# Meyer v. State > Nevada Supreme Court · December 19, 2003 · 119 Nev. 554 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9783545 ## Case - **Full name:** ADAM RAY MEYER, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent - **Court:** Nevada Supreme Court - **Decided:** December 19, 2003 - **Citations:** 119 Nev. 554; 119 Nev. Adv. Rep. 61; 80 P.3d 447; 2003 Nev. LEXIS 80 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Becker - **Judges:** Agosti, Maupin, Becker, Leavitt, Shearing, Young - **Cited by:** 67 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9783545 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - stating that denial of motion for new trial based on juror misconduct is reviewed for abuse of discretion but that prejudicial effect of misconduct will be reviewed de novo “where the misconduct involves allegations that the jury was exposed to extrinsic evidence in violation … - recognizing that intrinsic juror misconduct involves, among other things, jurors not following admonitions or instructions, basing their decision on evidence other than that admitted at trial, or discussing sentencing or the defendanes failure to testify - explaining that jurors improperly considering a defendant's failure to testify is an example of an intrinsic influence or improper discussion amongst jurors that is inadmissible to denunciate a verdict - explaining that intrinsic influences on the jury, such as "intimidation or harassment of one juror by another, or other similar situations" cannot be used to impeach a verdict ## Opinion text Becker, J., with whom Shearing, J., and Young, Sr. J., agree, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I concur in the court’s adoption of the reasonable probability test for determining when juror misconduct warrants a new trial. I also concur in the court’s adoption of the New Mexico standard concluding that expert or quasi-expert opinions given by a juror during deliberations are not misconduct. I dissent, however, from the court’s conclusions that Meyer established a reasonable probability that the introduction of the PDR materials regarding Accutane affected the jury’s verdict and that a new trial is warranted. In my opinion, the court places too much emphasis on the inclusion of the PDR materials in the deliberation. While it did tend to undermine Meyer’s theory that Catrina’s bruises or bumps could have been side effects of Accutane use, other admissible evidence already cast doubts on this contention. The PDR reference was, in part, cumulative of other evidence at trial; namely, experts indicated Accutane was not responsible for the bruises visible on Catrina’s body when the police arrived and/or when the sexual assault evaluation was performed. The jury carefully considered the evidence as demonstrated by the questions to the district court on at least two occasions during deliberations and its ultimate decision to convict Meyer of sexual assault and acquit him of kidnapping. The fractured verdict suggests that the jury carefully delineated between the offenses and undertook its duties with care and diligence. 1 The fractured verdict does not, as suggested by Meyer, indicate the jurors had reservations about the prosecution’s case as a whole; there was substantially less evidence to support the kidnapping charge than the sexual assault charge. Thus, even if the jury accepted all of the State’s evidence regarding kidnapping, the jury could still conclude that the State had not met its burden of proving kidnapping beyond a reasonable doubt. The same cannot-be said of the sexual assault charge. The evidence of Meyer’s guilt as to sexual assault was substantial. In particular, Catrina’s boyfriend testified that Meyer called *576 him and told him that he was digitally penetrating Catrina’s anus as it occurred. The boyfriend could hear Catrina pleading for Meyer to stop. A police officer testified that Catrina told him shortly after the alleged incident that Meyer had digitally penetrated her anus without her consent. Additionally, the officer testified to seeing Catrina’s emotional state and various bruises on her person. Although Meyer testified that the incident was consensual, and his expert characterized Catrina’s recantation as consistent with an alcohol blackout, a sexual assault nurse testified that Catrina’s anal injuries were consistent with sexual assault. Additionally, the State offered an explanation via expert testimony on Battered Woman Syndrome for Catrina’s recantation of her initial allegation of sexual assault. In addition, while Meyer attempted to attribute some of Catrina’s bruises to the side effects of Accutane, he conceded that many of her injuries could not be explained by the medication. As to these other injuries, Meyer’s experts testified that falls, acne, or minor blunt force trauma could have caused the injuries. Thus, the importance of the PDR reference diminishes when compared to the other significant injuries Catrina sustained. Finally, none of Meyer’s experts attributed Catrina’s bruising to Accutane. The only evidence admitted to support this theory was Catrina’s statements. In contrast, the State produced expert testimony indicating that the bruising was not caused by minor injuries or side effects of Accutane. Moreover, the jury’s finding of guilt suggests that it rejected Meyer’s expert testimony on all of the issues, not just the side effects of Accutane. In light of the totality of the State’s evidence that the jury must have accepted as true to sustain a verdict of guilty, and the relatively minor role the bruises played in comparison to Catrina’s other injuries, I conclude Meyer did not demonstrate that there was a reasonable probability that the misconduct contributed to the verdict, and the district court did not err in denying the motion for a new trial. I would affirm the conviction. See U.S. v. Lloyd, 269 F.3d 228, 241 (3d Cir. 2001) (length of jury’s deliberations and the structure of the verdict are relevant to determining the likelihood of prejudice). --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9783545. Public record. Not legal advice.