# State v. Weaver

> Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas · November 18, 1998 · 982 S.W.2d 892

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9776115

## Case

- **Full name:** The STATE of Texas, v. Noel Gene WEAVER, Appellee
- **Court:** Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
- **Decided:** November 18, 1998
- **Citations:** 982 S.W.2d 892; 1998 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 152; 1998 WL 796999
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Price
- **Judges:** McCormick, Mansfield, Keller, Holland, Womack, Meyers, Price, Overstreet, Baird
- **Cited by:** 45 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9776115

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding venue proper in Harris County for prosecution of aggregate theft arising out of a single scheme, even though offenses against some complainants took place outside Harris County because alleged out-of-county offenses arise from same scheme or continuing course of conduc…
- noting that the “main purpose” of the 1974 addition of Section 31.09 was to “increase the punishment range for a thief who commits various thefts” because under the common law, a person who “stole x amount from various victims at different times could not be as severely punish…
- discussing 63rd Legislature’s consolidation of various separately defined theft offenses into one general theft offense that said “thou shalt not steal”

## Opinion text

*896 PRICE, Judge,
concurring and dissenting.
I concur in the judgment of the majority, and I join the first part of the majority opinion, which makes its determination on the basis of statutory analysis. However, I dissent as to the latter portion, which discusses legislative history. Under our approach to statutory interpretation, we look to the literal text of the statute for its meaning, and we ordinarily give effect to that plain meaning. Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). The only exceptions to this rule are where application of the statute’s plain language would lead to absurd consequences that the Legislature could not possibly have intended, or if the plain language is ambiguous. Id. Because the plain language of the relevant statutes is not ambiguous, and because a literal interpretation of those statutes does not lead to an absurd result, we need not, and indeed should not, consider the legislative history. Id. at 785-786 .

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9776115. Public record. Not legal advice.