# Elkins v. Superior Court

> California Supreme Court · August 6, 2007 · 63 Cal. Rptr. 3d 483

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9782106

## Case

- **Full name:** JEFFREY ELKINS, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CONTRA COSTA COUNTY, Respondent; MARILYN ELKINS, Real Party in Interest
- **Court:** California Supreme Court
- **Decided:** August 6, 2007
- **Citations:** 63 Cal. Rptr. 3d 483; 41 Cal. 4th 1337; 163 P.3d 160; 2007 Cal. LEXIS 8214
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Werdegar
- **Judges:** George, Werdegar
- **Cited by:** 218 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- **Red flag:** Superseded by statute, as recognized in Swain v. Swain (In re Swain).
- Negative treatments: 1
- Distinguished by: 0
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9782106

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that "a party's opportunity to call witnesses to testify and to proffer admissible evidence is central to having his or her day in court"
- discussing the validity of a trial court’s local rule and scheduling order under California law

## Opinion text

WERDEGAR, J., Concurring.
I agree that the superior court’s local rule and trial scheduling order were inconsistent with statutory provisions of the Evidence Code and Code of Civil Procedure, particularly the hearsay rule of Evidence Code section 1200. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1354—1363.) I also agree the trial court abused its discretion in excluding petitioner’s exhibits; because the rule and order were inconsistent with state law, enforcing these invalid measures to exclude virtually all of a party’s evidence was necessarily an abuse of discretion. But given the existence of the local rule and order at the time of trial, I would not conclude that the trial judge acted arbitrarily or unduly “mechanically” in excluding petitioner’s evidence. (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 1365.) The trial court excused one breach of the order (petitioner’s late submission of his exhibits) and explained to petitioner the other (failure of petitioner’s declaration to establish the foundation for his exhibits). The court then offered petitioner an opportunity to cure the violation, an opportunity petitioner, for whatever reason, did not pursue. Despite petitioner’s sudden offer to give up his interest in the family home, moreover, the court ordered his interest preserved. In my view, the trial court’s rule and order, rather than the particular actions of the court in this case, are to blame for the exclusion of petitioner’s evidence.
*1370 Finally, while I join the majority in recommending that the Judicial Council study ways for trial courts to balance efficiency and fairness in dissolution proceedings (maj. opn., ante, at p. 1369, fn. 20), I find it unnecessary to join the majority’s policy critique of the Contra Costa County rule and order (id. at pp. 1365-1369). The court properly holds the local rule and order invalid because they conflict with state statutes, not because they are poor policy. The criticisms voiced by family law practitioners, although important, would be better considered by the Judicial Council or the Legislature than by this court. As we have sound statutory grounds for holding the local rule and order invalid, I would leave the weighing of competing policy, at least in the first instance, to other institutions.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9782106. Public record. Not legal advice.