# Granzer v. State

> Wyoming Supreme Court · October 8, 2008 · 193 P.3d 266

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9781906

## Case

- **Full name:** Sally Jo GRANZER, Appellant (Defendant), v. the STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff)
- **Court:** Wyoming Supreme Court
- **Decided:** October 8, 2008
- **Citations:** 193 P.3d 266; 2008 WY 118; 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 124; 2008 WL 4489154
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Voigt
- **Judges:** Voigt, Golden, Hill, Kite, Burke
- **Cited by:** 62 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9781906

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- acknowledging the rule generally

## Opinion text

VOIGT, Chief Justice,
dissenting, in which GOLDEN, Justice, joins.
[128] I respectfully dissent because, even though I agree with the majority that reversal should flow from the instructional error, I would also reverse on the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence, which would result in reversal for entry of a judgment of acquittal. The failure of the district court adequately to instruct the jury as to the elements of the offense charged was exacerbated in this case by the dearth of evidence that the appellant "stored" methamphetamine in the home at a time that she allowed the child to "enter and remain" in the home. It appears undisputed that the appellant arrived at the home just shortly before the officers did, that when she arrived she was not aware that the child was there, and that the only methamphetamine present, other than trace amounts in empty baggies, was in her pocket when she entered. Evidence that the appellant may have at other times in the past allowed the child to enter and remain in the home, at which time there may or may not have been metham *274 phetamine "stored" there, is irrelevant. I would reverse and remand for entry of a judgment of acquittal because there was insufficient evidence to convict.
[129] The temporal factor is significant in this case both in regard to the definition of the crime and to the appellant's theory of defense. The legislature defined the crime as "knowingly and willfully" allowing a child to "enter and remain" in a dwelling "being used" to store methamphetamines. See majority opinion supra 16. Neither an inference of previous permission for the child to enter the dwelling, nor an inference of previous use of the dwelling to store methamphet-amines, is sufficient to prove that a crime occurred on October 10, 2006. In other words, the State did not prove the confluence of actus reus and mens rea. Specifically, there was no proof that the appellant allowed a child to enter and remain in the house at a time that she knew methamphetamine was being stored there. Furthermore, I would find that, as a matter of law, the appellant's attempt to hide the methamphetamine she had in her pocket when she entered the house is not what the legislature had in mind when it required as an element of the crime that methamphetamine be "manufactured" or "stored" in the room, dwelling, or vehicle. This was a simple possession case.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9781906. Public record. Not legal advice.