# Hoyle v. Faucher

> Supreme Court of Arkansas · October 15, 1998 · 334 Ark. 529

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9770968

## Case

- **Full name:** Joe HOYLE, Randy Stewart, Geneva Kelly, Denver Clement, and Shelly Bruce v. Dianna FAUCHER, Jerry Williams, Farrell Johnson, and Freda McMaster, in Their Official Capacities as Assessor, County Judge, Collector, and Treasurer for Crawford County, Arkansas; County of Crawford, Arkansas; And Jimmie Lou Fisher, Arkansas State Treasurer
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Arkansas
- **Decided:** October 15, 1998
- **Citations:** 334 Ark. 529; 975 S.W.2d 843; 1998 Ark. LEXIS 547
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Thornton
- **Judges:** Brown, Banks, Proctor, Holmes, Thornton, Glaze, Corbin, Imber
- **Cited by:** 26 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## Opinion text

Ray Thornton, Justice, dissenting. Amendment 59 states, in pertinent part:
Whenever a countywide reappraisal or reassessment of property subject to ad valorem taxes made in accordance with procedures established by the General Assembly shall result in an increase in the aggregate value of taxable real and personal property in any taxing unit in this state of ten percent (10%) or more over the previous year the rate of city or town, county, school district, and community college district taxes levied against the taxable real and personal property of such taxing unit shall, upon completion of such reappraisal or reassessment, be adjusted or rolled back, by the governing body of the taxing unit, for the year for which levied as provided below.
Ark. Const. art. 16, § 14(a) (emphasis added). The clear language of Amendment 59 provides that the rollback provision is triggered by a countywide reappraisal of real and personal property, which increases the assessed value of all property in the county by more than ten percent above the assessed value for the base year. I cannot agree that a reassessment of less than twenty-five percent of the taxable real property in the county, having the effect of an unknown percentage increase in the assessed value of all real and personal property, transforms a properly voted and completely legal ad valorem tax into an “illegal exaction.” Perhaps that result reflects the spirit of Amendment 59, but the determination that a legal tax has been converted into an illegal exaction should rest on words and principles articulated in Amendment 59, rather than on an interpretation of a legislative act that erroneously sought to establish procedures for implementation of Amendment 59.
The flaws that the majority recognizes in Act 758 of 1995, which attempted to spread the process of reappraisal over a five-year period, certainly should require that a trial court adjust tax rates so as not to violate the terms of Amendment 59. However, that conclusion does not require us to stretch the language of our constitution to invalidate legislative efforts aimed at equalizing and making fair the valuation of real and personal property within a county or on a statewide reappraisal.
On the merits, I agree with the majority that Act 758 was inartfully drawn, and that it could not be given effect as a limitation upon the required rollback of taxes under Amendment 59. What is missing from the majority’s opinion is an analysis as to whether the rollback provisions of Amendment 59 are self-executing, and what theory of construction do they apply to a partial reassessment of less than twenty-five percent of the real property in a governmental unit. I would remand the case to the trial court for such a review and for such relief as may be appropriate, but I cannot join in a declaration that a legal ad valorem tax may be transformed, by flaws in a legislative attempt to establish reassessment procedures, into an illegal exaction.
I respectfully dissent.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9770968. Public record. Not legal advice.