# Armstrong v. State

> Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas · March 29, 1995 · 897 S.W.2d 361

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9772598

## Case

- **Full name:** William Brooks ARMSTRONG, Appellant, v. the STATE of Texas, Appellee
- **Court:** Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
- **Decided:** March 29, 1995
- **Citations:** 897 S.W.2d 361; 1995 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 34; 1995 WL 131964
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Overstreet
- **Judges:** Baird, Overstreet, Maloney, Baird'S
- **Cited by:** 162 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9772598

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that the jury selection process is designed to insure that an intelligent, alert, disinterested, impartial, and truthful jury will perform the duty assigned to it
- holding that there was no error where counsel did not ask question that would uncover juror = s close friendship with prosecutor
- holding that there was no error where counsel did not ask question that would uncover juror’s close friendship with prosecutor
- recognizing that defense counsel has burden to ask questions to determine a juror’s potential bias
- stating that “defense counsel has an obligation to ask questions calculated to bring out that information which might be said to indicate a juror’s inability to be impartial and truthful”

## Opinion text

OVERSTREET, Judge,
dissents with the following note:
I suppose one could play on words as the majority apparently approves of to the infringement of an accused right to fair trial; however I refuse to do so. The facts of the voir dire proceeding are not in dispute and *374 well chronicled in the majority opinion and dissenting opinion.
The central issue in this case is whether the presiding juror and the elected prosecutor had a relationship that in all candor should have been disclosed to the defense. If there is a requirement to be candid and above board, the answer is yes. If trial by ambush is allowed and out of town lawyers can be hoodwinked, then sadly the answer is no.
Without question the conduct of the lawyer representing the accused would have been different if the relationship had been revealed. The record reflects that the juror would have been challenged for cause and failing success there, peremptorily struck.
The juror’s explanation as to why she did not reveal the relationship is weak at best, the prosecutor’s, because as an officer of the court has a greater responsibility, should be condemned.
With these comments I dissent to the majority and otherwise join the dissenting opinion.
MALONEY, J., joins Parts I and II of Judge BAIRD’s dissenting opinion.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9772598. Public record. Not legal advice.