# State Ex Rel. Mathewson v. Board of Election Commissioners > Supreme Court of Missouri · October 27, 1992 · 841 S.W.2d 633 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9774897 ## Case - **Full name:** STATE Ex Rel. James MATHEWSON, Et Al., Appellants, v. the BOARD OF ELECTION COMMISSIONERS OF ST. LOUIS COUNTY, Et Al., Respondents - **Court:** Supreme Court of Missouri - **Decided:** October 27, 1992 - **Citations:** 841 S.W.2d 633; 1992 WL 214469 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Holstein - **Judges:** Covington, Benton, Price, Gaertner, Holstein, Thomas, Robertson - **Cited by:** 24 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9774897 ## Opinion text *638 HOLSTEIN, Judge, dissenting. I respectfully dissent. The majority finds ambiguity in that portion of Mo. Const, art. Ill, § 7, which provides that after the filing of the reapportionment map and plan, “senators shall be elected according to such districts until a reapportionment is made as herein provided.” I find those words to be plain, clear, and unambiguous, requiring no interpretation or construction. The majority perceives the Constitution to be ambiguous as to whether art. Ill, § 7, applies to all senators elected after the filing of the plan, or just some senators after the filing of a reapportionment plan. I believe the key to understanding the quoted portions of art. Ill, § 7, is that it establishes the effective date for implementing the reapportionment plan for the state senate. From a reading of the entire Constitution, only art. Ill, § 7, dictates the time after which senators are to be elected from newly reapportioned districts. The provision in redundant fashion demands that from the filing of the reapportionment map and plan, and until the adoption of a subsequent reapportionment plan, senators are to be elected from the district described in the map and the plan. The language is unequivocal and free of proviso or exception. Persuasive in reaching this conclusion is a remarkably similar case from Pennsylvania involving almost the same constitutional provision present here. Pennsylvania’s Constitution provided that after the time for appealing a reapportionment plan had passed, “the reapportionment plan shall have the force of law, and the districts therein provided shall be used thereafter in elections to the General Assembly until the next reapportionment as required ...” Penn. Const, of 1968 art. II, § 17(e). Pennsylvania had staggered senatorial elections, like Missouri. State Senator Do-nolow died in November of 1972. His term was not to expire until 1974. A special election was called. The election was to be held after the 1970 reapportionment plan had become final. Persons excluded from voting in the “old” senatorial district brought suit to challenge the election in the newly reapportioned district. There the court stated: Our reading of this section of the Pennsylvania Constitution makes it crystal clear to us, and we therefore conclude, that its strict interpretation is, under the facts of this case, that a special election to fill the vacancy brought about by the death of Senator Donolow must be held in the new [district], as set forth in the Final Plan of the Pennsylvania Legislative Reapportionment Commission which became law June 5, 1972. Marston v. Kline, 8 Pa.Cmwlth. 143 , 301 A.2d 393, 396 (1973) (emphasis added). The majority relies on the rules of constitutional construction to demonstrate that art. Ill, § 7, is ambiguous. The primary rule of construction relied on by Chief Justice Robertson is that of contextual construction. All rules of constitutional construction, including the rule of contextual construction, are resorted to for the purpose of making ambiguous provisions clear, not to make clear provisions ambiguous. The most fundamental principle of constitutional interpretation is that “words are to be taken in accord with their fair intendment and their natural and ordinary meaning,” and “[w]hen language is plain and unambiguous, no construction is required.” Concerned Parents v. Caruthersville School Dist., 548 S.W.2d 554, 559 (Mo. banc 1977). Even if context is considered, there is no other provision that remotely relates to the effective date of reapportionment plans for senatorial districts. Article III, § 5, establishes the length of senators’ terms but makes no mention of the time reapportionment plans take effect. Article III, § 11, establishes that half of the senators shall be elected every two years, but is silent as to the effective date of reapportionment plans. Article III, § 14, relates to filling of vacancies, but it also is silent as to the time when senatorial reapportionment plans take effect. In sum, all of these provisions are complete and unambiguous within the confines of the subject matters each covers. I find neither text nor context in any of the provisions suggesting that the effec *639 tive date of reapportioned senatorial districts is delayed for those senators who are elected for less than a four-year term. Judge Price in his concurring opinion relies on another rule of construction. That rule provides that when there is an ambiguous provision in the Constitution, attorney general opinions and official legislative acts are very persuasive in resolving the ambiguity. But, as heretofore noted, where a constitutional provision is free of ambiguity, rules of construction, including our usual deference to interpretations of the other branches of government, must give way to the plain meaning. State ex rel. Randolph Co. v. Walden, 206 S.W.2d 979, 984 (Mo. banc 1947). I have no disagreement with the majority’s conclusion regarding the standing of Senator Mathewson. However, I would find that the statute, § 21.130, contravenes the plain language of art. Ill, § 7, and is unconstitutional. I would affirm the trial court. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9774897. Public record. Not legal advice.