# Hill v. State

> Court of Appeals of Maryland · January 26, 2011 · 418 Md. 62

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9784832

## Case

- **Full name:** Enoch Jermaine HILL v. STATE of Maryland
- **Court:** Court of Appeals of Maryland
- **Decided:** January 26, 2011
- **Citations:** 418 Md. 62; 12 A.3d 1193; 2011 Md. LEXIS 17
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Murphy
- **Judges:** Bell, Harrell, Battaglia, Greene, Murphy, Adkins, Barbera
- **Cited by:** 18 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9784832

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- concluding that the officer's statement that the victim's family “did not want to see him get into any trouble, but they only wanted an apology” would cause a reasonable layperson to infer leniency based on that statement upon his confession
- holding that a statement to a suspect by an interrogating officer that the victim and the victim’s family “did not want to see [the suspect] get into trouble, but they only wanted an apology” for what happened, is an improper inducement

## Opinion text

*86 MURPHY, J.,
dissenting.
While I join Judge Harrell’s dissenting opinion, I would also affirm the judgment on the well settled ground that an incriminating statement made subsequent to an improper inducement is nonetheless admissible if the trier of fact is persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that the inducement did not, in any way, cause the defendant to make the statement.
In the case at bar, before being told about what the victim allegedly wanted, Petitioner was well aware that (1) the officers had “taped” his telephone conversation with the victim, and (2) he had made incriminating statements during his interrogation. Under these circumstances, the evidence was sufficient to persuade the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner’s -written apology was not made in reliance upon the officer’s statement about what the victim allegedly wanted, but rather in a strategic effort to avoid criminal charges. I would therefore hold that, although Petitioner was entitled to a jury instruction to the effect that the jurors must “disregard the apology unless you are persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that the inducement did not in any way cause the defendant to make the apology,” Petitioner (who did not request such an instruction) was not entitled to exclusion of his apology.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9784832. Public record. Not legal advice.