# Burton v. United States

> District of Columbia Court of Appeals · December 12, 1994 · 657 A.2d 741

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9767107

## Case

- **Full name:** Johnnie T. BURTON, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee
- **Court:** District of Columbia Court of Appeals
- **Decided:** December 12, 1994
- **Citations:** 657 A.2d 741; 1994 D.C. App. LEXIS 230; 1994 WL 700143
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion of the court by King
- **Judges:** Ferren, Schwelb, King
- **Cited by:** 24 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9767107

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding voluntary consent where officers asked “only a few brief questions” in a “conversational tone”

## Opinion text

Opinion for the Court by Associate Judge KING.
Concurring opinion by Associate Judge FERREN at p. 749.
Dissenting opinion by Associate Judge SCHWELB at p. 750.
KING, Associate Judge:
Appellant challenges the denial of his motion to suppress evidence that was obtained as a result of what he claims was an illegal seizure and a subsequent warrantless, non-eonsensual search. The principal issue presented is whether consent to search, once given, can be withdrawn by an act or comment that falls short of an unequivocal expression of withdrawal of consent. We hold that it cannot, and since the other grounds asserted by appellant in his challenge to the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress are without merit, we affirm.
I.
Burton entered a conditional plea of guilty 1 to a single count of unlawful possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance, to wit, cocaine. 2 Prior to entering the guilty plea, appellant had moved to suppress the cocaine on the ground that it had been obtained from him in violation of the Fourth Amendment. At the hearing on the motion, the government presented the following facts.
On October 30, 1991, at approximately 5:00 a.m., Detectives Kimerly Oxendine, Ronnie Hairston, and two other members of the Metropolitan Police Force, Drug Interdiction Unit, boarded a bus at the Greyhound Bus Station located in Northeast Washington, D.C., intending to interview the passengers. The detectives were dressed in plainclothes, and none displayed a weapon. Although the bus had just arrived from New York City, a location known to be a major source for illegal drags, the officers had no specific information that anyone on that bus possessed drags. Oxendine interviewed one passenger and then approached appellant, who was seated in the window seat in the third row from the rear on the driver’s side of the bus. At the time, appellant was twenty-three years old and resided in Richmond, Virginia.
Oxendine identified herself as a police officer, displayed her “identification folder,” and asked appellant if she could speak to him. The detective testified that as she spoke to appellant, she was standing in front of the row of seats directly ahead of appellant, so as not to block his path to the aisle; Hairston had previously situated himself in a seat one or two rows behind appellant, and the other two detectives were at the front of the bus. Thus, none of the officers was in the aisle near appellant’s seat. Appellant agreed to speak to Oxendine, and after she requested *743 permission to inspect his ticket he gave it to her. She observed that appellant was traveling from Newark, New Jersey to Richmond, Virginia and then returned the ticket to appellant. The detective also asked appellant to point out his luggage, which he identified on the rack above his head. Oxendine explained to appellant that she was a member of the Drug Interdiction Unit, and she then inquired whether he was carrying any drugs or guns. Appellant denied carrying either, and he consented to Oxendine’s request to search both his luggage and his person. Thereafter, Oxendine searched the luggage and, finding nothing of an incriminating nature, directed Hairston, a male officer, to search appellant.
Hairston then approached Burton, identified himself as a police officer, and informed appellant he was going to conduct a search. Hairston noticed a bulge in the left inside pocket of appellant’s jacket, and just as the detective “started to search Mr. Burton, [appellant] grabbed his jacket and he looked to the — towards the window. He also put his [right] hand into the inner left outer coat that he was wearing.” It appeared to Oxen-dine that appellant, as he turned toward the window, was attempting to extract something from the pocket and hide it between the seat and the side of the bus. Hairston told appellant to remove his hand from the jacket, appellant complied without saying anything, and Hairston reached into the pocket and removed a package wrapped in grey duct tape. The package was later determined to contain powdered cocaine; another package, containing powdered cocaine and a rock of cocaine, was then recovered from appellant.
Burton’s own testimony contradicted the government’s evidence on four separate points. First, appellant testified that Oxen-dine was “standing over him” in the aisle next to where he was seated, and that he would have come into contact with her had he attempted to leave his seat. Second, he claimed Oxendine requested permission to inspect both his ticket and driver’s license and that she never returned either of them. 3 Third, appellant maintained that he refused to consent to the search of his luggage and person. Lastly, Burton testified that Hair-ston threatened him before beginning the pat-down, advising appellant that “if you don’t cooperate, we’re going to whip your a-s-s on this bus.” 4
The trial court credited the testimony of the detectives and in a written order found that:
the defendant’s movement of his body away from Detective Hairston and the placing of his hand inside his coat could have been interpreted in several ways. As Detective Oxendine testified, she thought the defendant was either trying to hide something or trying to discard something. On the other hand, Detective Hairston thought the defendant might be reaching for a weapon_ [T]he defendant testified that he was indicating his desire not to be searched. The court concludes that it was objectively reasonable for the detectives to have drawn all of these impressions from the defendant’s actions.
Having voluntarily given unlimited consent for the police officers to search him, the defendant created an atmosphere which caused the detectives to believe that they had been given authority to conduct the search to its completion. While this court has no doubt that the defendant had the right to terminate the search before it was completed, the court also concludes that the defendant could only do so if his words and or actions were unequivocal.
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Thus, the trial court ruled that appellant had voluntarily consented to the search and had not unequivocally ■withdrawn his consent during the search. On appeal, appellant contends the evidence should have been suppressed as the fruit of an illegal seizure of his person. He next contends that the subsequent search *744 was otherwise tainted because it was noncon-sensual, any consent he gave was involuntary, and, even if consent was given, he withdrew it during the search.
II.
Burton first contends that the officers’ conduct amounted to an illegal seizure of his person without probable cause and, therefore, the evidence obtained following the seizure should have been suppressed. 5 Burton maintains that a seizure occurred because of the “coercive” nature of the encounter, emphasizing that Oxendine was situated only a few feet away from him, Hairston was seated behind him, and two other officers blocked the exit of the bus.
In In re J.M., 619 A.2d 497 (D.C.1992) (en banc), we were faced with similar circumstances involving an encounter with a juvenile by Metropolitan Police detectives on an interstate bus. We held, despite the fact that the detective stood next to J.M. during the interview and search, that “the police conduct was not so intimidating that a reasonable person would have felt incapable of declining the officers’ requests or otherwise terminating the encounter.” Id. at 502 . In contrast to In re J.M., in testimony credited by the trial court, Oxendine stated that had appellant attempted to terminate the conversation, he could have gotten out of his seat and walked down the aisle in either direction since she was standing in front of the seat directly ahead of appellant “so that [she] wasn’t blocking his path to get ou[t] of the seat.” A fortiori, if there was no seizure in In re J.M., there could be no seizure here. 6
Moreover, in the totality of the circumstances, which included the fact that the detectives were dressed in plainclothes, their weapons were concealed, and Oxendine addressed appellant in a polite, conversational tone of voice, requesting permission to speak with appellant rather than demanding it, we conclude that the officers’ presence did not rise to the level of a “threatening presence.” See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 , 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877 , 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980). Although appellant was not informed that he had a right to terminate the interview, whether or not he was so informed is not dispositive on the issue of whether there was a seizure. See id. at 555 , 100 S.Ct. at *745 1877 . 7 We hold, therefore, that there was evidence in the record to support the conclusion that appellant was not seized prior to the search of his person. See In re J.M., supra, 619 A.2d at 500 (this court reviews the determination of a seizure vel non as a question of law) (citation omitted).
III.
Having determined that Burton was not seized does not end our inquiry. Warrant-less searches are per se unreasonable, subject “to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 , 88 S.Ct. 507, 514 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). “[0]ne of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent.” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 , 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2043-44 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1972) (citations omitted). 8 Appellant contends, however, that: (1) he did not consent to the search; (2) any consent that he did give was involuntary; and (3) if he did consent, he withdrew that consent prior to the time Hairston seized the cocaine.
A.
On the question of whether appellant consented to be searched, the trial court credited the testimony of the police officers, rejected appellant’s testimony that he did not consent and that Hairston threatened him, and concluded that appellant consented to the search. “Because this determination is essentially factual, we are bound to uphold the trial court’s finding that [the] search was consensual” as that finding is supported by the record. Kelly, supra note 8, 580 A.2d at 1288 (citation and internal quotation omitted).
B.
The Supreme Court has held that the government is not required to establish that a defendant knew that he or she had a right to withhold consent in order to uphold a finding that a consent to search was voluntary. See, e.g., Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 248-49 , 93 S.Ct. at 2058-59 . Rather, the government must establish in the totality of the circumstances 9 that consent was, in fact, freely given. Id. at 222 , 93 S.Ct. at 2045 . While the government’s burden falls short of establishing a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right not to consent to a search, “[t]o approve such searches without the most careful scrutiny would sanction the possibility of official coercion.” Id. at 229 , 93 S.Ct. at 2048 . Thus, “account must be taken of subtly coercive police questions, as well as the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person who consents.” Id.
We conclude that the trial court had a sufficient basis for finding that consent was voluntarily given. Burton testified essentially that he was aware he was not obligated to acquiesce in the detective’s request that he allow the search. In addition, although the encounter occurred at an early hour of the morning, there was no custodial detention or physical coercion by Oxendine and Hairston, only a few brief questions; the request for consent and the subsequent searches were closely related in time; appellant acknowledged that Oxendine addressed him in a polite, conversational tone of voice; and there was no evidence whatsoever that appellant suffered from any intellectual deficiency or that appellant’s age affected his capacity *746 to consent. See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 226 , 93 S.Ct. at 2047 ; see also supra note 9. Although appellant testified that Hairston threatened him, the trial court did not credit that testimony, finding it to be inconsistent with appellant’s other testimony. Thus, after carefully considering all the evidence presented — especially appellant’s admission that he was aware of his right to end the encounter with the detectives — we hold that the trial court did not err in finding that the consent was voluntary. See Kelly, supra note 8, 580 A.2d at 1288.
C.
Whether or not a suspect may unilaterally withdraw consent to a search once it was voluntarily given has never been expressly decided by this court. In Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 252 , 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1804 , 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991), the Supreme Court held that a suspect’s right to be free from unreasonable searches is not violated when the scope of the search is within the bounds of the suspect’s authorization, noting, however, that “[a] suspect may of course delimit as he chooses the scope of the search to which he consents.” 10 The Jimeno Court reasoned that the scope of a consent under the Fourth Amendment is judged on a standard of “objective” reasonableness, ie., “what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?” Id. at 251 , 111 S.Ct. at 1803 -04 (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183-89 , 110 S.Ct. 2793, 2798-2802, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990)). It has also been held that while a suspect may limit or revoke consent to a search, such limitation or revocation must be made before the search is completed. See United States v. Dyer, 784 F.2d 812, 816 (7th Cir.1986). We think these authorities compel the conclusion that when the basis for a warrantless search is consent, consent may be withdrawn any time prior to completion of the search, and we so hold.
We must next decide what standard should be applied in determining whether consent was in fact withdrawn. Appellant maintains that his evasive behavior, “an equivocal attempt to revoke his consent,” was enough to satisfy the objective reasonableness standard (emphasis added). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held, however, that conduct falling short of “an unequivocal act or statement of withdrawal” is not sufficiently indicative of an intent to withdraw consent. United States v. Alfaro, 935 F.2d 64, 67 (5th Cir.1991) (emphasis added). Accord State v. French, 203 Neb. 435 , 279 N.W.2d 116, 119-120 (1979); Lawrence v. Commonwealth, 17 Va.App. 140 , 435 S.E.2d 591, 595 (1993), aff'd, 247 Va. 339 , 443 S.E.2d 160 (1994) (citation omitted); cf., Davis v. United States, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 2350 , 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994) (after waiving right to counsel during interrogation, suspect must unambiguously request counsel to stop further questioning). Other courts have implicitly adopted an unequivocal revocation of consent standard, holding that the conduct withdrawing consent must be an act 11 clearly inconsistent *747 with the apparent consent to a search, an unambiguous statement 12 challenging the officer’s authority to conduct the search, or some combination of both. 13 For example, the closing and locking a car trunk and the shutting of a bedroom door are acts that courts have held to be express revocations of consent. 14 Conversely, courts have held that an equivocal act 15 or statement 16 cannot reasonably be interpreted as conveying an indication that consent has been withdrawn. For example, in Luther, supra note 15, the defendant’s act of closing and locking the door to his room, together with his acquiescence in later efforts to open the door for the police, was held not to have constituted a revocation of consent. See Luther, supra note 15, 663 P.2d at 1263.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has held that equivocal conduct is not sufficient to reasonably convey the withdrawal of consent previously given. In Joseph, supra note 13, the defendant, while standing in an open area of Amtrak’s Union Station depot, reached into a bag being searched by a Metropolitan Police officer after he had consented to the search, remarking: “[d]o we have to do this here? ... I have underwear and things in the bag.” Joseph, supra note 13, 282 U.S.App.D.C. at 105, 892 F.2d at 121. Joseph then accompanied the officers to a secluded alcove where they completed the search, which uncovered a revolver and crack cocaine. The court held that Joseph’s conduct of reaching into the bag, together with his query and assent to the continuation of the search, did not constitute a withdrawal of consent. Id. at 106, 892 F.2d at 122.
In Lawrence, supra, a Drug Enforcement Administration officer approached Lawrence in an Amtrak station after his return trip from a “source city.” Lawrence, supra, 435 S.E.2d at 592 . Eventually consenting to a *748 search of his person, Lawrence voluntarily began to empty his pockets. When the officer noticed that Lawrence had emptied all of his pockets except his left front pants pocket, he:
asked [Lawrence] what was in his left front pants pocket and [appellant] replied ... “Nothing.” Then [the officer] asked him if he would mind showing me what was in his pocket and [appellant] put his left hand into his front pants pocket. As he did so, he pushed the large bulge to the rear of his pocket_ He pulled out several tissues and handed them to me and said, “That’s all I have.” [The officer] then reached down and touched the bulge with the back of [his] hand and asked him again, “What is it?” He again put his hand in his left front pants pocket, pushed the bulge to the rear again and pulled out a set of keys.... [The officer] then asked him again what was in his pocket and ... [appellant] thrust his hand into his pocket.
Id. at 594 (some alterations in original). The officer then removed Lawrence’s hand from the pants and extracted a package from the pocket containing multiple packets of heroin. Id. The court, concluding that Lawrence’s conduct fell short of an “unequivocal act or statement of withdrawal,” held that consent had not been withdrawn because Lawrence’s “hesitancy” could have been reasonably construed by the officer as an “extreme[ ] reluctance]” to facilitate the search. See id. at 595 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
The import of Luther and Lawrence , and the other eases cited, is that equivocal conduct can be construed in many different ways and it, therefore, does not pass muster under an objective reasonableness test. See, e.g., Alfaro, supra, 935 F.2d at 67 ; Brown, supra note 16, 884 F.2d at 1312; Brady, supra note 16. 269 U.S.App.D.C. at 20 n. 6, 842 F.2d at 1315 n. 6; Archer, supra note 15, 840 F.2d at 573; Morocco, supra note 16, 393 S.E.2d at 550. We are persuaded by these authorities and we, accordingly, hold that an effective withdrawal of consent requires unequivocal conduct, in the form of either an act, statement, or some combination of the two, that is inconsistent with the consent to the search previously given.
Here, appellant was sitting in the window seat with the window to his left. The trial court found that appellant’s conduct in putting his hand into his left pocket as he turned toward the window was not an unequivocal withdrawal of consent. It is undisputed that after he granted Oxendine permission to search, appellant said nothing at all to either detective. 17 Appellant complied without comment with Hairston’s request to remove his hand from his pocket. Moreover, there is no evidence that appellant did anything that could objectively be interpreted as signifying withdrawal of consent, such as pushing the detective away or attempting to leave his seat.
In fact, there were a number of possible explanations for appellant’s conduct. For example, appellant’s furtive actions could reasonably have been interpreted, as Oxendine and Hairston respectively testified, as an attempt to hide the contents of his pocket or to acquire a weapon. In addition, as the government has suggested, the movement could have also indicated the reflexive response of a guilty conscience or an attempt to assist the detective’s search. Further, while the trial court noted that appellant’s movement could be considered to be an attempt to withdraw consent, it could have as readily been interpreted as an attempt to discard the drugs before they were found on appellant’s person, thus acknowledging the widespread, and not always mistaken, belief on the part of narcotics violators, that they cannot be successfully prosecuted unless the contraband is actually found on their person. 18 As *749 the Court of Appeals of Virginia observed, the mere reluctance to facilitate a search does not satisfy the objective reasonableness standard. See Lawrence, supra, 435 S.E.2d at 595 . We hold, therefore, that a reasonable police officer could conclude, in these circumstances, that Burton’s conduct did not constitute an unequivocal withdrawal of consent.
To hold otherwise would require the police in future cases to scrutinize every gesture for an indication that a suspect may possibly wish to withdraw consent when he or she has otherwise failed to clearly express that desire. We agree with Judge Walton’s observation that unless withdrawal of consent is unequivocal:
police officers who have been given express consent to search by a person would have to go through the unrealistic task of second-guessing a clear verbal expression of permission to search because of subsequent words and or actions that may, or may not[,] be intended to convey to the officers a desire to alter their impression that they could conduct the search, as clearly shaped by a definite and unambiguous voluntary statement of the defendant.
For the reasons stated, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying appellant’s motion to suppress. Accordingly, the ruling of the court is hereby,
Affirmed.
. Super.Ct.Crim.R. 11(a)(2) provides:
With the approval of the Court and the consent of the government, a defendant may enter a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, reserving in writing the right, on appeal from the judgment, to review of the adverse determination of any specified pretrial motion. A defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea.
. D.C.Code § 33-541(a)(l) (1993).
. As noted supra at p. 743, Oxendine testified that she only requested Burton’s ticket and after examining it she immediately returned it to him. On remand, after oral argument, the trial judge, making further findings at our request, credited Oxendine’s testimony on that score.
. On remand, see note 3 supra, the trial judge found that no such threat was made.
. Appellant filed a written motion to suppress statements and, apparently, a written motion to suppress physical evidence (which is not included in the record on appeal); the government filed an opposition to both motions. Thereafter, an evidentiary hearing was conducted during which the trial court heard testimony from the detectives and appellant. The issue of the seizure of the person was raised by appellant, but the trial court did not make an explicit finding on that point. The trial court ruled that appellant had voluntarily consented to the search of his luggage and his person, but directed the parties to submit additional arguments in writing on the issue of whether appellant’s conduct constituted a withdrawal of consent. In his supplemental pleading, appellant again raised the seizure of the person issue. Although the trial court did not explicitly decide that issue in its subsequent written order, the court, citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 , 111 S.Ct. 2382 , 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991), reiterated its previous ruling that appellant had voluntarily consented to the search. We think it is implicit in that finding, as well as the findings at the conclusion of the hearing, that the trial court also rejected the claim that there was an illegal seizure of the person. In this court in renewing his claim that there was an illegal seizure, appellant does not contend otherwise.
. See also Bostick, supra note 5 , 501 U.S. at 435 , 111 S.Ct. at 2388 ("no seizure occurs when police ask questions of an individual, ask to examine the individual's identification, and request consent to search his or her luggage — so long as the officers do not convey a message that compliance with their requests is required”); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 , 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1324 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1982) (plurality opinion) ("law enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely approaching an individual on the street or in another public place, by asking him if he is willing to answer some questions, [or] by putting questions to him if the person is willing to listen”) (citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 , 210 n. 12, 99 S.Ct. 2248 , 2255 n. 12, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 31, 32-33 , 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1885, 1885-86 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (Harlan, J., concurring), 34, 88 S.Ct. at 1886 (White, J., concurring) (1968)); United States v. Lewis, 287 U.S.App.D.C. 306, 311-12 , 921 F.2d 1294, 1299-1300 (1990) (no seizure occurred where the officers boarded bus, interviewed passengers, inspected tickets and identification, did not wear badges, or display weapons).
. See also United States v. Smith, 284 U.S.App. D.C. 64, 66, 901 F.2d 1116, 1118 (1990); United States v. Lloyd, 276 U.S.App.D.C. 118, 122 , 868 F.2d 447, 451 (1989).
. See also Symes v. United States, 633 A.2d 51, 53-54 (D.C.1993); In re J.M., 596 A.2d 961, 967 (D.C.1991); Kelly v. United States, 580 A.2d 1282, 1288 (D.C.1990); Davis v. United States, 532 A.2d 656, 658 (D.C.1987).
. The factors the Schneckloth Court deemed to be important in assessing the "totality of the circumstances” were "the youth of the accused; his lack of education, or his low intelligence; the lack of any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights; the length of detention; the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning; and the use of physical punishment.” Id. 412 U.S. at 226 , 93 S.Ct. at 2047 (citations omitted). According to the Pretrial Services Agency report prepared, with appellant's input, to aid the court in setting bail, at the time of the arrest appellant was twenty-three years old, had ten years of education, and had no apparent health problems.
. See also Mason v. Pulliam, 557 F.2d 426, 428 (5th Cir.1977) (holding that "[n]othing in Schneckloth suggests ... that a consent which waives Fourth Amendment rights cannot be limited, qualified or withdrawn”); 3 Wayne R. La-Fave, Search and Seizure § 8.1(c), pp. 172-73 (2d ed.1987) (recognizing that, although there is authority to the contrary, the better rule is that consent may be withdrawn or limited).
. See, e.g., United States v. Ibarra, 731 F.Supp. 1037, 1039 (D.Wyo.1990) (closing and locking trunk of vehicle after a consensual search), aff'd, 955 F.2d 1405 (10th Cir.1992); Cooper v. State, 480 So.2d 8, 11 (Ala.Crim.App.1985) (locking plane doors after a consensual search); People v. Hamilton, 168 Cal.App.3d 1058 , 214 Cal.Rptr. 596, 602 (1985) (attempting to close bedroom door was a “direct, positive” act inconsistent with consent); State v. Reagan, 209 Conn. 1 , 546 A.2d 839, 844-45 (1988) (third person's act of standing in threshold "where it would make it difficult for [officer] to get by”), appeal denied, 211 Conn. 805 , 559 A.2d 1139 (Conn.1989); and Nease v. State, 484 So.2d 67, 69 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.) (running away from narcotics agents), aff'd, 494 So.2d 1153 (Fla.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 , 107 S.Ct. 1982 , 95 L.Ed.2d 822 (1987).
One commentator has observed, however, that “[t]he gist of the cases suggest that the consenter must verbalize his or her limitation; actions sometimes are not enough. Some actions clearly would be; e.g., stopping an officer from opening a door or a car trunk.” 1 John W. Hall, Jr., Search and Seizure § 8:55, pp. 462-63 n. 46 (2d ed.1991). It is also clear from the cases cited here and infra note 13, that under the objective *747 reasonableness standard, the less equivocal a defendant's actions are, the more obvious is the intent to withdraw consent.
. See, e.g., United States v. Miner, 484 F.2d 1075, 1076 (9th Cir.1973) (“No it's personal”); United States v. Dichiarinte, 445 F.2d 126, 128-29 (7th Cir.1971) ("The search is over. I am calling off the search.”); United States v. Bily, 406 F.Supp. 726, 728-29 (E.D.Pa.1975) ("That’s enough. I want you to stop.”); Villari v. State, 372 So.2d 522, 523-24 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1979) ("Don’t you need a search warrant to look at my personal belongings?”); and French, supra, 279 N.W.2d at 119-20 ("defendant’s unequivocal ‘no’ could only be reasonably interpreted as revoking whatever consent might have previously been given, if any”).
. See, e.g., United States v. McCarthur, 6 F.3d 1270, 1274, 1277 (7th Cir.1993) (defendant zipped luggage closed and told officer she did not want him to see her personal items); United States v. Carter, 300 U.S.App.D.C. 36, 37-38 , 985 F.2d 1095, 1096-97 (1993) (defendant snatched paper bag back from officer, saying “[t]here’s food in there; I will show you”); Goldberg v. State, 407 So.2d 352, 352 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1981) (stating "[h]ey, that is my personal stuff,” as defendant "lunge[d]” toward package, constituted a withdrawal of consent); but see United States v. Joseph, 282 U.S.App.D.C. 102, 106 , 892 F.2d 118, 122 (1989) (reaching into bag and saying ”[d]o we have to do this here? ... I have underwear and things in the bag,” did not constitute effective withdrawal when defendant then accompanied officers to a more secluded area for the completion of the search).
. See, e.g., Ibana, supra note 11, 731 F.Supp. at 1039 , and Hamilton, supra note 11 , 214 Cal.Rptr. at 602 , respectively.
. See, e.g., United States v. Archer, 840 F.2d 567, 573 (8th Cir.) (defendant verbally consented to search while refusing to execute a written consent form), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 941 , 109 S.Ct. 364 , 365, 102 L.Ed.2d 354 (1988); State v. Luther, 63 Or.App. 86 , 663 P.2d 1261, 1263 (1983) (en banc) (although defendant closed door to his room, there was no "express revocation” where defendant “tried to open door himself, told a police officer that his mother had a key and made no objection to the police obtaining the key or opening the door”), aff'd, 296 Or. 1 , 672 P.2d 691 , 672 P.2d 691 (1983) (en banc); and Lawrence, supra, 435 S.E.2d at 594-95 (rearranging contents of pants pocket).
. See, e.g., Alfaro, supra, 935 F.2d at 67 (“I have to go outside and talk to Lieutenant [Steve] Morville”); United States v. Brown, 884 F.2d 1309, 1312 (9th Cir.1989) ("Any reluctance [defendant] showed in admitting he was carrying the keys to his luggage was not enough to indicate he had withdrawn his unambiguous statement of consent.”), cer t. denied, 493 U.S. 1025 , 110 S.Ct. 732 , 107 L.Ed.2d 750 (1990); United States v. Brady, 269 U.S.App.D.C. 18 , 20 n. 6, 842 F.2d 1313 , 1315 n. 6 (1988) (disclaiming ownership of luggage); and State v. Morocco, 99 N.C.App. 421 , 393 S.E.2d 545, 550 (1990) (statement to the effect that defendant’s "bag contained some nude photographs of [his] wife").
. Although appellant claimed that he did not consent to the search, there is no dispute that, after Hairston approached and began the search, appellant said nothing to either detective until well after the contraband was recovered.
. See Harris v. United States, 614 A.2d 1277, 1278 (D.C.1992) (defendant threw to the ground a bottle containing packets of PCP-laced marijuana); Edmonds v. United States, 609 A.2d 1131, 1132 (D.C.1992) (defendant threw to the ground a paper bag containing packets of crack cocaine), cert. denied, -U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2983 , 125 L.Ed.2d 679 (1993); Porter v. United States, 561 A.2d 994, 995 (D.C.1989) (defendant threw to the ground a bag containing packages of PCP-laced *749 marijuana); see also Collins v. United States, 596 A.2d 489 , 495 n. 1 (D.C.1991) ("Sometimes the stratagem works and sometimes it doesn’t.”) (Schwelb, J., dissenting).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9767107. Public record. Not legal advice.