# Dixon v. State

> Supreme Court of Arkansas · January 10, 1977 · 260 Ark. 857

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9768081

## Case

- **Full name:** Roy Lee DIXON v. STATE of Arkansas
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Arkansas
- **Decided:** January 10, 1977
- **Citations:** 260 Ark. 857; 545 S.W.2d 606; 1977 Ark. LEXIS 2187
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Fogleman
- **Judges:** George Rose Smith
- **Cited by:** 156 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9768081

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that a claim of error unsupported by citation to authority or convincing argument will be considered on appeal only if it is apparent without further research that the argument is well taken
- stating that “[i]n effect the court is asked to research the law and to hold in favor of the appellant if the result of our labor so demands. We must decline that invitation”
- stating, “In effect the court is asked to research the law and to hold in favor of the appellant if the result of our labor so demands. We must decline that invitation.”
- holding that the court will not research the law for an appellant

## Opinion text

John A. Fogleman, Justice, dissenting. I would affirm the judgment in this case. I agree that there was no statutory presumption of intent to deliver heroin in this case. But the circumstances here are certainly sufficient to afford a basis for a finding that Dixon’s possession was with the intent to deliver. Andol, a drug user, who was held on a felony charge relating to drugs, had the telephone number of White and gave it to a police officer, as that of a dealer in heroin. Andol talked to White and placed an order for “skag” and asked him to deliver it to Room 115 at Days Inn Motel. Andol said that “skag” was a “street term” for heroin. Two black men, one answering a description given the police officers by Andol, pulled into the motel parking lot. Both White and Dixon, both of whom were black, immediately thereafter appeared at the door to the motel room. Although White handed over two packets which actually contained brown cake powder, or brown sugar, after responding affirmatively to Andol’s inquiry whether he had the “junk,” it was Dixon who actually had in his possession what Andol had ordered, who appeared with White in response to that order, and who made a break for the door and had to be subdued in effecting his arrest. The fact that Dixon possessed six packets instead of only two ordered by Andol certainly is not inconsistent with an intent to deliver. A dealer in any commodity hardly ever confines his inventory to the amount required to fill a single order.
If Dixon had no intent to deliver heroin, why did he accompany White to the motel carrying the substance Andol ordered? And why did he leave the vehicle in which the two pulled into the parking lot and accompany White to the room designated for delivery? And why did he run when the police officer appeared? The jury could reasonably\have'drawn the' inferenceuhat'the answer to these questions was that Dixon intended, if all went well, to make the delivery to Andol pursuant to the order placed. The fact that Andol knew White but did not know Dixon is also a circumstance to be considered.
It must be remembered that Dixon is not charged with making a sale or a delivery. He is charged with possession of the drug with intent to deliver.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9768081. Public record. Not legal advice.