# Ex Parte Krupps

> Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas · June 11, 1986 · 712 S.W.2d 144

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9773058

## Case

- **Full name:** Ex Parte Charles E. KRUPPS, Harold O. Edgington, H.O. Mathews, Vincent Rose, Lattie Rose, Rose Henley & John Henley, Applicants
- **Court:** Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
- **Decided:** June 11, 1986
- **Citations:** 712 S.W.2d 144
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Miller
- **Judges:** Davis, Onion, Clinton, Teague, Campbell, McCormick, White, Miller
- **Cited by:** 23 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9773058

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that constructive contempt adjudications satisfy due process if the con-temnor is given notice, a hearing, and the opportunity to obtain an attorney
- explaining that constructive contempt adjudications satisfy due process if the contemnor is given notice, a hearing, and the opportunity to obtain an attorney

## Opinion text

MILLER, Judge,
dissenting.
I join Judge Campbell’s dissent and further disagree with the majority opinion’s handling of appellant’s final argument by stating:
“Even if the rising requirement created a burden on applicants’ religious freedom, Judge Floyd removed the burden by giving them the option of remaining outside until after court convened.”
At 151. I would reach the merits of applicant Krupps’ complaint about burdening his religious freedom and, under these facts, decide against him.
It occurs to me that the majority’s reasoning concerning alternative choice as a substitute for the exercise of a constitutional right suffers from the same flaw as “separate but equal” thinking or providing that certain people can ride the bus but only if they sit in the back (I’m not going to even mention the “moment of silence” as an alternative to school prayer controversy). Granted, we are talking about the balance of least intrusive means of infringing on a constitutional right in favor of courtroom decorum and the relationship of that balance to the concept of direct contempt, not just the right to exercise the constitutional right. Still the two are so intertwined that the mere fact that an alternative was given in this case does not justify the majority’s cursory dismissal of applicant’s claim that the balance of right versus decorum should be tipped in his favor.
I dissent.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9773058. Public record. Not legal advice.