# City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court > California Supreme Court · August 26, 2002 · 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 202 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9782274 ## Case - **Full name:** CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent; JEREMY BRANDON, Real Party in Interest - **Court:** California Supreme Court - **Decided:** August 26, 2002 - **Citations:** 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 202; 29 Cal. 4th 1; 2002 Daily Journal DAR 9743; 52 P.3d 129; 2002 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7802; 2002 Cal. LEXIS 5471 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Brown - **Judges:** Kennard, Brown, Moreno - **Cited by:** 140 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9782274 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding "procedural element" established where employer had 20 "imposed on [employee] an adhesive arbitration agreement"; observing "few employees 21 are in a position to refuse a job because of an arbitration requirement" - rejecting plaintiff’s theory of damages not seeking 11 disgorgement of all defendant’s profits but seeking the amount it allegedly would have 12 obtained as a commission it been awarded the contract - applying Garner's 'significant risµ' test ## Opinion text BROWN, J., Concurring. I agree with the majority that the 1990 complaint against Officer C. does not meet the materiality standard set forth in Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 [ 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 ] (Brady) (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 15-16), but I reject the conclusion (id. at pp. 14-15) that a pretrial discovery motion pursuant to Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 897 , 522 P.2d 305 ] (Pitchess) and Evidence Code section 1043, subdivision (b), permits the trial court to search through confidential police personnel records for Brady material. The majority relies on Pennsylvania v. Ritchie (1987) 480 U.S. 39 [ 107 S.Ct. 989 , 94 L.Ed.2d 40 ] (Ritchie). (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 14-15.) That case involved confidential records that were not available to the prosecution, and hence the prosecution had no means to meet its Brady obligation with respect to those records. (Ritchie, at p. 57 [ 107 S.Ct. at p. 1001 ].) In that context, the high court approved a procedure, based on Pennsylvania law, whereby the trial court reviewed the records in chambers for Brady material. (Ritchie, at pp. 58-61 [107 S.Ct. at pp. 1001-1003].) The majority is correct that peace officer personnel records, like the records at issue in Ritchie , are generally confidential (Pen. Code, § 832.7, subd. (a)), but the law is unsettled as to whether prosecuting authorities can access the records for purposes of meeting their Brady obligation. Section 832.7, subdivision (a), declares the confidentiality of peace officer personnel records and places limits on their disclosure, but it also creates an exception for “investigations . . . concerning the conduct of police officers . . . conducted by ... a district attorney’s office.” We have not yet decided whether this exception (or some other) permits a prosecutor, seeking to comply with Brady , to review the personnel records of a police officer who is a witness in a criminal case (see 66 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 128 , 130 (1983)), but if it does, then Ritchie is not on point, and we have no reason to interpose the trial court as an enforcer of the prosecution’s Brady obligation. More important, the high court in Ritchie noted that a criminal defendant “may not require the trial court to search through [a confidential] file without first establishing a basis for his claim that it contains material evidence.” (Ritchie, supra, 480 U.S. at p. 58, fn. 15 [ 107 S.Ct. at p. 1002 ], italics added.) In other words, the defendant may not simply fish for evidence; he must have reason to believe the confidential records actually contain material evidence. This case, in contrast, demonstrates the very slight showing *18 that will support a Pitchess motion. Here, defendant simply stated that he “may” assert as a defense that “witnesses . . . were coached,” and on that basis he sought information from the arresting officers’ confidential personnel files that reflected on their “honesty or truthfulness.” Defendant did not give any basis for his belief that witnesses had been coached, and he did not explain how information relating to the truthfulness of the arresting officers would tend to establish that they had coached witnesses. In short, defendant was simply groping for information to help his case, which might satisfy Pitchess and Evidence Code section 1043, subdivision (b), but does not satisfy the showing necessary under Ritchie to obtain trial court review of confidential records. This conclusion is particularly salient in the pretrial context, where materiality for purposes of Brady is very hard for the trial court to assess because the court does not yet know what the prosecution’s evidence at trial will be. Here, the trial court ordered disclosure, pursuant to Brady , of confidential information that was not subject to disclosure under Pitchess or Evidence Code section 1045, subdivision (b). Contrary to settled law, it made this order without defendant’s “first establishing a basis for his claim that [the records] contained] material evidence.” (Ritchie, supra, 480 U.S. at p. 58, fn. 15 [ 107 S.Ct. at p. 1002 ].) The effect of the trial court’s order was to excuse defendant from making this showing and to substitute, for the required showing, defendant’s Pitchess motion. The majority approves this procedure and, in so doing, improperly conflates Pitchess and Brady . As a result of the majority’s holding, defendants now enjoy the advantage of the low threshold applicable to Pitchess motions without the corresponding limitations the Legislature has placed on Pitchess discovery. For these reasons, I cannot adopt the majority’s analysis, but I concur in the result. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9782274. Public record. Not legal advice.