# People v. Randy G.

> California Supreme Court · August 13, 2001 · 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 516

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9782604

## Case

- **Full name:** In Re RANDY G., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RANDY G., Defendant and Appellant
- **Court:** California Supreme Court
- **Decided:** August 13, 2001
- **Citations:** 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 516; 26 Cal. 4th 556; 2001 Daily Journal DAR 8525; 28 P.3d 239; 2001 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6998; 2001 Cal. LEXIS 5257
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Werdegar
- **Judges:** Baxter, Werdegar
- **Cited by:** 49 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
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## Opinion text

WERDEGAR, J.
I concur. We face in this case a tension between two important considerations. On the one hand, teachers and school administrators have a solemn responsibility to protect the safety and well-being of our children and to ensure that schools can fulfill their educational mission. 1 On the other hand, minor children attending school, like all persons in America, possess rights under the Constitution. (See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., supra, 469 U.S. at pp. 333-334 [105 S.Ct. at pp. 738-739] [Fourth Amendment rights]; Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School Dist. (1969) 393 U.S. 503, 506 [ 89 S.Ct. 733, 736 , 21 L.Ed.2d 731 ] (Tinker) [First Amendment rights]; *570 Goss v. Lopez (1975) 419 U.S. 565 [ 95 S.Ct. 729 , 42 L.Ed.2d 725 ] [due process rights].) 2
The high court, while recognizing that students do not leave their constitutional rights “at the schoolhouse gate” (Tinker, supra, 393 U.S. at p. 506 [ 89 S.Ct. at p. 736 ]), has also recognized the need for balance in evaluating the scope of their Fourth Amendment rights, explaining that “maintaining security and order in the schools requires a certain degree of flexibility in school disciplinary procedures, and we have respected the value of preserving the informality of the student-teacher relationship.” (New Jersey v. T. L. O., supra, 469 U.S. at p. 340 [105 S.Ct. at p. 742].) In addition, “[i]t is evident that the school setting requires some easing of the restrictions to which searches by public authorities are ordinarily subject.” (Ibid.)
The majority acknowledges this framework by considering a minor student’s right to freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment within the context of a modem school setting. Although students unquestionably retain Fourth Amendment rights while in school, and “public school officials are subject to the limits placed on state action by the Fourteenth Amendment” (New Jersey v. T. L. O., supra, 469 U.S. at p. 334 [105 S.Ct. at p. 739]), not every encounter between teacher and student implicates the Fourth Amendment, for “the nature of those [constitutional] rights is what is appropriate for children in school.” (Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton (1995) 515 U.S. 646, 656 [ 115 S.Ct. 2386, 2392 , 132 L.Ed.2d 564 ] (Vernonia); cf. Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 19, fn. 16 [ 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 ] [“not all personal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves ‘seizures’ of persons”].)
Moreover, even where, as here, the circumstances of the encounter as viewed in the context of a school setting arguably support the conclusion the minor has been subjected to a “seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, the standard for assessing the reasonableness of the challenged action must take into account “the schools’ custodial and tutelary responsibility for children.” (Vernonia, supra, 515 U.S. at p. 656 [ 115 S.Ct. at p. 2392 ].) As Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at page 21 [ 88 S.Ct. at page 1879 ], recognizes, “there is ‘no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to [seize] against the invasion which the [seizure] entails.’ ” (Quoting Camara v. Municipal Court (1967) 387 U.S. 523, 536-537 [ 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1734-1735 , 18 L.Ed.2d 930 ].) Accordingly, I agree with *571 the majority’s conclusion that “detentions of minor students on school grounds do not offend the Constitution, so long as they are not arbitrary, capricious, or for the purposes of harassment.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 567.)
The majority finds it unnecessary to decide whether the security guard in this case subjected minor Randy G. to a detention within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 565.) Accordingly, the majority does not foreclose the possibility that a teacher or school official may be found, in an appropriate setting, to have done so. With that understanding of the majority opinion, I concur.
‘The primary duty of school officials and teachers ... is the education and training of young people. A State has a compelling interest in assuring that the schools meet this responsibility. Without first establishing discipline and maintaining order, teachers cannot begin to educate their students.” (New Jersey v. T. L. O. (1985) 469 U.S. 325, 350 [ 105 S.Ct. 733, 747 , 83 L.Ed.2d 720 ] (conc. opn. of Powell, J.).)
That school officials “are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes.” (Board of Education v. Barnette (1943) 319 U.S. 624, 637 [ 63 S.Ct. 1178, 1185 , 87 L.Ed. 1628 , 147 A.L.R. 674 ].)

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9782604. Public record. Not legal advice.