# State v. Jenkins

> Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee · March 24, 1987 · 733 S.W.2d 528

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9775449

## Case

- **Full name:** STATE of Tennessee, Appellee, v. Donald JENKINS and Edward Black, Appellants
- **Court:** Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
- **Decided:** March 24, 1987
- **Citations:** 733 S.W.2d 528; 1987 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 2541
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Byers
- **Judges:** Jones, Byers, Cornelius
- **Cited by:** 82 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9775449

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that a conviction for a criminal offense may not be based upon conjecture, guess, speculation or mere possibility

## Opinion text

BYERS, Judge,
concurring.
I concur with my colleagues in affirming the drug convictions and in dismissing the charge of going armed. I further concur with them in the sentence fixed for the defendant Edward Black. I do not, however, subscribe to the statements in the majority opinion dealing with the level of evidence required to show a deterrence factor in passing on probation.
My colleagues read State v. Horne, 612 S.W.2d 186 (Tenn.Cr.App.1980), and State v. Vance, 626 S.W.2d 287 (Tenn.Cr.App. 1981), to require testimonial evidence of the fact that a particular crime is significant enough to require a denial of probation on the basis of deterrence. I do not believe either decision makes such testimony essential for such a finding. Although this kind of evidence would go a long way in supporting the finding of a trial judge, to make it essential would prohibit the application of judicial notice, by the trial court and this Court, of facts which are known by reason of the presence of multiple cases of a particular kind on the docket of the courts. I would not, therefore, read Home and Vance so restrictively.
Neither do I concur with the suggestion that T.C.A. § 40-35-102(2) gives weight to comparative sentences between particular defendants. Absolute parity in sentencing is not required by the general purposes of the Sentencing Reform Act. See State v. Leonard Moss, 727 S.W.2d 229 at Section 11.A. (Tenn., Knoxville, 1986).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9775449. Public record. Not legal advice.