# In Re Nomination Petition of Farnese

> Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · March 29, 2011 · 609 Pa. 543

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9770078

## Case

- **Full name:** In Re Nomination Petition of Lawrence M. FARNESE, Jr., for the Democratic Nomination for Senator in the General Assembly for the First Senatorial District in the Primary of April 22, 2008 Appeal of Keith Olkowski and Theresa A. Paylor
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** March 29, 2011
- **Citations:** 609 Pa. 543; 17 A.3d 357; 2011 Pa. LEXIS 683
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Eakin
- **Judges:** Castille, Saylor, Eakin, Baer, Todd, McCaffery, Greenspan
- **Cited by:** 31 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9770078

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting Pennsylvania adheres to the “American Rule” (quoting Trizechahn Gateway LLC v. Titus, 976 A.2d 474, 482–83 (Pa. 2009)

## Opinion text

Justice EAKIN,
concurring and dissenting.
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the mere fact candidate prevailed against the challenge to his nomination petition is insufficient to support an award of costs to him. It will not suffice to submit an invoice with neither explanation of why the award of costs would be “just,” nor reference to 25 P.S. § 2937; likewise, an award without reference to § 2937’s requirement that the award be “just” is insufficient for review purposes.
I disagree, however, that the proper remedy is simply reversal of the order awarding costs. The applicable standard is whether the lower court abused its discretion, see Majority Op., at 563, 17 A.3d at 369, and where, as here, the record is silent concerning the lower court’s analysis, we cannot determine whether such discretion was properly exercised. Candidate should not be thrown completely out of court simply because the trial court was quick to grant relief but failed to provide its analysis. As long as the record provides some reason to suggest § 2937’s standard for an award of fees may be met, remand for further elucidation is the better course. See Borough of Beaver v. Steckman, 728 A.2d 418, 420-21 (Pa.Cmwlth.1999) (distinguishing reversal of award of attorney’s fees without remand in Township of South Strabane v. Piecknick, 546 Pa. 551 , 686 A.2d 1297 (1996), on grounds there was no indication of contemnor’s bad faith on record in Piecknick , whereas record in Steckman indicated contemnor acted in bad faith). Similarly, while the trial court here provided no analysis of the applicable standard, the record does not indicate the standard cannot be met, so the award of costs may still be appropriate. Candidate’s entitlement to costs cannot be ignored because the trial court originally acted too quickly and without articulation — the shortcoming seems the court’s, not the litigant’s, and the litigant’s request should thus be given proper consideration. Accordingly, I would *573 remand for the trial court to articulate such reasons it may have to deem the award just.
Accordingly, I concur in the finding there was insufficient assessment of whether the award was just, but dissent as to the complete reversal of the award.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9770078. Public record. Not legal advice.