# ACW, INC. v. Weiss > Supreme Court of Arkansas · June 30, 1997 · 329 Ark. 302 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9769774 ## Case - **Full name:** ACW, INC.; Phillips Development Corporation; And United Wholesale Florists, Inc., on Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated v. Richard WEISS, Director of Department of Finance & Administration, and John Theis - **Court:** Supreme Court of Arkansas - **Decided:** June 30, 1997 - **Citations:** 329 Ark. 302; 947 S.W.2d 770; 1997 Ark. LEXIS 413 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Glaze - **Judges:** Thornton, Newbern, Glaze, Brown - **Cited by:** 70 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9769774 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - noting that in light of the enactment of a refund statute, the voluntary-payment rule "is of no consequence" - discussing Ark. Const. art. 5, § 38, which was added to the constitution by Ark. Const. amend. 19 ## Opinion text Tom Glaze, Justice, dissenting. I must dissent. In my view, the majority decision is disturbing precedent and bodes trouble for Arkansas taxpayers. In short, I submit that Act 1052 of 1991 is unconstitutional because it was enacted contrary to Article 5, Section 38, of the Arkansas Constitution, as amended by Amendment 19. First, it must be kept in mind that the Arkansas Constitution is a limitation upon and not a grant of power to the legislature. Erxleben v. Horton Printing Co., 283 Ark. 272 , 675 S.W.2d 638 (1984). As previously mentioned, this court is called on to interpret Amendment 19, and in relevant simple terms, that provision prohibits the General Assembly from increasing personal taxes except after the voters approve the increase, or in case of emergency, the General Assembly approves the increase by a three-fourths vote. Here, the voters have not approved an increase in personal taxes, so the issue is, did an emergency exist that would authorize the General Assembly under Amendment 19 to enact a measure by a three-fourths vote to increase such taxes? In determining what is meant by the hmiting language of Amendment 19, this court should look to the history and state of things existing when the constitution was framed and adopted. Glover v. Hot Springs Kennel Club, 230 Ark. 544 , 323 S.W.2d 902 (1959); Lybrand v. Wafford, 174 Ark. 298 , 296 S.W.2d 729 (1927). With this principle in mind, this court must look to the situation confronting the Arkansas people when they adopted Constitutional Amendment 19 in 1934, and when it does so, the conclusion is obvious — Arkansas and all states were fighting a depression. Unquestionably, Arkansas voters passed Amendment 19 to prohibit the increase in taxes except (1) when the people approved them, or (2) in emergencies, when the General Assembly enacted an increase by a three-fourths vote. The majority opinion mistakenly relies on cases from other, jurisdictions that lend no light on Amendment 19’s history, but instead espouse general principles largely concerning statutory construction. Here, the reader must keep in mind that this court is asked to expound on the Arkansas Constitution. The majority opinion also looks to Arkansas’s Initiative and Referendum Amendment 7 to define the meaning of emergency and in support cites to a plurality opinion, Priest v. Polk, 322 Ark. 673 , 912 S.W.2d 902 (1995). However, this court’s decision in Burroughs v. Ingram, 319 Ark. 530 , 893 S.W.2d 319 (1995), appears to be the prevailing law and, in Burroughs, this court held the word “emergency,” in its most accepted usage, means some sudden or unexpected happening that creates a need for immediate action. Act 1052 reveals no “sudden or unexpected happening,” which required its passage by the General Assembly. To the contrary, § 9 of Act 1052 merely recites that the General Assembly studied the State’s higher quality education programs and its studies showed that, in the year 2000, workers will need more education and the State is in desperate need of training, retraining, and upgrading the work force. The Act further reads that the Act “will provide the funding necessary to provide every citizen with an opportunity to participate in vocational-technical training or college transfer programs, and that it is necessary for this Act to become effective immediately to provide the funding needed for these programs as soon as possible.” In sum, while I am the first to concede that Act 1052’s objective is a lofty one, the fact remains that it cannot fairly or reasonably be said that the establishment of a program to train all citizens to function in the workplace by 2000 is a concept or goal that resulted from a “sudden” or “unexpected” event. In conclusion, I must respond to the majority opinion’s final suggestion that this court’s holding that Act 1052 is an emergency measure does not deprive the people of their rights to refer any measure to a popular vote. First, I note the obvious that it is much too late now for citizens to refer Act 1052’s tax increase to the vote of the people. See Amendment 7 to the Arkansas Constitution. Second, and more important, the majority’s suggestion cryptically underscores that, under today’s decision, the Arkansas people now have the burden to remain watchful for tax-increase measures like Act 1052 in the future, and be organized, well-funded and otherwise prepared to initiate referendums on such measures. It is difficult, if not impossible, for me to believe that, when the voters of Arkansas passed Amendment 19, they intended an emergency could be so easily declared so as to authorize the General Assembly to approve a tax increase without a vote of the people. Nor did they intend to establish a situation or procedure whereby Arkansas voters would be forced to refer tax-increase measures in order to ensure their right to vote on such taxes. The majority opinion’s interpretation of Amendment 19 and its term “emergencies” is much too broad, and in my view, is error. For the above reasons, I would reverse and dismiss. Newbern, J., joins this dissent. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9769774. Public record. Not legal advice.