# Meyer v. State > Nevada Supreme Court · December 19, 2003 · 119 Nev. 554 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9783543 ## Case - **Full name:** ADAM RAY MEYER, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent - **Court:** Nevada Supreme Court - **Decided:** December 19, 2003 - **Citations:** 119 Nev. 554; 119 Nev. Adv. Rep. 61; 80 P.3d 447; 2003 Nev. LEXIS 80 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Rose - **Judges:** Agosti, Maupin, Becker, Leavitt, Shearing, Young - **Cited by:** 67 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9783543 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - stating that denial of motion for new trial based on juror misconduct is reviewed for abuse of discretion but that prejudicial effect of misconduct will be reviewed de novo “where the misconduct involves allegations that the jury was exposed to extrinsic evidence in violation … - recognizing that intrinsic juror misconduct involves, among other things, jurors not following admonitions or instructions, basing their decision on evidence other than that admitted at trial, or discussing sentencing or the defendanes failure to testify - explaining that jurors improperly considering a defendant's failure to testify is an example of an intrinsic influence or improper discussion amongst jurors that is inadmissible to denunciate a verdict - explaining that intrinsic influences on the jury, such as "intimidation or harassment of one juror by another, or other similar situations" cannot be used to impeach a verdict ## Opinion text *573 Rose, J., with whom Leavitt, L, agrees, concurring: I generally agree with the court’s method in determining claims of juror misconduct. However, I would prefer to adopt the California approach when dealing with a juror who has specialized knowledge or training, and I believe that the court should have considered the juror affidavits of improper discussions concerning the possible sentence Meyer might receive. The jurors improperly discussed the sentence Meyer would receive if convicted of sexual assault. I do not agree with the court’s prohibition on scrutinizing intra-jury or intrinsic misconduct when it concerns jurors applying an improper legal standard or jurors considering evidence or facts they were instructed not to consider. Instead, I would apply the same standard in reviewing instances of this type of intrinsic misconduct as we do with extrinsic misconduct. Jurors are specifically instructed to disregard the sentence to be assessed for any verdict returned, as it is solely the province of the court to assess such punishment. 1 The affidavit of one juror stated that she was the last holdout juror and that another juror advised her not to worry about convicting Meyer because the punishment for sexual assault was only a couple of years. This information, which was apparently accepted as true, was patently false. Sexual assault is a non-probationable offense that carries a sentence of ten years to life, with a mandatory minimum of ten years in the state penitentiary. 2 Upon receiving this information, the holdout juror changed her mind, resulting in a guilty verdict of sexual assault. I consider this misinformation on the law, given in violation of the jury instructions, to be every bit as harmful as consulting a reference book about the effects of a medication. Thus, I conclude that the penalty discussion constituted intra-jury misconduct that also could justify a new trial. 3 In prohibiting a district court from considering any intra-jury misconduct presented in a juror affidavit, the court logically concludes that intra-jury misconduct will rarely justify a new trial. Certainly, the district court will not be aware of many instances of jury misconduct if it is unable to consider the jurors’- statements or discussions in the jury room. As in this case, the court holds that information about sentencing was improperly contained in a juror’s affidavit. But what if the jurors all acknowledge that they returned a first-degree murder conviction primarily because they believed the mandatory sentence was five years instead of twenty years; or *574 if the jurors admitted that they considered ‘ ‘beyond a reasonable doubt” to be the same as “a preponderance of the evidence,” and returned a conviction on that faulty basis. There are some instances of intrinsic juror misconduct that should be considered in a juror’s affidavit even without extrinsic influences being involved, but the rule that the court adopts prevents the consideration of this type of misconduct, even though it can be every bit as harmful as extrinsic misconduct, and effectively denies a defendant a fair trial. I would not limit this court’s ability to review juror misconduct simply because it involves only intra-jury activity. I concur in the reversal of Meyer’s conviction, with only the reservations as expressed. Here, Jury Instruction No. 9 instructed the jurors not to consider the penalty in arriving at a verdict. See NRS 200.366(2)(b). See U.S. v. Keating, 147 F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that “in- ■ trajury communications may constitute prejudicial extrinsic evidence sufficient to require a new trial”). --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9783543. Public record. Not legal advice.