# In Re Nomination Petition of Farnese

> Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · March 29, 2011 · 609 Pa. 543

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9770077

## Case

- **Full name:** In Re Nomination Petition of Lawrence M. FARNESE, Jr., for the Democratic Nomination for Senator in the General Assembly for the First Senatorial District in the Primary of April 22, 2008 Appeal of Keith Olkowski and Theresa A. Paylor
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** March 29, 2011
- **Citations:** 609 Pa. 543; 17 A.3d 357; 2011 Pa. LEXIS 683
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by McCAFFERY
- **Judges:** Castille, Saylor, Eakin, Baer, Todd, McCaffery, Greenspan
- **Cited by:** 31 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9770077

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting Pennsylvania adheres to the “American Rule” (quoting Trizechahn Gateway LLC v. Titus, 976 A.2d 474, 482–83 (Pa. 2009)

## Opinion text

Justice McCAFFERY,
concurring.
I join the majority in determining that the award of costs must be reversed. I write separately to observe and emphasize that the objective factors here, including that the candidate conceded that 1077 of the 1778 signatures contained in his nomination petition were invalid, would support an inference that the appellant objectors acted in good faith in initiating and pursuing their challenge to the authenticity of the signatures contained in the petition. On this relevant fact alone, I believe, the court’s award of costs to the candidate should be considered an abuse of discretion. Under the circumstances, the candidate should have expected that litigation would likely ensue, and I can see no just reason to support a judicial shifting of costs to the objectors where the candidate admitted that more than 60% of the signatures contained in his petition were invalid.
Moreover, this Court has stated that the statute permitting an assessment of costs where a court deems it just “is consistent with the interest of the Commonwealth in ensuring fair elections that are free from the taint of fraud.” In re Nomination Paper of Nader, 588 Pa. 450 , 905 A.2d 450, 460 (2006). In our disposition of the appeal from the trial court’s denial of the objectors’ petition to set aside the nomination petition in this case, we expressed our concern that a candidate for office “should not be permitted to submit a nomination petition that contains mostly illegitimate signatures without doubt being cast upon the propriety of the candidate’s signature procurement process.” In re Nomination Petition of Farnese, 17 A.3d. 375, 377 (Pa.2011). The circumstances here cast doubt upon the candidate’s method of procuring signatures and support a colorable allegation of fraudulent conduct. Accordingly, I believe the allocation of costs to the party that sought to shed greater light on the seemingly *572 tainted conduct represents a manifestly unreasonable judgment, and an abuse of discretion.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9770077. Public record. Not legal advice.