# Morris v. State

> Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston) · June 30, 1988 · 755 S.W.2d 505

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9767627

## Case

- **Full name:** Alister Johnson MORRIS, Appellant, v. the STATE of Texas, Appellee
- **Court:** Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston)
- **Decided:** June 30, 1988
- **Citations:** 755 S.W.2d 505; 1988 Tex. App. LEXIS 1559; 1988 WL 67282
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Evans
- **Judges:** Evans, Bass, Dunn
- **Cited by:** 19 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9767627

## Opinion text

EVANS, Chief Justice,
concurring.
I concur with the result reached by the majority based on the Court of Criminal Appeals’ holding in Rose v. State that the jury instruction on the parole law is unconstitutional and that the harm analysis is that found in Tex.R.App.P. 81(b)(2). Rose v. State, 752 S.W.2d 529 (Tex.Crim.App.1988) (op. on reh’g). But I disagree with the conclusion that the State’s jury argument went outside the record and constituted reversible error.
During the State’s argument in the guilt/innocence phase of trial, the prosecutor made several references to the quantity and value of the marijuana, as stated in the majority opinion. After the State’s second reference, appellant’s trial counsel objected on the ground of no evidence. The trial court promptly sustained appellant’s objection and instructed the jury to consider only the evidence presented. In my opinion, the court’s ruling sufficiently admonished the jury to consider only the evidence before them regarding the quantity and value of the marijuana involved.
I would also hold that the State’s argument about drugs and “dope dealers” was *512 not so extreme or improper as to require a reversal of the judgment. The appellant's testimony, at the punishment phase of the trial, reflects his obvious attempt to evidence remorse at his participation in the particular crime charged and to provide assurance that he would never again become involved in illegal drug trafficking. The prosecutor’s argument was a predictable response to those efforts. The State’s argument simply called upon the jurors to use their common knowledge about the impact of the drug problem on the community. Appellant did not object to the prosecutor’s argument, and instead, he specifically responded to it. In such response, appellant’s trial counsel argued to the jury that appellant was not “some kind of extraordinary dope dealer”; that he did not represent all the dope dealers in Harris County; and that the jury should not be misled by the prosecutor to believe that “by putting him away for a long time, you’re somehow ridding this county of drug dealers.” Defense counsel further argued that the “important thing in this case is to look at what has gone on, what has happened, what you’ve heard from that witness stand, not the fact that there is drug dealing in the rest of Harris County or everything else that’s gone on.”
Since appellant did not object to the State’s argument and, instead, responded to it in kind, I see no reason for reversing the judgment on that ground.
Except in the respects noted, I concur in the holding and the reasoning of the majority opinion.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9767627. Public record. Not legal advice.