# Book Agents of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South v. State Board of Equalization

> Tennessee Supreme Court · June 17, 1974 · 513 S.W.2d 514

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9779222

## Case

- **Full name:** BOOK AGENTS OF the METHODIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH, SOUTH and the Board of Publication of the Methodist Church, Petitioners, v. the STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION of the State of Tennessee Et Al., Respondents; The SUNDAY SCHOOL BOARD OF the SOUTHERN BAPTIST CONVENTION, Petitioner, v. the STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION, Etc., Et Al., Respondents; Clifford ALLEN, Tax Assessor, and the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee, Petitioners, v. the STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION of the State of Tennessee, Respondent
- **Court:** Tennessee Supreme Court
- **Decided:** June 17, 1974
- **Citations:** 513 S.W.2d 514; 1974 Tenn. LEXIS 467
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Chattin
- **Judges:** Dyer, McCanless, Leech, Chattin, Fones
- **Cited by:** 17 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9779222

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- rejecting the Court of Appeals test for assessing the taxability of religious publications “based on whether the particular book or activity adhered to the ‘doctrine and practice’ or ‘religious faith’ of the respective denominations” in favor of a test that did not turn upon a…

## Opinion text

CHATTIN, Justice
(concurring in part and dissenting in part.)
I concur in all of the Chief Justice’s-opinion, except the holding therein that the tax on the printing press property shall be prorated on the basis of the ratio of denominational religious earnings to all earnings. While the ratio is reasonable and fair, there is no right or justification given by the statute to adopt any ratio at all.
T.C.A. Section 67-502(2) clearly provides that only the real and personal property “occupied” and “used exclusively” for religious purposes shall be exempt. The statute says nothing at all of ratios or proportions or other things of this nature.
It is clear beyond argument to have a ratio at all, it must first he admitted that the property is not “used exclusively” for religious purposes. Otherwise, why have the ratio? And, since the entire purpose and sense of the statute is to limit a religious exemption to property that is “used exclusively” for these purposes, it is likewise clear that the opinion goes outside the statute when it adopts a ratio.
The Chief Justice justifies the adoption of a ratio by the last part of a sentence in Section 67-502(2) T.C.A., as follows:
“. . . but if a portion only of any lot or building of any such institution is used exclusively for carrying out thereupon one (1) or more of such purposes of such institution, then such lot or building shall be so exempt only to the extent of the value of the portion so used, and the remaining or other portion, to the extent of the value of such remaining or other portion, shall be subject to taxation.”
The true sense of this part of the sentence cannot be understood without the first part of the sentence in mind. It reads:
“The real property of any such institution not so used exclusively for carrying out thereupon one (1) or more of such purposes, but leased or otherwise used for other purposes, whether the income received therefrom he used for one (1) or more of such purposes or not, shall not be exempt;”
The legislative intent controls the construction of statutes. Mayhew v. Mayhew, 52 Tenn.App. 459 , 376 S.W.2d 324 (1964).
A statute should be construed as a whole, giving effect to each word; and it should and will be assumed the legislature used each word in the statute purposely and that the use of the words convey some *529 intent and have a meaning and a purpose. Anderson Fish and Oyster Co. v. Olds, 197 Tenn. 604 , 277 S.W.2d 344 (1955).
When the entire sentence is read it is clear the legislature intended to deal with situations where “a portion only of any building or lot” is “used exclusively” for religious purposes with the remaining portion leased or not so exclusively used. In which event, only the exclusively used portion would be exempt. To take the reference to a “portion only of any lot or building” and make this apply so as to exempt commercial enterprises which happen to be operated by religious institutions, and are used by such institutions at their will for secular purposes, along with religious purposes, is to violate both the statute and the constitution, from which the statute comes.
The Statute comes from Article 2, Section 28 of the Constitution which authorizes the legislature to exempt only such property “as may be held and used for purposes purely religious.” In Baptist Memorial Hospital v. Couillens, 176 Tenn. 300 , 140 S.W.2d 1088 (1940), the terms “purely” and “exclusively” were held to be synonymous.
So, when in the statute the legislature says, time and again, the exemption is predicated on exclusive use it is not expressing a policy or carving out an exemption. The legislature is simply following the plain, clear command of the constitution; and is giving the broadest exemption that the constitution allows. The Methodist Publishing House property has a net worth of $33,000,000.00 and the Baptist Sunday School Board property has a net equity in excess of $43,000,000.00. These extensive printing properties of these giants of the printing industry are not such as are within the constitutional authorization. These properties, by their very nature, held to be used by their owners at their will, as the market may require, for either secular or religious purposes, simply cannot come within the constitutional requirement for exempt property: that it “be held and used” for purely religious purposes.
Whether the property was being used exclusively for an exempt purpose must be determined from the facts. The opinion of the Chief Justice states the record supports the determination of the State Board of Equalization, the Chancellor and the Court of Appeals that the property owners publish denominational, nondenominational, religious and secular literature.
Thus, it is clear the Chief Justice admits the printing presses and the buildings in which they are housed are not used “exclusively for carrying out thereupon one (1) or more of the purposes for which said institution was created or exists, and the personal property . . . used exclusively for one (1) or more of the purposes for which such institution was created or exists.”
Likewise, the decree of the Chancellor authorizing the taxing authorities to tax only “to the extent of the dollar volume of the exempt activity as compared with the entire dollar volume of business done by the property owners,” is a tacit admission on his part the properties were not being used exclusively for exempt purposes.
“The real test determinative of a corporation’s tax exempt status is the use it makes of the property.
⅜ ⅝ ⅝ ⅜ ⅝ “Although our statute (§ 67-502 T.C. A.) has undergone several changes through amendment, the standard required of corporations seeking a tax exemption has not changed.” North Gates Elk Club v. Garner, Tenn., 496 S.W.2d 887 (1973).
The only possible conclusion from the facts is the property owners do not use their respective printing press properties exclusively for any of the exempt purposes.
In other words, the facts show each of the property owners have been, and are, *530 using their printing press “otherwise” than for purely and exclusively religious purposes.
The statute specifically states “the real property * * * not so used exclusively * * * but leased or otherwise used for other purposes * * * shall not be exempt.”
“As said above, the plain intent of this Act is to exempt such an institution’s real estate only when it is both (1) ‘occupied’ and (2) ‘used exclusively’ by the institution for one of its charter purposes; and the exemption is denied not only to property ‘leased’ by it to others, but also to property occupied by it but ‘not used exclusively’ for a charter purpose.” Nashville v. Bd. of Equalization, 210 Tenn. 587 , 360 S.W.2d 458 (1961).
The property physically used in the work of an religious institution is exempt. The property in which the funds of such institution are invested is not exempt, although the income therefrom be used exclusively in the maintenance and work of the institution. State v. City of Nashville, 178 Tenn. 344 , 157 S.W.2d 839 (1942).
“The terms ‘purely’ and ‘exclusively’ * * * are held by this Court to be synonymous, and to require that the property be used wholly for the purposes mentioned in order to come within the exemption.” Baptist Mem. Hospital v. Couillens, supra.
Since the record shows the respective parent institutions have and are each using their printing press for printing both religious and secular material, although the income therefrom is used exclusively for the work of the parent institution, the properties are not exempt.
The adoption of the ratio by the Chancellor and concurred in by the opinion of the Chief Justice as a basis for exemption is judicial legislation and contrary to the doctrine of separation of powers.
Finally, the opinion of the Chief Justice holds directly contrary to, and virtually overrules, two opinions of this Court released last year: The East Catholic Club of Memphis v. Riley C. Garner, Shelby County Trustee, et al., unpublished, filed May 21, 1973; and North Gates Elks Club v. Garner, supra. These cases involved directly the question here considered: Whether property owned by an exempt institution, and used interchangeably for exempt and taxable purposes, has any exemption at all. The answer in each case was in the negative.
It is true in those cases the property values were quite small compared to those here involved. It is likewise true that the secular use of the property was probably greater than in these cases; especially, in North Gates Elks Club. But do these factors justify ignoring these cases? Is it the case that a ratio is not to be employed where the value of the property is comparatively small? Is it the case that the ratio is not to be employed where the religious use is appreciably smaller than the secular use?
If these factors enter into the question of the right to a ratio, it will be necessary to go further and say how valuable the property has to be before a ratio can be applied, and how much greater the proportion of secular use to religious use in order to make the ratio unavailable. Only by such classification can the discrimination against the East Catholic Club of Memphis, North Gates Elks Club, and all other religious and charitable institutions inherent in this opinion be removed.
The printing press properties of the two institutions involved should be assessed as the State Board of Equalization assessed them. The State Board’s assessment respected the constitutional requirements that the property, to be exempt, had to be used “purely for religious purposes;” and respected the implementation of this constitutional requirement of pure use, by the requirement of “exclusive use.” This is the law and we should follow it.
I am authorized to say that Mr. Justice FONES joins me in this dissent.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9779222. Public record. Not legal advice.