of providing a factual basis for the supposed violation. See, e.g., N.T., Sept. 4, 2007, at 4. Although inadequate under these circumstances to establish reasonable suspicion to conduct a lawful vehicle stop, especially since the suppression court was without any means to evaluate whether the purported object materially obstructed Appellee’s view, see 75 Pa.C.S. § 4524(c), such testimony may be sufficient in other instances, namely, where the alleged traffic offense does not contain a subjective component. See, e.g., id. §§ 3703(a) (“[N]o person shall drive any vehicle ... upon a sidewalk”), 3711(a) (“No person shall hang onto or ride on the outside or the rear end of any vehicle”). Thus, I do not view the majority’s holding as foreclosing that possibility.
Chief Justice CASTILLE joins this concurring opinion.
. Instead of limiting its recitation of the facts to this issue, the majority proceeds to develop, at length, the events following the stop. See Majority Opinion, at 4-8, 14 A.3d at 91-93 (discussing, inter alia, the pat down search of Appellee, the warrantless search of the vehicle, and the warrantless search of Appellee's person conducted after his arrest). Such facts, while perhaps providing a more complete picture of Appellee's arrest, ultimately have no bearing on the question presented. Moreover, to the extent that such facts suggest questions concerning the veracity of the officers’ testimony, see, e.g., id. at 6 n. 6, 14 A.3d at 92 n. 6, it should be noted that, not only did the suppression court credit the testimony of Officers Trotta and Evans, but their testimony was also largely uncontradicted. See N.T., Sept. 4, 2007, at 42-43 (testimony of Appellee); id. at 44-45 (testimony of Sinard Ballard); see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 560 Pa. 345, 349 , 744 A.2d 1261, 1263 (2000) ("When reviewing the ruling of a suppression court, we must determine whether the record supports that court's factual findings. As long as the record supports the findings of the suppression court, we are bound by those facts[.]”).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9784903. Public record. Not legal advice.