# Derichsweiler v. State > Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas · January 26, 2011 · 348 S.W.3d 906 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9783653 ## Case - **Full name:** Mark DERICHSWEILER, Appellant, v. the STATE of Texas - **Court:** Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas - **Decided:** January 26, 2011 - **Citations:** 348 S.W.3d 906; 2011 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 112; 2011 WL 255299 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Keller - **Judges:** Price, Womack, Keasler, Hervey, Cochran, Keller, Meyers, Johnson - **Cited by:** 530 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9783653 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding police officer had reasonable suspicion to detain defendant based on “information known collectively to the police,” which included 911 dispatcher, even though officer who stopped defendant only received information from dispatcher about suspicious vehicle, because cit… - recognizing that a “detaining officer need not be personally aware of every fact that objectively supports a reasonable suspicion to detain” an individual, and that an officer may rely in part on information as relayed by a 911 dispatcher, who is “ordinarily regarded as a ‘coo… - finding that the defendant’s conduct of pulling up and staring at an identified citizen for two separate thirty second intervals and his actions doing the same to other parked vehicles, while not overtly 6 criminal in any way, was bizarre enough to support a suspicion that he … - stating that “the detaining officer need not be personally aware of every fact that objectively supports a reasonable suspicion to detain; rather, ‘the cumulative information known to the cooperating officers at the time of the stop is to be considered in determining whether r… - concluding that the lower court “erred to the extent that its opinion may be read for the proposition that facts adduced to give rise to a reasonable suspicion must show that the detainee has committed, is committing, or is about to commit, a particular and distinctively ident… ## Opinion text KELLER, P.J., concurring. I think the Court misconstrues the opinion of the court of appeals. The Court believes that the crux of that opinion is whether the officer had reasonable suspicion with respect to a specific penal code offense. That is an interesting issue, but it is not in the case, and it was not the issue that was briefed by the parties. Before making a stop, an officer must have reasonable suspicion that a person “is, has been, or soon will be” engaged in criminal activity. 1 The court of appeals cites that proposition correctly, 2 but the gist of its opinion is that there must be reasonable suspicion that a person actually “is” engaged in illegal activity. 3 Here, there was instead reasonable suspicion that appellant “soon would be” engaged in criminal activity. That is sufficient under the law. Like the Court, I would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. Because the Court analyzes an issue that is not before it, I join its judgment only. . Crain v. State, 315 S.W.3d 43, 52 (Tex.Crim. App.2010); Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex.Crim.App.2005). See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27-28 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (Officer’s conduct of stopping the suspects and conducting a patdown for weapons was reasonable at its inception and as conducted because he observed them acting in a manner "he took to be preface to a 'stick-up.' " That is, their actions were "consistent with [the officer's] hypothesis that these men were contemplating a daylight robbery.”); United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 12 , 109 S.Ct. 1581 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The reasonable-suspicion standard is a derivation of the probable-cause command, applicable only to those brief detentions which fall short of being full-scale searches and seizures and which are necessitated by law enforcement exigencies such as the need to stop ongoing crimes, to prevent imminent crimes, and to protect law enforcement officers in highly charged situations.”) (emphasis added). . Derichsweiler v. State, 301 S.W.3d 803, 809 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2009). . Id. at 811 (contrasting reasonable suspicion to believe that suspects were committing trespass because they were in a place "where they should not be” with present case in which the officer merely observed the suspect "circling two public parking lots at 8:00 p.m., an act which does not constitute criminal behavior” and concluding that "this is not a case in which the officer received information that a citizen informant witnessed criminal behavior”). --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9783653. Public record. Not legal advice.