# In Re Marriage of Hall

> Appellate Court of Illinois · August 25, 2010 · 404 Ill. App. 3d 160

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9779668

## Case

- **Full name:** In Re MARRIAGE OF DEBORAH L. HALL, Petitioner-Appellant, and PAUL HALL, Respondent-Appellee
- **Court:** Appellate Court of Illinois
- **Decided:** August 25, 2010
- **Citations:** 404 Ill. App. 3d 160; 343 Ill. Dec. 514; 935 N.E.2d 522; 2010 Ill. App. LEXIS 907
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Bowman
- **Judges:** Hutchinson, Bowman
- **Cited by:** 24 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9779668

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding the petitioner’s interest was not limited to specified retirement plans because had the parties intended to limit petitioner’s interest to specific retirement plans, they could have added language to effectuate that intent

## Opinion text

JUSTICE BOWMAN, specially concurs:
I concur with the majority that petitioner was seeking to enforce the marital settlement agreement rather than seeking to vacate the dissolution judgment, pursuant to section 2 — 1401. I also concur with the majority in its ultimate decision to reverse the judgment of the trial court and to remand the cause. However, I disagree with the majority that article 18.4 of the marital settlement agreement is unambiguous.
When interpreting a marital settlement agreement, a court seeks to give effect to the parties’ intent. Allton v. Hintzsche, 373 Ill. App. 3d 708, 711 (2007). The language used in the agreement is usually the best indication of the parties’ intent. Allton, 373 Ill. App. 3d at 711 . “When the terms of the agreement are unambiguous, we determine the parties’ intent solely from the language of the [agreement].” Allton, 373 Ill. App. 3d at 711 . “An ambiguity exists when an agreement contains language that is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.” Allton, 373 Ill. App. 3d at 711 . “ ‘Where the language is ambiguous, parol evidence may be used to decide what the parties intended.’ ” Allton, 373 Ill. App. 3d at 711 , quoting In re Marriage of Michaelson, 359 Ill. App. 3d 706, 714 (2005). All the provisions of the agreement should be read as a whole to interpret it and to determine whether an ambiguity exists. Rich v. Principal Life Insurance Co., 226 Ill. 2d 359, 371 (2007). An ambiguity is not created simply because the parties disagree on the meaning of any provision. Rich, 226 Ill. 2d at 371-72 .
In this case, I find that article 18.4 of the marital settlement agreement is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation and therefore is ambiguous. In determining that an ambiguity exists, I read the marital settlement agreement and article XVIII as a whole. Article XVIII is entitled “Retirement Plans,” and begins in article 18.1 to name two specific plans: the Anheuser-Busch deferred income stock purchase and savings plan and the Kraft Foods thrift plan. The parties agreed to enter into a QDRO to distribute the plans equally. Article 18.2 then states that respondent was to obtain current account statements for “each of these retirement plans.” Article 18.3 then states that respondent was responsible for preparing the QDRO for “each of these retirement plans.” Article 18.4 then provides that it was the parties’ intention to divide the “balance of each of [respondent’s] retirement plans” equally. Because the agreement already stated in section 18.1 that the two identified plans would be divided equally and the subject of a QDRO, I believe that one could reasonably interpret that articles 18.2, 18.3, and 18.4 referred to other retirement plans. However, because none of the provisions of article XVIII makes clear that additional retirement plans exist, I believe that one also could reasonably interpret article 18.4 as referring solely to the two plans named in article 18.1. Accordingly, I believe that article 18.4 is ambiguous and that the judgment of the trial court should be reversed and the cause remanded for the trier of fact to determine whether the parties intended for the equal division of the pension plans. Given the fact that the parties had testified that they intended to divide the marital property equally and that the pensions in question were marital property, I would predict that respondent would have a difficult time prevailing, but I do believe that the question is proper for the fact finder.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9779668. Public record. Not legal advice.