# Brown v. State > Court of Appeals of Arkansas · April 1, 1992 · 38 Ark. App. 18 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9770796 ## Case - **Full name:** Roger Leland BROWN v. STATE of Arkansas - **Court:** Court of Appeals of Arkansas - **Decided:** April 1, 1992 - **Citations:** 38 Ark. App. 18; 827 S.W.2d 174; 1992 Ark. App. LEXIS 269 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Cooper - **Judges:** Danielson, Cracraft, Cooper, Mayfield - **Cited by:** 5 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9770796 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that an officer’s testimony regarding his training that dealt in depth with the HGN test was sufficient to establish him as an expert witness qualified to discuss the details and results of the test ## Opinion text James R. Cooper, Judge, dissenting. I dissent because I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Officer Edward’s actions were justified by the “fresh pursuit” doctrine. Officer Edwards was within the city limits when he observed the appellant speeding on a county road outside Office Edwards’ territorial jurisdiction. As the majority notes, a local police officer acting without a warrant outside territorial jurisdiction lacks the official power to apprehend offenders in the absence of a state statute authorizing him to do so. Perry v. State, 303 Ark. 100 , 794 S.W.2d 141 (1990). The Perry Court also noted that: The State of Arkansas has authorized local police officers to act outside their territorial jurisdiction in four instances: (1) the well known “fresh pursuit doctrine” which is codified as Ark. Code Ann. § 16-81-301 (1987); (2) when the peace officer has a warrant of arrest, Ark. Code Ann. § 16-81-105 (1987); (3) when a local law enforcement agency requests an outside officer to come within the local jurisdiction, and the outside officer is from an agency which has a written policy regulating its officers when they act outside its jurisdiction, Ark. Code Ann. § 16-81-106 (1989); and (4) a county sheriff may request that a peace officer from a contiguous county come into the requesting sheriff’s county. The visiting officer may then come into that county and investigate and make arrests for violations of drug laws. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-64-705 (1987). Perry, supra, at 102-103 . The majority attempts to distinguish Perry, supra, from the facts of the case at bar by noting that, in Perry, the police officer was not within his territorial jurisdiction when he first observed the defendant. However, this is a distinction without a difference because the crucial question with respect to the hot pursuit doctrine is not where the police officer is situated, but is instead where the offense is committed. In Perry v. State, supra, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that an officer seeking to make an arrest outside his territory must be treated as a private citizen. The Perry court further noted that, under Arkansas law, a private citizen may arrest upon reasonable cause to believe a felony has been committed, but may not arrest for a misdemeanor. Applying these rules to the facts of the case, the Supreme Court concluded that a Searcy policeman did not have the authority to arrest a driver for DWI when he saw the vehicle parked with the motor running in an unincorporated area outside the city limits. Perry stands for the proposition that the commission of a misdemeanor in an officer’s presence, without more, is not a sufficient basis to authorize an extraterritorial arrest. The Perry court noted that local police are authorized to act outside their territorial jurisdiction in cases of fresh pursuit, but did not answer the question presented in the case at bar, i.e., whether a police officer, who, while within his jurisdiction, observes a misdemeanor being committed outside his jurisdiction, has the authority to arrest under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-81-301 (1987). There are no Arkansas cases which so define the extent of the “fresh pursuit” doctrine, but Ark. Code Ann. § 16-81-303 (1987) permits resort to the common law. The majority cites no authority for the proposition that the “fresh pursuit” doctrine applies when a police officer, from within his territorial jurisdiction, observes a misdemeanor being committed outside his territorial jurisdiction, but cases from other jurisdictions state the rule as follows: “The fresh pursuit exception allows officers, who attempt to detain or arrest within their territorial jurisdiction, to continue to pursue a fleeing suspect even though the suspect crosses jurisdictional lines.” State v. Phoenix, 428 So.2d 262 (Fla.App. 1982) (emphasis supplied). Clearly, no attempt was made in the case at bar to effect an arrest within the officer’s territorial jurisdiction. In Pennsylvania, it has been held that “the pursuit must begin both in the jurisdiction where the police are authorized to act and in that jurisdiction where the crime is committed.” Commonwealth v. Fiume, 436 A.2d 1001 (Pa. Super. 1981). Certainly, this is the most reasonable result if peace officers are to be regarded as guardians of the territorial jurisdiction which employs them, and whose authority is derived from their territorial jurisdiction for its protection. The Arkansas Supreme Court in Perry, supra, endorsed this traditional idea of territorial jurisdiction for peace officers, stating that it was a sound concept because a local community is best served when arrests are made by local officers. Id., 303 Ark. at 103 . Finally, Smith v. City of Little Rock, 305 Ark. 168 , 806 S.W.2d 371 (1991), does not support the proposition that an officer within his jurisdiction may, under the fresh pursuit doctrine, make an arrest for an offense he observed outside his jurisdiction. In Smith, supra, the campus officer’s jurisdiction included streets “contiguous or adjacent to” the campus: A security officer appointed pursuant to the authority of 25-17-304, except to the extent otherwise limited by the executive head of the state institution or department appointing him, shall protect property, preserve and maintain proper order and decorum, prevent unlawful assemblies and disorderly conduct, exclude and eject persons detrimental to the well-being of the institution, prevent trespass, and regulate the operation and parking of motor vehicles upon and in all of the grounds, buildings, improvements, streets, alleys, and sidewalks under the control of the institution employing him. Ark. Code Ann. § 25-17-305 (a) (1987). Under Ark. Code Ann. § 25-17-301 (1) (1987), “‘property’ means both real and personal property owned by or under the control of the institution and shall include all highways, streets, alleys, and rights-of-way that are contiguous or adjacent to property owned or controlled by the institution.” Clearly, the arrestee was on Fair Park, adjacent to the campus, when his erratic driving was noted by the campus officer, and there was no issue presented in Smith, supra, concerning the arresting officer’s whereabouts. In my view, because the offense at issue in Smith was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the arresting officer, Smith does not support the result reached by the majority in the case at bar. I respectfully dissent. Cracraft, C.J., and Mayfield, J., join in this dissent. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9770796. Public record. Not legal advice.