# Matamoros v. State > Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas · June 14, 1995 · 901 S.W.2d 470 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9776331 ## Case - **Full name:** John Reyes MATAMOROS, Appellant, v. the STATE of Texas, Appellee - **Court:** Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas - **Decided:** June 14, 1995 - **Citations:** 901 S.W.2d 470; 1995 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 70; 1995 WL 354068 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Baird - **Judges:** Keller, Baird, Clinton, Overstreet - **Cited by:** 264 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9776331 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - finding no abuse of discretion in admitting crime scene photographs over Matamoros’ objection that they were cumulative of a crime scene video previously admitted as the photographs provided different vantage points, which might enhance the jury’s understanding of the crime sc… - holding trial court properly denied jury instruction that mere admission of DNA evidence does not mean that court vouches for its reliability or that results should be accepted as proof beyond reasonable doubt because that is comment on weight of evidence by singling out parti… - holding that the defendant committed burglary because the evidence was sufficient to establish that the victim was sleeping in his bed when the defendant entered the house without his victim's consent and the defendant surprised and killed him - holding that a probable cause affidavit is sufficient if it specifies a named informant as supplying the information upon which probable cause is based and is sufficiently detailed to suggest direct knowledge on the informant's part. - holding that a named witness who told police that Appellant confessed to killing victim and cutting himself was reliable because it showed direct knowledge of Appellant’s culpability and police observed the cut on Appellant’s hand ## Opinion text BAIRD, Judge, concurring. In the early portions of the opinion, the majority refers to the deceased by name. However, the latter portions of the opinion refer to the deceased as “the victim.” The latter references clearly establish that the majority’s use of the deceased’s name is gratuitous, unnecessary and, for the following reasons, improper. The purpose of an appellate opinion is to resolve the case and controversy before the court, and to instruct the bench and bar on legal principles for future application. In so doing, a court should recite only the facts necessary and relevant to decide the case and instruction on the law. See, Ruggero J. Aldisert, Opinion Writing, 97 (West.1990); and, Joyce J. George, Judicial Opinion Writing Handbook, 103 (3d ed. 1993). Facts which are unnecessary or distracting should be excluded. George, at 103-104. Because the name of a crime victim is seldom necessary to our discussion of the merits of a case, the Court should refrain from referring to the victim by name. See generally, Star-Telegram, Inc. v. Doe, — S.W.2d -, - - - [ 1995 WL 341575 ], slip op. pp. 6-7 (No. D-4578, Supreme Court of Texas, June 8, 1995) (The “private details about a ... victim or the victim’s identity may be irrelevant when the details are not uniquely crucial to the case_”). More importantly, however, our constitution grants crime victims “the right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy throughout the criminal justice process.” Tex. Const, art. I, § 30. Further, there is a general presumption under Texas law that the public has no legitimate interest in embarrassing facts about private citizens. Star-Telegram, — S.W.2d at -, slip op. pg. 6 (citing Industrial Found. of the South v. Texas Indus. Accid. Bd., 540 S.W.2d 668, 682 (Tex.1976)). Because victimization by crime brings not only the trauma of the crime itself but humiliation and embarrassment, it is improper to further invade a crime victim’s privacy by unnecessarily stating the victim’s name in an opinion. See, Knapp v. Martone, 170 Ariz. 237 , 823 P.2d 685, 686, n. 1 (1992). Referring to the names of crime victims typically serves only to further embarrass and traumatize victims and their families. State v. Ramey, 318 N.C. 457 , 349 S.E.2d 566, 569, n. 1 (1986). Accordingly, as a matter of sensitivity and respect, courts should not refer by name to the victim of an offense unless it cannot be avoided because of the peculiar circumstances of the case. Dinkins v. State, 894 S.W.2d 330, 335, n. 2 (Tex.Cr.App.1995); First v. State, 846 S.W.2d 836, 837, n. 2 (Tex.Cr.App.1992); State v. Kites, 175 Ariz. 358 , 857 P.2d 1212, 1215, n. 2 (1993); State v. Pearson, 1992 WL 70547 , 1, n. 1 (Tenn.Cr.App.1992) (unpublished) (practice of court is to avoid mentioning names of victims in sexual related crimes in order to protect victim’s privacy interest); State v. Shamsid-Deen, 324 N.C. 437 , 379 S.E.2d 842, 845, n. 1 (1989) (victims of sexual assault); and, State v. McGautha, 617 S.W.2d 554, 555, n. 2 (Mo.Ct.App.W.D.1981). See also, Wilcox v. State, 672 S.W.2d 12, 13, n. 1 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th] 1984); and, People v. Brown, 35 Cal.App.3d 317, 320, n. 2 , 110 Cal.Rptr. 854, 856, n. 2 (Ca.Ct.App.2d Div.1973). Believing the reference to the deceased by name in the instant case was improper, I will not join the opinion. With these comments, I join only in the judgment of the Court. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9776331. Public record. Not legal advice.