# Dodaro v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission

> Appellate Court of Illinois · August 3, 2010 · 403 Ill. App. 3d 538

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9782877

## Case

- **Full name:** THERESA DODARO, Appellant, v. ILLINOIS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION Et Al. (The City of Chicago, Appellee)
- **Court:** Appellate Court of Illinois
- **Decided:** August 3, 2010
- **Citations:** 403 Ill. App. 3d 538; 950 N.E.2d 256
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Gordon
- **Judges:** Gordon, Holdridge, Hudson, Robert
- **Cited by:** 25 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9782877

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- applying clearly erroneous standard of review

## Opinion text

JUSTICE ROBERT E. GORDON, specially concurring:
I concur with the majority and I have additional comments to make. I believe that an individual is not a “duly appointed member of a police department” until he or she becomes a sworn police officer. 820 ILCS 305/1(b)(1) (West 2000).
In the text of the Workers’ Compensation Act, there is no definition of “duly appointed member of a police department.” Thus, without a definition, there is no way to determine the legislative intent other than by the plain and ordinary meaning of the legislators’ words. People v. Pack, 224 Ill. 2d 144, 147 (2007) (“[t]he best indication of legislative intent is the statutory language, given its plain and ordinary meaning”). It is logical to conclude that since the legislators used the words “duly appointed member of a police department,” they meant a sworn police officer who carries a gun and a badge and has the authority to make an arrest, not a recruit.
Although the Act makes no reference to a “sworn” police officer, the Act also does not expressly exclude coverage to a “recruit,” “probationary officer,” or “trainee.” Thus, the language is ambiguous and can be susceptible to either interpretation. However, the purpose behind the Workers’ Compensation Act is to provide financial protection to those whose ability to earn a living is interrupted or terminated, so the Act should be interpreted liberally. Sylvester v. Industrial Comm’n, 197 Ill. 2d 225, 232 (2001). To accomplish the purpose of the Act in the case at bar, the Act should be read to include coverage for police recruits, especially in the absence of specific language denying them coverage.
HOLDRIDGE, J., joins in this special concurrence.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9782877. Public record. Not legal advice.