# Pilchesky v. Gatelli > Superior Court of Pennsylvania · January 5, 2011 · 2011 Pa. Super. 3 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9784874 ## Case - **Full name:** Joseph PILCHESKY, Appellant v. Judy GATELLI, as President of Scranton’s City Council; As Councilwoman; And, in Her Individual Capacity, Appellee v. Joanne Pilchesky and John Does; Joseph Pilchesky, Appellee v. Judy Gatelli, as President of Scranton’s City Council; As Councilwoman; And, in Her Individual Capacity, Appellant v. Joanne Pilchesky and John Does - **Court:** Superior Court of Pennsylvania - **Decided:** January 5, 2011 - **Citations:** 2011 Pa. Super. 3; 12 A.3d 430; 2011 Pa. Super. LEXIS 10; 2011 WL 17520 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Colville - **Judges:** Elliott, Freedberg, Colville - **Cited by:** 29 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9784874 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - concluding that a discovery dispute entailed consideration of threshold requirements relevant to protecting First Amendment rights of John Doe defendants and that such consideration was separate from the underlying defamation action - explaining, general damages include “[i]njury to reputation, impairment of standing in the community, personal humiliation[,] and mental anguish” - finding itself “in alignment with the formulations set out in Cahill” ## Opinion text CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY COLVILLE, J.: I agree with the Majority’s decision to quash Appellee’s appeal. I, however, also would quash Appellant’s appeal in its entirety. The Majority finds that the first question Appellant presents in his appellate brief is reviewable pursuant to the collateral order doctrine. “An appeal may be taken as of right from a collateral order of an administrative agency or lower court.” See Pa.R.A.P. 313(a). The collateral order doctrine “conveys the right to appeal ..., provided that the party appealing has satisfied the three-pronged prerequisite: (1) the order must be separable from and collateral to the main cause of action; (2) the right involved must be too important to be denied review; and (3) if review is postponed, the claim will be irreparably lost.” Commonwealth v. Dennis, 580 Pa. 95 , 859 A.2d 1270, 1277 (2004); Pa.R.A.P. 313(b). Importantly, the collateral order doctrine is to be construed narrowly; every one of its three prongs must clearly be present before collateral appellate review is allowed. Rae v. Pennsylvania Funeral Directors Association, 602 Pa. 65 , 977 A.2d 1121 , 1126 (2009). Appellant’s pro se brief suffers from a lack of organization. In my view, a fair reading of the arguments Appellant utilizes to support his first issue contain an essential claim that the trial court erred by requiring him to reveal the identities of six anonymous internet posters because the statements attributed to those posters are not defamatory and, thus, are protected by the First Amendment. My view of Appellant’s issue and arguments does not differ significantly from the Majority’s view of the same. See Majority Opinion at 437 (“In the argument supporting his first question presented, Appellant contends that the trial court ordered disclosure of the identity of six John Doe defendants, in *447 violation of their First Amendment rights, absent sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case”). As to the first prong of the collateral order doctrine, our Supreme Court has “held that if the resolution of an issue concerning a challenged trial court order can be achieved independent from an analysis of the merits of the underlying dispute, then the order is separable for purposes of determining whether the order is a collateral order pursuant to Rule 313.” Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 583 Pa. 208 , 876 A.2d 939, 943 (2005). A primary issue in Appellee’s case is whether the anonymous posters defamed Appellee. Resolution of Appellant’s first appellate issue, as he frames and supports it, requires that we examine the complained-of statements and determine whether they constitute constitutionally protected speech or statements capable of defamatory meaning. As such, a review of Appellant’s issue cannot be achieved without an analysis of the merits of the underlying dispute. According to the Majority, Appellant’s argument “implicates the threshold requirements imposed by the trial court as a prerequisite to disclosure of the identity of six John Doe defendants.” Majority Opinion at 437. In concluding that the issue implicated by Appellant’s argument qualifies as an issue entitled to collateral review, the Majority states, “It is precisely the type of question previously accepted by our Supreme Court in [Melvin v. Doe, 575 Pa. 264 , 836 A.2d 42 (2003) ].” Id. Had Appellant presented such an issue to this Court, I would agree with the Majority’s conclusion. According to the rules of appellate procedure, “No question will be considered unless it is stated in the statement of questions involved [section of an appellant’s brief] or is fairly suggested thereby.” Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a). Appellant frames his first issue in the following manner: 1. Did trial court [sic] err at law or abuse its discretion where it ordered the Appellant to disclose the identities of six (6) anonymous posters on the Appellant’s political message board where the statements made by the posters were constitutionally protected by the First Amendment. Appellant’s Brief at 4. On its face, this issue asks whether the trial court erred by ordering Appellant to disclose the identities of the anonymous posters where their statements were constitutionally protected. The issue does not expressly raise a question regarding the threshold requirements imposed by the trial court as a prerequisite to disclosure of the posters’ identities, nor does the issue fairly suggest such a question. We are required to construe the collateral order doctrine narrowly, and in doing so, we may only review an issue pursuant to this doctrine if every one of its three prongs is clearly present. With these principles in mind, I am unable to credit Appellant with raising the question which the Majority attributes to him by implication. In my view, Appellant’s first issue fails to clearly present an issue separable from and collateral to the main cause of action. I, therefore, would quash Appellant’s appeal. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9784874. Public record. Not legal advice.