# EX Parte Evans

> Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas · May 4, 2011 · 338 S.W.3d 545

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9783845

## Case

- **Full name:** Ex Parte Johnathan EVANS, Applicant
- **Court:** Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
- **Decided:** May 4, 2011
- **Citations:** 338 S.W.3d 545; 2011 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 596; 2011 WL 1662384
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Keller
- **Judges:** Cochran, Meyers, Price, Johnson, Keasler, Hervey, Keller, Womack
- **Cited by:** 34 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9783845

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding habeas applicant entitled to relief from parole revocation based solely on violation of sex-offender conditions that were imposed without due process “and against which [Evans] . . . protested at every step of the way”

## Opinion text

KELLER, P.J.,
concurring.
I disagree with the Court’s statement that Meza 1 “addressed the due process protections required before imposing ‘sex offender conditions’ as a general matter.” 2 On the contrary, the Meza court stated: “Having determined that sex offender registration and therapy are at issue in this *557 case, we find it is unnecessary to examine whether Meza has a liberty interest in any of the other sex offender conditions.” 3
Conditions ordering sex offender registration and therapy were found to infringe on liberty interests inherent in the Fourteenth Amendment because those conditions are “highly stigmatizing and invasive.” 4 Other “sex offender conditions” may not implicate liberty interests inherent in the Fourteenth Amendment but may be subject to notice in a particular case where there is a state-created liberty interest, such as the right to release on mandatory supervision, the conditional right to release on discretionary mandatory supervision, 5 or the right of a person on early release (whether parole or mandatory supervision) to remain on release while he maintains his good behavior. Determining the nature and importance of the liberty interest involved is crucial to determining what procedures are required by due process. 6
Appellant’s parole was not revoked for any failure to register or undergo therapy. It was revoked for his failure to abide by other conditions that were not at issue in Meza. Most of the violations involved conditions that denied the right to possess, send, or receive sexually explicit images. The remaining violation involved a condition that denied the right to possess a cell phone with still picture and video capability. These conditions might or might not be considered “invasive,” but as mere prohibitions on certain types of activities, the conditions did not involve any stigma. Nevertheless, these conditions were a significant departure from the conditions previously imposed upon applicant, under which he had been living successfully, and applicant had a due process right to be heard before his parole conditions were modified so significantly.
In Meza, release was mandatory. In the present case, release had already occurred. The question of whether a hearing is required if release is discretionary or if conditions are imposed at the time of release is not before us. I think the Court speaks too broadly when it suggests that the procedures it now imposes would apply to any sex-offender conditions, regardless of re-leasee’s status or when those conditions are imposed.
With these comments, I concur in the Court’s judgment.
. Meza v. Livingston, 607 F.3d 392 (5th Cir. 2010). As the Court acknowledges, Meza is not binding upon us, but we can consider the case for its persuasive value.
. See Court’s op. at 555.
. 607 F.3d at 400 .
. Id. at 401, 409 .
. See Ex parte Geiken, 28 S.W.3d 553 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
. See Meza, 607 F.3d at 401-10 .

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9783845. Public record. Not legal advice.