# La Sara Grain Co. v. First National Bank of Mercedes

> Texas Supreme Court · May 23, 1984 · 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 382

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9776667

## Case

- **Full name:** LA SARA GRAIN COMPANY, Et Al., Petitioners, v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF MERCEDES, Texas, Respondent
- **Court:** Texas Supreme Court
- **Decided:** May 23, 1984
- **Citations:** 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 382; 673 S.W.2d 558; 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (West) 963; 1984 Tex. LEXIS 351
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Barrow
- **Judges:** Spears, Barrow
- **Cited by:** 403 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9776667

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that deposit creates an implied agreement that bank will disburse funds only in accordance with depositor’s instructions
- holding that “an obligation of good faith is imposed on the performance of every contract or duty with the [Texas Uniform Commercial] Code” and citing the § 1.203, the predecessor provision relating to the duty of good faith
- holding that a lender "may be subject to a [Deceptive Trade Practices Act] claim if the borrower’s 'objective' is the purchase or *1294 lease of a good or service thereby qualifying the borrower as a consumer”
- holding bank liable for paying checks on an unauthorized signature under Tex.Bus. & Com.Code Ann. § 4.406 where bank paid cheek drawn from La Sara’s account by employee with signa-toe authority despite corporate resolution requiring bank to pay checks only upon the signatures …
- holding that pure extension of credit does not constitute “goods or services,” and therefore borrower in this transaction will not qualify as consumer under Deceptive Trade Practices Act

## Opinion text

BARROW, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent in part. I would remand this cause to the court of appeals for consideration of the bank’s factual insufficiency point. By that point, the bank complains of the finding that it had actual knowledge of the unauthorized change in the signature card.
This court does not have jurisdiction of points that attack the factual sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a jury finding. Hurst v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 647 S.W.2d 249, 253 (Tex.1983); Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. arts. 1728, 1821. As the majority points out, the bank urged under one point that there was no evidence to support the jury finding, or in the alternative the evidence was factually insufficient to support that finding. This manner of presentation is expressly authorized by Rule 418(d), Tex.R. Civ.P., as amended January 1, 1981. Furthermore, the bank’s argument was fully presented under this point because the same record references and legal arguments support both the no evidence and the factual insufficiency contentions.
I agree that there is “some evidence” to support the jury finding, but we do not have jurisdiction to consider the factual insufficiency contention.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9776667. Public record. Not legal advice.