# People v. Acosta

> California Supreme Court · September 11, 2002 · 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 435

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9782251

## Case

- **Full name:** The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. GREG ACOSTA, Defendant and Appellant; THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DAVID LEWIS CORNELIUS, Defendant and Appellant
- **Court:** California Supreme Court
- **Decided:** September 11, 2002
- **Citations:** 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 435; 29 Cal. 4th 105; 52 P.3d 624
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Werdegar
- **Judges:** Chin, George, Kennard, Werdegar
- **Cited by:** 132 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9782251

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- observing that, in California, “[a]ll presumptions are against a repeal by implication” and “[a]bsent an express declaration of legislative intent, we will find an implied repeal only when no rational basis exists to harmonize the two potentially conflicting statutes, and the …

## Opinion text

WERDEGAR, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I agree with the majority’s conclusion in part 2 (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 118-127) that both the “One Strike” (Pen. Code, § 667.61) and the “Three Strikes” (id., § 667, subds. (b)-(i)) laws may properly be applied to a defendant who qualifies for sentencing under both.
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion in part 3 (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 128-131) that a sentencing court may, despite the plain language of Penal Code section 667.61, subdivision (f), reuse for other sentencing purposes a factual circumstance already used to qualify a defendant for sentencing under the One Strike law. On this point, I generally agree with the concurring and dissenting opinions of the Chief Justice and Justice Kennard.
*141 I also disagree with the majority’s conclusion in part 1 (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 112-118) that Penal Code section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(A)(i) directs the sentencing court to triple the minimum term for an indeterminate term in calculating a third-strike sentence. To be sure, a different provision of the Three Strikes law expressly directs the court to multiply the “minimum term for an indeterminate term” (id., § 667, subd. (e)(1)) in calculating a second-strike sentence. But the third-strike provision, option one (id., § 667, subd. (e)(2)(A)(i)), contains no such language. The majority views the difference in language between these two provisions as insignificant. In contrast, I view the difference as demonstrating beyond cavil that the Legislature knew how to tell courts to multiply the “minimum term for an indeterminate term” (id., § 667, subd. (e)(1)) when that is what the Legislature intended to do. The entire court apparently considered this point self-evident in People v. Jefferson (1999) 21 Cal.4th 86, 99 [ 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 893 , 980 P.2d 441 ], (See also id. at p. 105 (dis. opn. of Werdegar, J.).) We should not add words the Legislature omitted.
On September 11, 2002, the opinion was modified to read as printed above.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9782251. Public record. Not legal advice.