# People v. Manning > Illinois Supreme Court · February 3, 2011 · 241 Ill. 2d 319 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9782790 ## Case - **Full name:** The PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. ARTHUR R. MANNING, Appellant - **Court:** Illinois Supreme Court - **Decided:** February 3, 2011 - **Citations:** 241 Ill. 2d 319; 350 Ill. Dec. 262; 948 N.E.2d 542; 2011 Ill. LEXIS 422 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Kilbride - **Judges:** Garman, Kilbride, Karmeier, Freeman - **Cited by:** 272 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9782790 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - stating under the second Strickland prong, a defendant must prove counsel’s deficient performance rendered the result of the trial unreliable or fundamentally unfair - finding not unreasonable the attorney’s decision to reserve his two remaining peremptory challenges for the three jurors yet to be seated ## Opinion text CHIEF JUSTICE KILBRIDE, specially concurring: Although I agree with the majority that defendant has failed to make a sufficient showing of ineffective assistance of counsel, I disagree with its reliance on the first Strickland prong, addressing instead only the objective reasonableness of trial counsel’s performance. Because the majority does not reach the merits of the second Strickland prong, requiring a showing of prejudice, its lengthy initial discussion of the proper standard of review for the prejudice prong appears to be unnecessary, as Justice Karmeier notes in his special concurrence. See 241 Ill. 2d at 326-33. As Justice Karmeier correctly recognizes, if the majority does not address the merits of the prejudice prong, its discussion of the standard of review applicable to that prong is unnecessary. 241 Ill. 2d at 340 (Karmeier, J., specially concurring). I do not join Justice Karmeier’s special concurrence, however, because I believe the court should have limited its discussion to the prejudice prong. The prejudice prong should have been addressed by the majority for two reasons. First, the pressing need in both our appellate court and the appellate bar for guidance on the proper standard of review of the Strickland prejudice prong was a probable factor in this court’s decision to allow defendant’s petition for leave to appeal. Indeed, defendant specifically asked us to reconsider our decision in Metcalfe because subsequently “other courts have held that a biased juror is inherently prejudicial.” 241 Ill. 2d at 329-30. If the need for guidance on these questions were not a significant factor in allowing defendant’s petition, the majority likely would not have discussed the applicable standard of review without also addressing the merits of the prejudice prong. If the parties’ prejudice prong arguments are not reached, the overall utility and precedential value of our decision will be severely limited because our standard of review discussion will be rendered mere dicta. If, however, this court reaches the merits of defendant’s prejudice prong argument, then the majority’s extensive and persuasive discussion of the applicable standard of review becomes an integral part of our analysis, delivering vital guidance to our appellate court and bar. Second, in addition to guidance, a discussion of the prejudice prong rather than the performance prong would strengthen this court’s decision. The greatest weakness in the majority’s analysis is its failure to explain fully how accepting a potentially biased juror could be a “reasonable trial strategy,” as Justice Freeman notes in his dissent (241 Ill. 2d at 348 (Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by Burke, J.)). Based on my view that some of A.C.’s answers were not clearly responsive and others created unresolved conflicts in his position, I disagree with the dissent’s contention that the record must be read to show A.C.’s bias (241 Ill. 2d at 348 (Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by Burke, J.)). I agree with the dissent, however, that here it is exceedingly difficult to justify retaining even a potentially biased juror. This difficulty is fiirther multiplied when defense counsel chooses not to use either of his remaining peremptory challenges to remove the juror. An examination of the merits of the prejudice prong would both eliminate this weakness in the analysis and logically proceed from our earlier discussion of the standard of review for that prong. Rather than focus on establishing the reasonable probability that he would not have been convicted without A.C. on the jury, defendant appears to rely on his argument that we should reconsider our decision in Metcalfe. After carefully analyzing this argument, the majority rejected it (241 Ill. 2d at 333) and made clear that prejudice will not be presumed even if “it is determined that counsel was deficient for not striking a biased juror” (241 Ill. 2d at 333). Defendant still must show “a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 241 Ill. 2d at 327. Without that showing, he cannot meet his burden on review. Based on my reading of A.C.’s statements and defendant’s arguments, defendant has failed to overcome his burden of showing a reasonable probability that A.C.’s alleged bias altered the outcome of the trial. Thus, while I agree with the majority’s result and its analysis of the standard of review under the prejudice prong, I cannot support its analysis of the performance prong. Accordingly, I respectfully concur in the majority’s judgment but not its full analysis. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9782790. Public record. Not legal advice.