# Bell v. State > Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas · March 19, 1986 · 724 S.W.2d 780 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9772414 ## Case - **Full name:** Walter BELL, Jr., Appellant, v. the STATE of Texas, Appellee - **Court:** Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas - **Decided:** March 19, 1986 - **Citations:** 724 S.W.2d 780; 1986 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1216 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Clinton - **Judges:** Miller, Teague, Clinton, McCormick - **Cited by:** 293 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9772414 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - concluding that, even though appellant was only person in array with bright white pants, was shortest person in array, and was only person with triangular mark above his head, trial court did not err in allowing witness's in-court identification of appellant when it was based … - finding the question of whether the print was verified by another expert was improper, since it is an attempt to bolster the testifying expert's testimony, although such a question would be proper as a predicate to introducing the second technician's analysis - finding that appellant=s consent to search, the finding of evidence, and appellant=s confrontation with the evidence were intervening circumstances between the arrest and confession in favor of appellant - stating that prospective juror is not subject to a challenge for cause 21 “if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court” - stating that venireperson is not subject to a challenge for cause “if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court” ## Opinion text CLINTON, Judge, concurring. In addressing appellant’s sixth ground of error, the Court correctly resorts to Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975), and its progeny. However, in my judgment, its finding that “after the warrant was obtained the causal relationship between the illegal arrest and subsequent evidence was severed” is unsound in light of the seminal decision the majority purports to follow, namely, Wong Sun v. United States. 1 Wong Sun examined circumstances in which Toy made statements to officers in his bedroom to determine whether his making them was “sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint” of an invasion violative of the Fourth Amendment. 371 U.S. at 486, 83 S.Ct. at 416-417. The rationale is that the primary taint of an illegal arrest bears so strongly on the will of a detainee that evidence “come at by exploitation of that illegality ... may not be used,” 371 U.S. at 488, 83 S.Ct. at 417. Therefore, exploitation of an unauthorized arrest to obtain a confession is, by definition, that which is calculated to affect the will of an arrestee enough to produce a confession. It follows that events and circumstances having no impact upon the consciousness of one illegally confined after an unlawful arrest are of no consequence in determining whether the primary taint has been purged. The mere fact that a warrant was obtained while appellant remained in custody could not sever a relationship between the illegal arrest and his subsequent confession. While procurement of a warrant might be considered an “event,” for it to have any impact on his will surely appellant must at least become aware that the “event” has occurred. Otherwise, as found *805 in Taylor v. Alabama, obtaining a warrant is “irrelevant to whether the confession was the fruit of the illegal arrest,” 457 U.S. at 693, 102 S.Ct. at 2668. 2 Clearly, that the warrant was based on fruits of an illegal arrest is not the reason the Taylor Court found it irrelevant to the issue. Rather, it reasoned that existence of a warrant filed ex parte may not be considered an “intervening event” when an accused is unaware that one has been obtained. 3 Here, unlike Taylor but as in Johnson v. Louisiana, appellant was taken before a magistrate who advised him of his rights and signed arrest warrants. Thus warrants were not issued ex parte and appellant was well aware that booking and photographing that followed were done on account of his being detained by reason of actions of a magistrate rather than initial arrest by police officers. Known to appellant, those developments certainly qualify as “intervening events,” relevant to whether his subsequent confession was a fruit of the original illegal arrest. For those reasons I would overrule ground of error six. Accordingly, I join the judgment of the Court. . With deference, I point out that the Supreme Court did not use the phrase "as a direct result of' in relation to "verbal evidence" but only to tangible materials, viz: "The exclusionary rule has traditionally barred from trial physical, tangible materials obtained either during or as a direct result of an unlawful invasion.” 371 U.S. at 485, 83 S.Ct. at 416. . The majority believes "this situation differs critically from Taylor," but what Justice Mar-shall was saying about the arrest warrant there underscores the meaning of Wong Sun and Brown v. Illinois for us here, viz: "The filing of this warrant, however, is irrelevant to whether the confession was the fruit of the illegal arrest. This case is not like Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 , 92 S.Ct. 1620 , 32 L.Ed.2d 152 (1972), where the defendant was brought before a committing Magistrate who advised him of his rights and set bail. Here, the arrest warrant was , filed ex parte ..." [my emphasis]. . In the balance of his explication Justice Mar-shall turned the focus away from warrant to fingerprints, viz: --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9772414. Public record. Not legal advice.