# Allen v. State

> Supreme Court of Arkansas · March 17, 1997 · 327 Ark. 350

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9775147

## Case

- **Full name:** A.B. ALLEN v. STATE of Arkansas
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Arkansas
- **Decided:** March 17, 1997
- **Citations:** 327 Ark. 350; 939 S.W.2d 270; 1997 Ark. LEXIS 151
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Glaze
- **Judges:** Thornton, Glaze, Newbern
- **Cited by:** 11 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9775147

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that the appellate court does not attempt to weigh the evidence or pass on the credibility of witnesses; that duty is left to the trier of fact
- observing that holding public office is a political privilege and not a civil right

## Opinion text

Tom Glaze, Justice, concurring. A. B. Allen complains that the court failed to address his equal protection argument. The majority opinion specifically restated Allen’s argument, stating, “Appellant contends that the provisions for removal and ineligibility established for municipal officers are unconstitutional because they deny to appellant the equal protection of the laws in that county officials are not subject to the same provisions.” The majority opinion then continued by addressing the rational basis aspect of Allen’s argument and explains away Allen’s assertion that there is no rational basis for the distinction drawn by certain constitutional and statutory provisions dealing with removal of city and county officials. I need not further readdress the majority opinion on this point.
What I do mention is that Allen’s argument was wrong from its inception because he misidentified the classes. The charges against Allen centered on Ark. Code Ann. § 14-42-108 (1987), which makes it unlawful for a municipal official (1) to receive water, gas, or electric current without paying for it at the same rate as the general public, and (2) to furnish any person service from any public utility unless payment is made at the usual and regular rates. Only city officials violating these statutory provisions are subject to removal from office. Allen in no way contends that county officials engage in this same or similar conduct, namely, providing such utility services.
In sum, I agree that Allen’s rehearing petition should be denied, and although I think his equal protection argument was sufficiently addressed by the majority court, I add only my above thoughts.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9775147. Public record. Not legal advice.