# Beevers v. Miller > Supreme Court of Arkansas · May 8, 1967 · 242 Ark. 541 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9768612 ## Case - **Full name:** Dorothy Beevers, Adm’x v. Wilburn W. Miller - **Court:** Supreme Court of Arkansas - **Decided:** May 8, 1967 - **Citations:** 242 Ark. 541; 414 S.W.2d 603; 1967 Ark. LEXIS 1281 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Justice - **Judges:** Fogleman, Habrxs, Brown, Harris - **Cited by:** 19 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9768612 ## Opinion text liVLE BrowN Justice, dissenting. The majority opinion holds that the trial court erred in refusing to give plaintiff’s requested instruction AMI 502. From this holding I must dissent. This is a two-party lawsuit in which plaintiff alleges the defendant driver was negligent. The defendant denies negligence and asserts the deceased met death as a result of the negligence of the driver operating the truck in which deceased was a passenger. The court gave AMI 501, followed by AMI 203. Bearing in mind that G-oódwin (in whose truck deceased was a passenger) was not a party to the suit, I think the two instructions, given in the order copied, were sufficient. “AMI 501. The law frequently uses the expression ‘proximate cause,’ with which you may not he familiar. When I use the expression ‘proximate cause,’ I mean a cause which, in a natural and continuous sequence, produces damage and without which the damage would not have occurred. “This does not mean that the law recognizes only one proximate cause of damage. To the contrary, if two or more causes work together to produce damage, then you may find that each of them was a proximate cause.” “AMI 203. Dorothy Beevers as Administratrix claims damages from Wilburn W. Miller and has the burden of proving each of three essential propositions : First, that she has sustained'damages; . Second, that Wilburn W. Miller was negligent; And third, that such negligence was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s damage. “If the you find from the evidence in this case that each of these three propositions has been proved then your verdict should be for Dorothy Beevers, Admx.; but, if, on the other' hand, you find from the evidence that any one of these propositions has not been proved, then your verdict should be for Wilburn W. Miller.” Considering these two instructions together, the court told the jury that if Miller was' negligent, and Miller’s negligence was a proximate cause, Beevers’ ad-ministratrix was entitled to recover any damages sustained. Then with reference to defendant Miller’s assertion that Beevers’ driver (Goodwin) was negligent, the jury was in effect told, in the second paragraph of AMI 501, that Goodwin’s negligence would not bar recovery against Miller. In addition to the copied instructions,, plaintiff requested AMI 502: “When the negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons work together as' proximate causes of damage to another, each of those persons may be .found to be liable. This is true regardless of the relative degrees of fault between them. “If you find that negligence of the defendant proximately caused damage to the plaintiff, it is not a defense that some third person may also have been to blame.” First, I would call attention to this statement: “When the negligent acts oi; omissions of two or more persons work together as proximate causes of damage to another, each of those persons may be found to be liable.” This jury could not find liability against Goodwin because he was not a party to the suit. To that extent the instruction could! confuse the jury because in this case there is only one person charged with liability. Tile second paragraph of AMI 502 does. not speak of liability. It speaks of blame. Concededly, the second paragraph appropriately explains that any blame on the part of Groodwin would not free Miller if the latter’s negligence was a ‘proximate cause. In fact, it is there spelled out more explicitly than in the last paragraph of AMI 501. On the other hand, the exact argument can he made to the jury irrespective of which “last paragraph” is given. Of course lawyers naturally like to hear the trial judge instruct the jury in phrases that they can “hammer home” by quotation in their closing arguments. This is one reason for the traditional argumentative instructions, giving one for the plaintiff in his chosen words, then another to counteract it in the chosen words of the defendant. The majority opinion cites a number of old cases. Many of the cases cited are good examples of the pitfalls of lengthy instructions dealing in “specifics” advanced by plaintiff and defendant. The trend in composition of instructions is based on the requirements that they be conversational, understandable, and unslant-ed. It is refreshing to know that we are moving away from the old form of “instructions for the plaintiff” and “instructions for the defendant.” Secondly, the refused instruction is not a “must” instruction — one to be given in every tort case. When the case is submitted on interrogatories, the note on use to AMI 502 recommends that the bracketed portion of AMI 501 be given, if appropriate. Finally, it is my view that if the giving of AMI 502 be conceded appropriate, yet the refusal to give it was not prejudicial error. This conclusion is based on the theory that the subject matter was covered by AMI 501. I would affirm. Harris, C. J. joins in this dissent. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9768612. Public record. Not legal advice.