# Rose v. State

> Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas · June 15, 1988 · 752 S.W.2d 529

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9778060

## Case

- **Full name:** Vernon Lee ROSE, Appellant, v. the STATE of Texas, Appellee
- **Court:** Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
- **Decided:** June 15, 1988
- **Citations:** 752 S.W.2d 529; 1988 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 117; 1987 WL 1386
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Duncan
- **Judges:** Onion, Teague, McCormick, Clinton, Duncan, Campbell, Davis, White, Miller
- **Cited by:** 510 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- **Red flag:** Abrogated on other grounds by Karenev v. State, 2009 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 961 (2009).
- Negative treatments: 2
- Distinguished by: 0
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9778060

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that Tex. Code Crim.P. Ann. art. 37.07, sec. 4(a) (Vernon Supp.1988) (“the parole statute”), requiring that the trial court instruct the jury on the Texas parole laws, is unconstitutional
- holding that Tex.Code Crim.P. Ann. art. 37.07, sec. 4(a) (Vernon Supp.1988) ("the parole statute"), requiring that the trial court instruct the jury on the Texas parole laws, is unconstitutional
- holding that predecessor statute violated separation of powers and due course of law

## Opinion text

DUNCAN, Judge,
concurring on Court’s motion for rehearing.
On original submission I joined only that portion of Judge Clinton’s opinion that declared the parole instruction mandated by Art. 37.07, § 4(a) V.A.C.C.P., unconstitutional because it violated the due course of law provision of the Texas Constitution. I also concluded that since submission of the jury instruction was violative of a defendant’s right to due course of law it necessarily followed that a harm analysis as envisioned by Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex.Cr.App.1985) was inappropriate. I continue to adhere to my position that Almanza v. State, id., is inapplicable, but I do agree with Judge Campbell’s position that a harm analysis as required by Rule 81(b)(2) Tex.R.App.Proc. is applicable.
I now also agree with Judge Clinton’s observations that Art. 37.07, § 4(a), V.A.C. C.P., is an unconstitutional legislative intrusion upon the separation of powers doctrine. Therefore, I join completely the opinion of Judge Campbell.
*558 Nevertheless, I feel it is necessary to make these additional comments concerning the legislative activity that resulted in Art. 37.07, § 4(a), supra. It is no secret that Art. 37.07, supra was enacted to pacify a perceived public concern that defendants were being released prematurely from prison. Whether that is a valid thesis is irrelevant. What is relevant, however, is that there was a viable way to respond to the public’s arguable concern.
Assuming that the concern was real and action by the Legislature was necessary, there was a means of doing so without imposing upon the executive and judicial branches of Texas government. Very simply, rather than rely upon the speculation that Art. 37.07, supra, encourages, if the Legislature concluded that prisoners are being released too early all they have to do is alter the standards under which the parole laws are administered. Why the Legislature elected to proceed in the faulty manner that resulted in Art. 37.07, supra, as opposed to confronting the matter in a direct and constitutional way is not readily apparent.
Courts are properly hesitant to declare legislative actions unconstitutional. But when a legislative body acts in a manner that unaccountably usurps the authority and responsibility of another branch of government it is the right and duty of this Court to declare such actions unconstitutional. Art. 37.07, supra was not only an unconstitutional legislative effort, but unnecessary as well.
MILLER, J., joins.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9778060. Public record. Not legal advice.
