# Casarez v. State

> Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas · December 13, 1995 · 913 S.W.2d 468

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9767514

## Case

- **Full name:** George Toby CASAREZ, Appellant, v. the STATE of Texas, Appellee
- **Court:** Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
- **Decided:** December 13, 1995
- **Citations:** 913 S.W.2d 468; 1995 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 132; 1994 WL 695868
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by White
- **Judges:** Baird, Campbell, Clinton, Maloney, Mansfield, McCORMICK, Meyers, Overstreet, White
- **Cited by:** 95 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9767514

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that "in the case of religion, the attribution is not overly broad, and therefore not invidious, when the belief is an article of faith[; b]ecause all members of the group share the same faith by definition, it is not unjust to attribute beliefs characteristic of the f…
- holding that “interests served by the system of peremptory challenges in Texas are sufficiently great to justify State implementation of choices made by litigants to exclude persons from service on juries . . . on the basis of their religious affiliation.”
- concluding, in case involving strike of Pentecostals, that peremptory strikes based on religious affiliation do not violate the federal constitution
- holding that state interests in peremptory challenges justify excluding prospective jurors based on their religious affiliation
- holding that challenges based upon religious affiliation are justified as "promot[ing] fairness and impartiality on the jury"

## Opinion text

WHITE, Judge,
dissenting.
I realize that Justice Hopkins’ concurring opinion is published below; however, I want to quote it verbatim as it is “right on the mark ” in this case:
“In Hill v. State, 827 S.W.2d 860 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), the majority opinion 1 contained the following: ‘[R]ace may be a factor coexisting with nonracial reason for a strike, however, race may not be the reason for the strike.’ Id. at 866 (emphasis added). ‘[Ajppellant must show that the prosecutor’s other explanations for his challenge were merely a pretext for discrimination.’ Id. at 869 .
“Texas has not adopted the so-called ‘bright-line’ rule suggested in Judge Baird’s concurring opinion in Hill. Id. at 875 (Baird, J., concurring).
Applying the rationale set forth by the majority in Hill , should the Batson prohibition against racial discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges later be extended to include prohibition against religious discrimination, as suggested by Chief Justice Hill in the dissenting opinion, I would follow Hill, supra, and hold that religious beliefs or affiliation as reasons for strikes may co-exist with nonreligious and nonracial reasons in the exercise of strikes. In the present case, the State, in my view, enunciated sufficient nonracial and nonreligious reasons for the exercise of the State’s strikes of the two black, Pentecostal venirepersons, including the fact that one’s brother was currently incarcerated and the venireperson expressed discomfort with the law applicable to the offenses charged, i.e., aggravated sexual assault and sexual assault of a child. The appellant did not show that these explanations were merely a pretext for discrimination.
“It should be noted that one of the veni-repersons struck appeared as number thirty-three on the list, and that the twelve jurors were obtained from the first thirty-two venirepersons. Although the prosecutor gave similar nonracial and nonreligious reasons for stinking number thirty-three, none were required because striking number thirty-three did not have an impact on the composition of the jury since the jurors were obtained from the first thirty-two members of the venire panel, nor did it deprive venireperson number thirty-three the privilege of service on the jury. See Gambel v. State, 835 S.W.2d 788, 791 (Tex.App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no pet.); Rodriguez v. State, 832 S.W.2d 727, 729 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no pet); Henderson v. State, 816 S.W.2d 845, 848 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1991, no pet.).”
Casarez v. State, 857 S.W.2d, at 788-789.
The majority opinion never reveals all of the facts regarding the other reasons the prosecutor gave for striking the prospective jurors and does not address the fact that one *490 prospective juror was never reached. In a letter brief to this Court responding to appellant’s petition for review, the State urged this Court to reject appellant’s arguments because he failed to “question the analysis of the concurring opinion below”, noting that several of the justifications offered by the State for its strikes were “unchallenged and clearly proper.” After this Court granted appellant’s petition, the State argued in its reply brief that appellant failed to show that the two strikes were made solely on an allegedly impermissible basis, citing Hill v. State, 827 S.W.2d 860 .
Similarly, the State also argued before this Court in Hill v. State that even if one of the factors relied upon to establish identity is shared race, it also offered reasons for its strike which were non-racial and established identity. Hill, at 866. The plurality opinion in Hill addressed this argument, holding that “race may be a factor co-existing with a nonracial reason for the strike”, id. In contrast, Judge Baird has chosen to ignore the State’s argument in the instant case, as he chose to ignore the State’s argument in his concurring opinion in Hill v. State. The plurality opinion is all “SMOKE AND MIRRORS. ”
I respectfully dissent.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9767514. Public record. Not legal advice.